*1 judgment cause to the trial court for the reinstatement of the entered against APT on December 1995.
Reversed and remanded.
DiVITO, P.J., RAKOWSKI, J., concur. COUNTRYSIDE, Trustee, al., STATE BANK OF Plaintiffs-Appellants, et CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee. v. THE CITY OF (2nd Division) First District No. 1 — 96—2185 Opinion April filed 1997.
TULLY, J., dissenting. Associates, Ltd., Charles Purcell and Daniel L. Houlihan & both of R. (Daniel Hennessy, counsel), Chicago appel- L. Houlihan and William J. of for lants. (Lawrence Sher, Counsel, Rosenthal, Corporation Chicago Susan S. of Solomon, Bamonte, Corporation
Benna Ruth and Thomas J. Assistant Counsel, counsel), appellee. for court; PRESIDING DiVITO delivered the JUSTICE Countryside Bank Construc- Plaintiffs State and Blackwater (Blackwater) Company legal tion were the title holder and sole bene- ficiary, Chicago. a respectively, piece Plaintiffs filed petition Chicago city change a with the to obtain a council Ml-1, zoning from restricted property’s classification district, R-4, manufacturing general After the residence district. city petition, plaintiffs complaint council denied the filed a for (the declaratory judgment against Chicago City). They zoning containing asked the to declare that the ordinance court applied subject prop- classifications was unconstitutional as it to the trial, erty. judgment a in favor of the After the circuit court entered City. (1) following whether the parties appeal;
The raise the issues on zoning valid City’s circuit court’s conclusion that the ordinance was (2) whether, against weight and the manifest of the evidence valid, rela- bear a real and substantial be ordinance must morals, comfort, safety, general and welfare public tion to the legitimate governmental inter- relationship or whether rational est is sufficient. complaint declaratory judgment,
In their first-amended alleged that the Ml-1 classification of their did not health, comfort, morals, any public bear substantial relation to the safety, arbitrary capri- or welfare. The classification was cious, deprived plaintiffs property’s highest use, title, plaintiffs’ and best it was a cloud on and it violated the mu- nicipal zoning enabling Consequently, plaintiffs statutes. asked the applied court to declare the ordinance invalid as it to their grant right develop they and to them the property had proposed. complaint, parties
Before the trial on the first-amended stipulated They stipu- submitted a set of facts to the circuit court. rectangular asphalt parking lated that the was a lot acres, by enclosed a chain link fence. The size of the lot was 2.6 north, public alley it was bordered West 64th Place to the to the east, south, West 65th Street to the and Natchez Avenue to the west. $650,000 April purchased 1994. parties stipulated plaintiffs petitioned further classification, existing zoning for a reclassification because the Ml-1, proposed. They permit development plaintiffs did not wanted an R-4 classification in order to build containing parking spaces. 84 condominiums with 151 off-street Each 1,200 square unit in the would have feet *3 bedrooms, $126,000. average price There two and the sale would be each, containing three-story buildings, be six 12 units and two would three-story buildings, containing six units each. There would be 67 remaining in 14 open parking spaces, spaces and the would be six-car garages. stipulations, proposed development the was con- to the regulations under the R-4 clas-
sistent with the use and bulk consistent with other sification. The was housing immediate multifamily developments the manufacturing with other classification was consistent subject property North and east of the the immediate area. three-story buildings property on with the R-4 clas- apartment were manufacturing build- were sification. South of Village Park. This was ings property in the of Bedford on H-l, heavy as industrial district. West zoned Follow- City property with the Ml-1 classification. buildings were on peti- unanimously plaintiffs’ denied ing hearing, city council tion. qualified Barrett was stipulated that John parties
The further contractor, developer opinion as a land expert render an a real expert opinion an as to render qualified Terrance O’Brien was render an qualified Anthony McNamara appraiser, estate E. engineer, Stephen registered professional opinion as a expert registered expert opinion as to render qualified Roman was planner. land architect and certified He testified trial, plaintiffs. Barrett testified on behalf
At John that Blackwater Blackwater representative that he was a an industrial April 1994 from purchased lot for the parking company. had been used it, a number of been vacant for complex south of but had bought prop- overgrown with weeds. Blackwater years and was building condominiums on it. erty with the intention of Barrett subject property, purchased At the time Blackwater would not zoned Ml-1 and that this classification knew that it was contingency development. There was no permit purchase in the contract developed
Barrett further testified that he had 500 condominiums trial, years he during developer. his career as a Thirteen before the subject property. he built 18 units to the east of the Mobile, he developed 12 at 63rd and but condominium units time. developed no the area since that selling the condo- experience, anticipated Based on his Barrett nearby He expected miniums to residents of the immediate and areas. and individuals who worked buyers would be older residents were City. He had received no calls from individuals who proposed develop- purchasing interested in a condominium in the ment. plaintiffs. behalf of He
Anthony McNamara also testified on consulting engineer he was a civil and had been retained stated that suitability analyze Blackwater property, proposed development. He determined that includ- connections, for the ing sewer and water was sufficient available it would also be suitable for proposed development. He admitted that manufacturing business. Roman, Next, registered architect and Stephen called Chicago’s worked in the planner, previously urban who had During testimony, he identi- Planning years. Department for 32 map an aerial base plaintiffs’ referred to exhibit fied and the zon- The exhibit showed surrounding subject property. area *4 dates on which map on the and the ing classifications of the changed. properties had classifications on different 1957, that, enacted explained in when Roman Street, of Oak ordinance, Place and 65th east strip between 64th 908 Avenue,
Park and west of Austin was zoned After Boulevard Ml-1. 1957, parcels strip the classification of several of the in this changed Ml-1 properties from to R-4. The classifications of six be- Narragansett changed tween Austin and apartment to accommodate 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1974, buildings. changes These in occurred Narragansett, and pieces 1976. West of the classifications of three R-4; 1978, property changed change from Ml-1 to one occurred one 1982, Place, one in and 1995. On the north side of 64th the clas- R-2, changed single-family sification of four from district, 1960, changes 1969, to R-4. These occurred in and changes, dwelling 1972. Pursuant to these 732 units had been built. changes
Despite only the fact that one of these had oc- majority curred since occurred in the sixties and seven- ties, multiple-family Roman believed there was a trend toward trend, ascertaining In an developments. he did not make Park extensive examination of the area west of Oak Avenue between Streets, only 63rd and 65th but he admitted that there was one block designation. in this area with an R-4 East of Austin Boulevard be- Avenue, tween 63rd 65th Streets and west of Central there was only designation. also one with an R-4 Roman, was consistent existing buildings development with the and the trend of in the although development "green space” more included addition, parking. development would as a "buffer” be- serve heavy single-family tween the homes to the north of it and the industry to the south. Ml-1, if the to be zoned opined
Roman continued building had been would remain vacant because one industrial between Oak Park Avenue and Austin strip built past years. explained He that there was no mar- Boulevard development because the area was sur- ket area for industrial Also, was not suit- rounded residential areas. development industry able for because new industrial standards trucks, expan- called for minimum of five acres to accommodate sion, employee parking. hand, strong Roman that there was a market
On the other found opinion was his visits in the area. The basis for his condominiums subject prop- These were north of the to two condominiums for sale. at the time he visited erty and had been on the market for two weeks open house at condominium spoke them. He also to a realtor at He did not visit a new 18- subject property. east of the somewhere Normandy. It was also his unit at 64th and *5 good it had access to neighborhood was desirable because good good schools. transportation, parks, and that, light cross-examination, in addition to Roman admitted On uses, restau- industry, Ml-1 allows other such as classification centers, offices, offices, rants, medical and dental professional business centers. O’Brien, also testi- professional appraiser, real estate
Terrance he was familiar with the plaintiffs. fied on behalf of He stated that because properties value of in the area around homes, concerning he records the sales of public had reviewed condominiums, in properties and industrial that area. that, existing opinion testified that it was his its
O’Brien classification, subject property would be the value of the foot, $250,000. He arrived at square approximately or $2 by considering permitted number the uses under the clas- in the area. properties sification and sales of similar unable, however, any with an Ml-1 properties He was to find depicted plaintiffs in the area on exhibit 1. He classification for sale Park, however, properties examined two in with Ml-1 zon- Bedford ing. Both were smaller than the One was mile August per from the in and sold for $1.88 foot, $149,864.20. square away or The other was half mile and sold foot, $114,928. in square December 1994 for or $1.36 opinion It was O’Brien’s if the classification were R-4, changed per to the value of the would be $6 foot, $750,000. square approximately opinion or He based this on the classification, permitted proposed develop- uses an R-4 under ment, area, development, other land the character of the the trend of area, utilities, in and sales of com- availability parable single-family with R-4 classifications. Ten homes properties $103,000 in area exhibit 1 to depicted sold $163,000. condominiums in the area sold for He testified other foot, number of con- per square but he could not recall the $70 $80 reaching opinion. dominium in He prices sale he had examined analyze development in a new at 64th did not sales of condominiums analysis oc- Normandy majority Place and because the of his curred before that rezoned in March 1995. property type hous-
O’Brien also examined the market demand for the ing He that there were not proposed development. determined by driving around the a lot of available in the area condominiums Also, many signs. he noticing area and there were not for-sale He appreciation in the of condominiums. had noticed value neighborhood could be acknowledged that the low turnover neighborhood. due to the fact that it is a mature He stated that he developments had considered new condominium but he many developments did not know how of the units in these were oc- cupied or vacant. Roman,
Like O’Brien there was a trend toward testified multifamily developments in the area. This was based on the rezonings fact that all in the area 1959 had been from R-2 or since Also, opined proposed development Ml-1 to R-4. O’Brien adversely community would not affect the health or welfare of the or the value of other in the area there would be because addition, multifamily developments other around it. In the sales similar, price proposed development of the units would be on a basis, per-square-foot other homes in the area.
O’Brien, put would highest its and best use because it would maximize the keeping with the trend of value and would be *6 character of the area. presentation the of their case with O’Brien’s concluded
testimony, then called Alderman Michael R. Zalewski to testify was alderman for the on its behalf. He testified he the ward, the located. 23rd which was familiar with area Alderman Zalewski testified that he was the surrounding the because he had lived there since he area as an aider- years represented was four old and because he the Zalewski, According multifamily development the size of man. to keeping would not be in with the character comprised mostly single-family which homes. The was multifamily proposed development was also different from other addition, developers developments in the area because of its size. Harlem, well at 63rd and Melvina and 63rd and as of condominiums the number of community groups, expressed had concerns about developments. units in those vacant testified that he was a member
Alderman Zalewski further goals of this com- City’s development economic committee. One of increase the tax base was attract businesses into the to mittee of the areas employment opportunities for residents and to increase it was in which the businesses were located. He testified maintain land zoned as Ml-1 to attract businesses important the area. had been vacant for
Zalewski admitted that attracting many years, and he had been unsuccessful along 65th Street properties West users for Ml-l-classified currently used were subject property. These area near restaurant, business, parking for a lots for the industrial area however, Recently, across the street. businesses had relocated into Ward, portions company other of the 23rd and one that had relocated Hamlin pledged community groups to 51st and to work with community. to hire within the trial,
After the the circuit ruling court issued oral in favor of City. although The court stated plaintiffs presented the un- opinions rebutted of three experts, experts’ testimony did not rise to the convincing level of clear and evidence that arbitrary ordinance was and unreasonable and had no re- substantial public’s safety, lation to the and welfare.
The court stated that the experts adequately explain did not opinions bases for their and that opinions largely unsup- their were ported by specific facts. The court noted that O’Brien did not have a written report, did not support opinions, have his notes to was unable to answer questions. some of the court’s O’Brien also long failed to demonstrate how had been on the market before plaintiffs purchased Although it. the court found Ro- man knowledgeable witness, to be a also found that his did not demonstrate that the Ml-1 classification was unrea- sonable. court, to the inadequate there was an basis for the
experts’ opinions that there community was need for the proposed development. Also, plaintiffs’ experts explain failed to why the court there was no need in area for the numerous other permitted by the Ml-1 classification. The court found that had proved proposed compatible with other uses in the area but found that the Ml-1 classification compatible was also with other manufac- turing uses in acknowledged the area. The court development would make the land more valuable than it was as a *7 lot, parking but the court was not convinced that the land should not part remain a of the Ml-1 buffer zone between heavy residences and manufacturing, as it originally intended. It also stated that was not convinced that the by area would not be better served some of the permitted other uses by the Ml-1 restriction. The court concluded that purchased subject property with no zoning contingency, "highest and property and best use of means more than largest money amount of to the owner.”
Zoning is primarily
legislative
(Cosmopolitan
function
Cook,
302, 313,
National Bank v. County
103 Ill. 2d
undue invasion of
constitutional
without
reasonable
justification
respect
public
to the
welfare. Kleidon v.
of
(1983).
Hills,
1043, 1046,
App.
120 Ill.
3d
913 plaintiffs, tian was their first exhibit and invalid. multifamily development. Roman’s showed a trend toward City argues the area failed to show had multi-family residential, predominantly become "so that Ml-1 clearly of the unreasonable.” analysis, Under the La Sinclair no one factor is control Salle! ling, but paramount importance existing of are the uses and Sumichrast, nearby property. of Hamann v. (1991). respect N.E.2d 847 With first Roman and
O’Brien multifamily testified there was a trend toward develop ment in the area. Plaintiffs presented also evidence in the cor Place, ridor between 65th Street and 64th Oak Park Avenue and Boulevard, Austin pieces property classifications of nine of changed from Ml-1 to R-4. out, City points however, As the majority rezonings of these occurred the sixties and only rezoning seventies. There was one from eighties only Also, Ml-1 to R-4 in the one in the nineties. contends, three of the nine properties R-4 in this cor- ridor extend from 64th Place subject to 65th Street like the property, and these three properties were ago, rezoned over two decades be- tween 1969 and 1974. The recent decline in the number rezonings timing rezonings of the property subject similar to the property plaintiffs’ contradict claim that there is a current trend to- ward multifamily development properties like the prop- erty. assert, however, multifamily developments
north of 64th Place also demonstrate the multifamily trend toward development in the properties area. But originally these were zoned R-2 for single-family use. rezoning may While their demonstrate a trend replacing toward single-family homes, homes with multifamily do not show that there is a converting trend toward industrial property multifamily developments, such that it un- reasonable for the property to retain its Ml-1 restriction. Plaintiffs further any contend that Ml-1 buffer zone between res- idential property north of 64th Place industrial property south of 65th replaced Street has been multifamily developments, consequently it was unreasonable for the court to conclude that the part should remain of an Ml-1 buffer zone. The evi- dence does a portion show that of the Ml-1 buffer zone between 64th Place and 65th Street replaced by multifamily housing. has been For pieces six of these nine property of R-4-classified strip, however, part original Ml-1 buffer separates zone from 65th Street. pieces Another two of these are L-shaped, portion original such that a Ml-1 buffer zone separates portion from 65th Street. The circuit court’s conclusion that one of the uses of area was as an Ml-1 buffer zone between 65th Street and 64th Place supported by the is therefore record. only did the evidence fail to show the existence of a
Not trend, also, facts, multifamily development stipulated but plaintiffs agreed that the Ml-1 classification was consistent *9 manufacturing with other uses in the immediate area. To success ordinance, enough not fully validity attack the of a it is reasonably differently. Little- property show that the could be zoned 713, 724, john City Chicago, v. North 631 N.E.2d (1994).Here, subject although plaintiffs may have shown that the R-4, enough not property may reasonably have been zoned this was arbitrary property’s existing that the classification was prove Instead, their concession that the Ml-1 restriction was unreasonable. the supports with other uses in the area a conclusion that consistent existing zoning was valid. argue existing zoning plaintiffs
Under the second property the was unreasonable because it diminished classification subject They rely on O’Brien’s that property. value of the $250,000 existing classifica- property of the with the the value $750,000 changed R-4. if the classification were tion but would be because, valuation was flawed City counters that O’Brien’s restriction, Ml-1 O’Brien considered valuing property in with the and did not consider the other only property industrial uses for Second, City argues that Ml-1 restriction. possible uses under the is not determinative because restric- a diminution value Third, property. it always almost result a decreased value for tions contends, with full given acquired that restriction, rely of value knowledge they cannot on the loss of the Finally, zoning change. in order to obtain a from this restriction the land plaintiffs purchased the fact that asserts the true $650,000 arm’s-length suggests that this is in an transaction existing Ml-1 restriction. of the land under value subject he based his valuation O’Brien stated that permitted uses under on an evaluation of with the Ml-1 restriction in the area. comparable property restriction and on the sales however, might affect how different explain, He did not valuation. Both
Also, "comparable” property. pieces he named two vacant, be other similarities and were but had the restriction were not evident. properties tween these Park, in Bedford one was were located "comparable” properties Both away. was half a mile away subject property, a mile and one from trial, sold almost years and the other One sold almost three before addition, smaller significantly the trial. In both were years before l½ that he had examined com subject property. than the O’Brien stated area, Chicago give he did not parable properties in the but any properties, and testified that these information about he vicinity other were not in the immediate Also, considering opinion O’Brien’s $250,000 restriction, agree was worth with the Ml-1 we with the $650,000 significant it is plaintiffs paid with its classification. provided support
O’Brien also
few facts to
classification,
R-4
the value
would be
$750,000. Although
he
that he had
at
stated
arrived
this value
analyzing
sales of condominium
he could not
examined,
prices
remember the number of condominium sale
he had
majority
analysis
and he had conducted the
of his
before March
years
over two
before the trial.
valuation,
however,
accepting
Even
O’Brien’s
is well
established that the fact property would be worth more if reclassified
is not
deciding
change
determinative
whether
*10
because,
cases,
in
rezoning
subject
almost all
property
the
would be
worth
if
more
reclassified.
Village
Glenview State Bank v.
Deer-
of
(1991).
field,
747, 761,
Moreover,
App.
213 Ill.
3d
The the restriction did benefit the public. provided It heavy buffer zone between residential and areas industry preserved land with which the could attract busi- nesses.
Although change zoning O’Brien that a in the testified the of subject property and the would have no impact community, adverse on the Alderman Zalewski contradicted opinion. The alderman testified that the Ml-1 in property the area important purpose buffering the of property served residential from industrial He also believed that important it was property retain with an Ml-1 classification in order to attract busi- and, therefore, revenue, jobs, nesses tax community support. addition, he that a multifamily development testified the size of the plaintiffs proposed one keeping was not in with the character of the neighborhood. testimony supported
Zalewski’s
the circuit court’s conclusion that
the Ml-1
Although
testimony
classification was valid.
O’Brien’s
Zalewski’s,
conflicted with
testimony
where there is a conflict
in
ordinance,
concerning
zoning
the reasonableness of the
the conflict
credibility
relates to the
weight
of the witnesses and the
their
testimony,
superior position
circuit court is in a
to resolve
these matters. See Firstbank Co. v. City
Springfield,
App.
253 Ill.
(1993).
844, 849,
3d
There is no
suitability
fifth
property
for its
use. Under the sixth
to suc
cessfully challenge
plaintiff
ordinance a
must show that the
is unsalable or vacant "because
clas
(emphasis
original).
Chicago,
sification”
St. Lucas Ass’n v.
(1991).
817, 831-32,
argue
what along long market before been use with how it was on bought kinds Ml-1 plaintiff [and] what other selling.” finding. supports the area are not The record *11 had been Barrett and Zalewski testified years, but there was no evidence that this was vacant for several Ml-1 restriction. Barrett testified before because of the subject property, company he an industrial across purchased the however, clear, It is not parking had used the as a lot. street subject as a company that ceased to use the why or when when it decided to sell the parking lot and the court with a suf- testimony provide Roman’s also did not concluding that was vacant ficient basis for justifiably The court not salable because of the Ml-1 restriction. "convincing provided presentation had not concluded that Roman Although is unreasonable.” Ro- that the current classification man that was not salable because it was testified uses, permitted the Ml-1 restriction other unsuitable uses. There was no evidence that was unsuitable concerning for these other uses. There was also no marketability of other in the area with the Ml-1 classifica- tion.
Turning parties agree to the seventh that part comprehensive classification of the is zon- ing factor, however, plan. eighth they disagree Under proposed development. whether there was a need inadequate The court stated that there was an basis for the plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions that proposed there was need for the experts why and that to explain failed there was no permits. need for numerous uses the Ml-1 classification object they to the court’s statement that should of- have testimony concerning fered permitted other uses under the Ml-1 re- striction. multiple The court stated: "There are other uses that experts community did not tell me than would serve less what proposed.” According plaintiffs, require unfair them to prove negative, should have had the burden of show- ing the need for proof other uses. Plaintiffs had the burden of unreasonable, showing however, the Ml-1 classification was experts the failure of their to discuss uses other than industrial subject property prevented meeting for the them from this burden. supports finding plaintiffs’ experts The record also the court’s did not provide opinions sufficient bases for their there was a expected need for the that he proposed development. Barrett testified to sell the condominiums in the to residents of nearby opinion experience area. His as a was based on his developer, but he testified that he had built no condominiums area since 1984. He also that he admitted had received no calls from purchasing individuals who were interested in units in the development. strong
Roman testified there was market for condominiums in the area subject property, around the but his was based *12 sale, only on visits to three condominiums for two across the street from the development and one somewhere east of the development. opinion O’Brien’s there was demand for similarly condominiums the area was unsupported. The basis for opinion was that there had been appreciation in the value of condominiums in the area and that he had not seen many for-sale signs as he drove Although around the area. he testified that he had considered new condominium developments assessing the demand type housing, for this many he did not know how the units developments these were vacant. addition, experts’ opinions
In by were contradicted Aider- testimony community man Zalewski’s groups and new condo- developers minium expressed in the area had concerns about condo- minium vacancies. finding
Plaintiffs ascribe error to the
experts’
court’s
that their
unpersuasive
respect
was
with
to this
as well as the
however,
An expert’s opinion,
other factors.
is
as valid as the
opinion (Gyllin
Enterprises,
bases and reasons for that
v. College Craft
Ltd.,
707, 715,
(1994)),
App.
260 Ill.
3d
After all the relevant we conclude that plaintiffs failed to show that the Ml-1 restriction was invalid respect Although with property. was suit proposed development, able for value existing zoning would be less under the than under an R-4 classifica tion, plaintiffs they were aware of the restriction when addition, purchased In the evidence showed existing zoning manufacturing was consistent other zone, of an Ml-1 part was buffer and that availability community. of commercial benefits the Furthermore, subject prop there was insufficient evidence that the erty existing zoning had remained vacant because of the classifica proposed development. tion or that there a need for the record, therefore, supports the circuit court’s conclusion that convincing failed to show clear and evidence that the unreasonable, arbitrary, Ml-1 restriction is and bears no substantial most, very public safety, relation or welfare. At the was debat subject property’s reasonableness of the classification trial, presented opinions at the and where able under the evidence restriction, differ a court must as to the reasonableness of a (Michalek Midlothian, legislative judgment Village v. defer to the (1983)). reasons, 1021, 1034, N.E.2d 655 For these 452 weight of the ruling against the manifest the circuit court’s was not evidence, it. affirm we arguing valid it bears that the ordinance is because addition welfare, health, safety, relation to substantial if it would also be valid asks us to declare that ordinance governmental relationship legitimate to a
merely bore a rational
the ordinance in
case
valid
interest. Given our decision that
standard,
not
we need
under the "real and substantial
relation”
stringent
a less
standard.
decide whether it would also be valid under
rational
Although
no
on the
of a
express
appropriateness
we
cases,
we note that exist
relationship
ordinance
standard
precedent supports
ing
Supreme
Appellate
Illinois
Court and
Court
relation”
in this
application of the "real and substantial
test
our
See,
Savings
Duggan,
Ill. 2d
e.g.,
case.
Harris Trust &
Bank v.
(1983);
Cook,
v. County
RAKOWSKI, J., concurs. TULLY, dissenting:
JUSTICE quarrel I must the respectfully dissent. While I have no law, majority’s of conclu- applicable accept recitation the I cannot its weight findings against sion that the trial court’s are not the manifest of the evidence. noted, validity
As the of a ordinance majority correctly eight by Supreme to is review under the factors outlined Cook, County Court of in La National Bank v. Illinois Salle of Park, (1957), 19 Village 2d 40 and Sinclair Line Co. v. Pipe ofRichton (1960). However, Ill. 2d 370 3d at after review See Ill. 915. ing City, I believe put by plaintiffs the evidence forth and the the trial have reached an incorrect result. majority court factor, regard
With to first La Sinclair Salle/ adjoin nearby uses and witnesses are the property, of best Aurora, 41 Ill. ing properties. See National Bank v. Aurora (1976). there a clear App. 244-45 In the instant case has been area multifamily development parcel trend of the toward permitted has nine develop. Since wish R-4. parcels majority be rezoned to The sig- diminishes the by nificance pointing trend that a number out of these rezon- ings were done the 1960s and 1970s couple and that oc- However, curred in anyone the 1980s and 1990s. familiar with real development estate neighbor- knows that it can take decades for a Moreover, develop. development hood’s character real estate is cycles particularly vulnerable business interest The rates. fact is out few years Clearly, the trend drawn over a is irrelevant. thus, and, weighs the trend is there plaintiffs. this factor in favor of factor, evidence about the second reduction of values, weighs in plaintiffs. appraiser, also favor of The real estate O’Brien, Jerry without testified contradiction that the value of the $250,000, trial property at time of was about while it would be Moreover, $750,000 if worth R-4. presented zoned there was evidence light there no industrial market for the lot in of its relatively the ongoing small size and of residential neighborhood. respect factors,
With the promotion to the third and fourth welfare, safety nothing or I believe there is Rather, significantly City’s position. the record that I bolsters opposite Surely, believe the is true here. people interests of the city large ward the 23rd and of the at are better served the cre- ownership ation of more homes and the within expansion home city. absolutely neighborhood I cannot believe is better off being a parking capacity with this land used as lot or in its current a dump. suitability As for the fifth for its use, undisputed perfectly it is suited for Thus, multifamily the construction of this fac- residential residences. weighs plaintiffs. tor also favor length
The sixth factor relates to the of time that the *14 has been it is true that the record does not reveal vacant. While vacant, long it exactly how has been is clear that it has long court lack expressed been time. trial concern about the question long this not point, key evidence on but how lot vacant, again has been but it ever be its for- whether will viable for nearly in mer use. In view of the nonexistent industrial unfortunately that an industrial renaissance it seems clear 23rd ward is not on immediate horizon. factor, community’s planning land Under the seventh care development, question it is without has exercised use comprehensive and administration of its great care creation However, ago years was enacted 40 ordinance. ordinance expan- post-war economic and industrial during unprecedented change our great economic has transformed time sion. Since economy a more mixed primarily economy from substantial which has much more economy in the service sector would seem light changes, role. common sense profound In allowing policy more City’s recent suggest a continuation multifamily development. residential community’s need
Finally, eighth factor is the provided this I believe Respecting use. development. this type than sufficient of need for more evidence ground. imagine Chicago dumping I another cannot needs note, closing, perplexing on a more I find at up opening Europe, time markets and economies are in Eastern when America, throughout encouragement world at Latin Asia and straightjacket government, of the United States we continue to regulation entrepreneurial spirit here at home.
Thus, refusing I believe that the trial court erred to rezone the would, therefore, I R-4. reverse the circuit court’s judgment and proceedings remand further consistent view. AMATO, GREENQUIST Plaintiff-Appellant,
DUANE F. v. VERNON C. et
al., Defendants-Appellees. (3rd Division) 1—94—2763, First District Nos. — 0350 cons. 1—95
Opinion April filed 1997.