55 Neb. 223 | Neb. | 1898
On . February 8, 1897, the State Bank of Nebraska of Seward, Nebraska, leased to Henry Robren a farm in Seward county. The lease was in writing, and provided
1. The first argument is that the petition does not state facts which show that the bank would sustain an irreparable injury if the injunction were denied. Of course a mere averment in a petition for an injunction that the plaintiff will suffer an irreparable injury unless the injunction be granted is not of itself sufficient to authorize the issuing of an injunction. To authorize a court of equity to interfere by injunction the facts averred in the petition' must show that the complainant would suffer an irreparable injury or damage. We think the petition at bar complied with this rule. It shows that unless the lessee should be enjoined by the court he will pr’event the lessor from entering upon the premises, fall plowing the stubble land and sowing it to wheat and rye, thereby depriving lessor of the right which it reserved under the lease, to enter upon said land for that purpose, and also deprive it of the opportunity at least to grow a crop of fall wheat. It may be that the injury which the bank would suffer if this injunction were denied would be small, but the facts averred in the petition show that the injury would be irreparable. We do not know how it
2. A second argument is that the bank has an adequate remedy at law by declaring the lease at an end on ac-countof the lessee’s refusal to permit the lessor to enter upon and fall plow and sow the stubble land and then bring forcible detainer for the possession of the premises. The answer to this is that the landlord cannot cancel this lease and retalie possession of the leased premises by forcible detainer because of the lessee’s refusal to permit appellee to enter upon the land and fall plow it, as the lease makes no provision for its forfeiture on that ground.
Another argument under this same head is that, since the lease reserves the right of the landlord to enter
. 4. A final argument is that if the appellee should sow the stubble land to wheat, and rye, and if the appellant should permit his cattle and other stock to run upon said ground and injure and destroy such wheat and rye, then appellant for such injury is provided with a complete and adequate remedy at law by sections 1 and 2, article 3, chapter 2, Compiled Statutes, which makes the damage done to property committed by stock running at large a lien upon the stock. -If the appellee at the time it brought this action had already fall plowed and sowed the lands to wheat and rye and sought the injunction because the appellant threatened to permit his stock to run upon and destroy the wheat crop, there might be some force in the argument; but the threat of the appellant to permit his stock to run upon and injure the crops of wheat which the appellee may sow on the land is merely an incidental feature of this case. The gist of this action is the refusal of the appellant to permit the appellee to enter upon the. lands and fall plow and sow them to wheat in accordance with the terms of the lease between the parties. Since the court had jurisdiction of the case and the right to restrain the appellant from preventing the landlord’s entry upon the premises for fall plowing and sowing wheat, we think it did not transcend
Affirmed.