65 Ala. 142 | Ala. | 1880
— The present case comes before us in. a form different from that presented hi Perry County v. S., M. & M. Railroad Co., 58 Ala. 546. An application was made to the court below, for a mandamus to the auditor, directing and commanding him to complete and apportion the assessment of the Memphis and Charleston Bailroad Company for the years 1870 to 1874, inclusive, and to notify the assessor of Jackson county “ of the number of miles of track, and value thereof, and the proportionate value of personal property taxable” in said county. The City Court of Montgomery granted the prayer of the petition, and awarded the writ of mandamus. From that judgment the present appeal is prosecuted. The question is thus raised, has the petitioner shown enough to authorize the relief prayed, either in whole or in part ?
It is contended before us, that in the assessment of the railroad valuations, and in the levy of the county taxes, many irregularities intervened, which render the proceedings void. The question has been much discussed, what regulations for the levy and assessment of taxes are mandatory, and what are simply directory. All directions given in the statutes, concerning the levy and assessment of taxes, ought to be substantially followed by courts and officers charged with the duties. They would not be enacted, if this were not the intention of the law-making power. “ But the negligence of officers,' their mistakes of fact or of law, and many other causes, will often prevent a strict observance ; and when the provisions which have been disregarded constitute
In Burroughs on Taxation, 219, is the following summary : “Where the statute directs that the roll shall have a column for ‘ true value,’ and one for ‘ reduced value,’ but the roll contains only one column marked ! value,’ or where there is no column for income, the assessment is valid. So, an irregularity in issuing the notice of the meeting of county clerks, who act as board of assessors, or the failure of tax officers to list all the property in their districts liable to taxa-^ tion, or other irregularities and informalities which make the roll not in strict conformity to the requirements of the statute, are regarded as directory. Where a board of supervisors were required, at their June meeting, to add to the assessment any taxable property omitted by the assessor, it is said that such a requirement as to time is directory, and a correction at a later meeting, by which property is made to bear its due proportion of the public burden, is valid. But, if there had been any thing in the act to show that the legist lature intended the time fixed as a limitation, it would have been invalid.”
In Torrey v. Milbury, 21 Pick. 61, the court said ; “In considering the various statutes regulating the assessment of taxes, and the measures preliminary thereto, it is not always easy to distinguish which are conditions precedent to the
By a statute of the State of Michigan, property was required to be assessed for taxation at what the assessors believed to be the true cash value thereof, and the assessors were required to authenticate the assessment-roll with a certificate to that effect. In Clarke v. Crane, 5 Mich. 151, the certificate was: “ We have estimated it” [the land in suit] “ at a sum which, for the purposes of assessing, we believe to be the true value thereof.” The word cash was left out. It was ruled that this vitiated the assessment, and the sale made for its payment. The court said: “ The object of the certificate appears to be two.-fold — to authenticate the assessment-roll, and to secure equality in taxation ; and with a view to this object, the assessors are required, to state in their certificate, that they have assessed the property mentioned in the assessment-roll at what they believe to be the true cash value thereof. If this be the object, — and we can see no other, — the tax-payer alone is interested in this part of the law. It is for his protection. . . He pays more or less tax than he should pay, when his property is assessed at a sum above or below its cash value.” A former statute of Michigan had required the assessors, after they had completed the assessment, to sign it, and also to attach to it a certificate signed by them, &o. In Sibley v. Smith, 2 Mich. 486, the assessment was not signed by the assessors, but there was a certificate signed by them. The court held that the certificate could not supply the omission of the assessors to sign the roll itself, and that for want of such signature the
The following authorities are not in harmony with this view: Van Rensselaer v. Whitbeck, 7 Barb. 133; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wisc. 470 ; City of Davenport v. Railroad, 38 Ill. 633; Buck v. People, ex rel., 78 Ill. 560. In Van Rensselaer v. Whitbeck, the court said : “ If the assessors have performed their duty in making the assessment-roll, as they may be presumed to have done, the certificate amounts to nothing more than a solemn declaration on their part, that they have performed such duty. It forms no part of their adjudication, upon which the action of the board of supervisors is to be taken. It is but the evidence of what the assessors have done, and therefore, it seems to me, would not, even in a direct proceeding bringing in question the validity of the assessment, be subject of review. At any rate, the entire want of such certificate, much less the omission of the assessor to adopt the form prescribed in the statute, could not invalidate a tax charged by the board of supervisors upon the persons and property specified in the assessment roll, if the assessment itself were in all respects conformable to law. The board of supervisors is required to examine the assessment-rolls returned to them, for the single purpose of ascertaining whether the valuations of real estate, in one town or ward, have a just' relation to those in the other towns or wards in the county ; and if tfiey do not, the board is authorized to change such valuation, so as to produce such relation.”
In Mills v. Gleason, supra, it was said: <c It is also objected, that the assessors did not meet for the purpose of hearing objections, as required by _ the charter. . . We shall attempt to determine what would be the effect of an entire omission of this meeting by the assessors. It is undoubtedly a matter of much difficulty, both upon principle and upon authority, to determine with what degree of strictness the directions of the statute in regard to taxation must be followed, in order to prevent the entire tax from being illegal. On the one hand is the evil of illegal and oppressive taxation upon the citizen; and on the other, the danger of defeating entirely the collection of the public revenue, by the neglect or omissions of the officers to whom it is intrusted. Perhaps, the only method of solving the difficulty would be, to hold that no objection which did not go to the very ground-work of the tax, so as to affect materially its principle, and show it must necessarily be illegal, ought to have the effect of rendering the whole invalid. . . But,
In Hilliard on Taxation (ch. 1, § 78), it is said: “ Upon the question, whether the taxing power, and the forms and proceedings by which it is exercised, are, in doubtful cases, to be construed in favor of the government or the citizen, it is held that a tax is to be presumed to have been properly levied, and that taxation for public purposes is to be construed liberally. , . The operations of government can not be carried on without the expenditure of money, and that expenditure must be supplied by taxes, collected from its citizens. The power to tax is, therefore, inherent in government. From the very nature of the case, such a power is supreme.”
In Buck v. People, ex rel., 78 Ill. 560, it is held: “ It will be presumed that taxes are properly and legally assessed, and are legally and justly due, in the absence of proof to the contrary.” In that case it was said : “ All of the objections in this case are merely technical, and devoid of merit. There is no pretense that the property of objectors is not liable to be rated, nor that they are unfairly or unjustly assessed; nor do they claim that a greater rate is imposed upon them, than on other citizens of the district; nor that the amount levied is not indispensable to the county and township governments, the keeping of roads and bridges in repair, and for the maintenance of schools, and the preservation of order in the villages of the county.”
We have quoted thus elaborately from text-writers and adjudged cases, to show the general drift of judicial determination on the question in hand. We concur in opinion with the Supreme Court of the United States, that those legislative directions which have for their object the protection of the tax-payer against spoliation, or excessive assessment, must be treated as mandatory. But, if there be enough to show that the assessment is so made_ and evidenced as to be understood, then regulations designed for the information of the' assessor, or other officer, intended to promote dispatch, method, system and uniformity in modes of proceeding, are merely directory. So, clerical and ministerial duties, the observance or non-observance of which do not affect the tax-payer injuriously, must be classed as directory. In cases of taxes imposed by municipal corporations, the intendments are less liberal. — Lott v. Ross, 38 Ala. 156.
Sections 24 to 26, inclusive, of the act approved December
The act approved February 9th, 1870 (Pamph. Acts, 87), we have heretofore declared to be unconstitutional. — Perry Co. v. R. R. Co., 58 Ala. 546. We might have given another reason for our opinion, equally as satisfactory. It is not within the constitutional power of the legislature to relieve private corporations from the payment of a tax, the burden of which rests on private individuals. — Const. of 1868, Art. 13, sec. 4; Const, of 1875, Art. 11, sec. 6; Mayor &c. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 53 Ala. 570. In that case we said :
We do not hesitate to declare, that many of the provisions of the revenue law copied above were intended merely as guides to the officers charged with the duty of assessment,— intended to secure system, uniformity and dispatch in the discharge of this trust. The tax-payer can not be injuriously affected by compliance or non-compliance with these directions. Hence, they are classed as directory, in contradistinction to other clauses styled mandatory, or conditions precedent, as Oh. J. Shaw phrases it; mandatory, because they are designed to protect the tax-payer against unjust assessment and spoliation. Each class, it is the duty of the assess- or to observe and obey; but a failure to conform to those, falling within the first class, does not invalidate the assessment, while a non-observance of the mandatory duties renders it wholly void. It is our duty, as we have shown above, to indulge every reasonable intendment in favor of regularity, in assessment for State taxation, rather than paralyze this motive power of the State’s machinery. — Hilliard on Taxation, 36, § 78; Cooley on Taxation, 329.
Among the many directions in sections 24-5-6 of the revenue law of 1868, given for the guidance of railroad officials, the auditor, and State board of equalization, we are satisfied that none of them are made conditions precedent, unless they are the following. In section 26 it is said, the auditor shall not apportion the values among the several counties, until the equalization shall have been made. This is mandatory, and, if disobeyed, will avoid the tax. The same section declares who shall constitute the State board of equalization, and directs that they shall “ meet at the office of the auditor of State in Montgomery, on the 3d Wednesday of May annually.” Has the tax-paying railroad an interest in having this meeting take place on the very day named in the statute ? and will such corporation be liable to be injuriously affected, if the meeting take place on a different day ? This
The State board of equalization “ shall keep a record of their proceedings, which shall be signed by all the members present, and deposited with, and kept by the auditor of State.” There can be no doubt that the injunction to keep a record of their proceedings is mandatory. Official action, such as this, should never be confided to so treacherous a custodian as human memory. It must be recorded. A record is a writing or memorandum made to preserve knowledge and remembrance of a transaction. It may be enrolled on parchment or paper, or written in a book. The proceedings of the courts of England were preserved in parchment rolls. Our acts of legislation are not recorded in books, but are enrolled on paper, and in this form preserved in the
“ Shall be signed by all the members present.” This was evidently intended as a means of authentication, and a guaranty that the record contained the true finding and determination of the board. It is the evidence which the statute requires, for the protection and safety of the tax-payer. We hold that this is mandatory, and a condition precedent to the right of the auditor to apportion the values between the several counties, which the statute declares shall not be done until the equalization shall have been made.— Clark v. Crane, 5 Mich. 151; Sibley v. Smith, 2 Ib. 486.
Some of the records of equalization were imperfect when made and filed, in the omission of the signatures of the officers of the board of equalization. This is fatal to all the assessments found in. that condition. The records of the equalizations, which were not recorded in a book, after being deposited with the auditor,'are not now in that office. The testimony shows they were used as copy in printing the annual reports of the auditor, and were then permitted to perish. We need scarcely say this was unauthorized. They were records, and should have been preserved. But, if sufficient when made and filed, their destruction has not destroyed their efficacy, if the contents can now be established by proof. Parol testimony, if clear and satisfactory, is competent and sufficient to establish their existence, loss, and contents. — 1 Greenl. Ev. § 509; Smith v. Wert, 63 Ala.
Recurring to the statute, and to the duty of the president and secretary of railroads thereunder, we find it is made their duty, annually, in the month of April, to report to the auditor, first, “ the total length of such railroad.” The purpose of this is shown farther on in the statute. It is, to enable the auditor to apportion the taxable value of the rolling stock — “ locomotive engines, passenger, freight, platform, construction and other cars ” — between the several counties, <fcc., in this State, through which the railroad passes. Rolling-stock pertains to the whole road, — runs, or may run, the whole length of it, and belongs to no one section more than another. If the railroad extends beyond our boundaries, into another State, the rolling-stock belongs equally to that part of the road which is within this State, and to that part which is without the State. The jurisdiction into which the
The next duty required of the president and secretary is, that their report shall show “ the total length and value of such road, including the right of way, road-bed, side track and main track in this State, distinguishing the total length and value thereof in each county, city, and incorporated town in this State.” The purpose of this requirement was, that a basis of apportionment among the several counties might be obtained, as affecting the assessment of the right of way, road-bed, side track and main track. This report is not, in its nature, conclusive, either as to length of track, or value. Neither is the making of such report an indispensable condition precedent to the assessment of the taxable values, and their apportionment; for, if the officers of the railroad fail “ to make the returns required, ... to the auditor of State, on or before the last day of April annually, the auditor shall proceed to ascertain the values herein required, from the best information he can conveniently obtain and the statute then proceeds to declare, that the auditor shall “ apportion the same among the several counties, cities and incorporated towns, .through which such roads run, in the manner hereinbefore provided.” It will thus be seen, that the statute has conferred very ample means and power for assessing that part of the property of railroads, which it is made the duty of the president and secretary to report annually to the auditor.
• In the case of Perry County v. Railroad Company, 58 Ala. 546, we said, “ Sections 24 to 28 of the act [of 1868] relate to railroads and telegraph companies; and the provisions in regard to these are entirely different [from the provisions which pertain to other and general subjects of taxation]. As to these, the assessor has nothing to do with the sworn list of the tax-paver, nor in the matter of fixing the values. These duties are confided to the auditor,
In Burroughs on Taxation, § 94, it is said ; “ The assessment ascertains what persons and property are liable under the tax bill, the value of the property, and the amount of the tax, to be paid by each person - to the State.” Section 95 : “ The assessment is usually, and almost universally, made a matter of record. This record is called the roll, or list. This roll contains the names of the persons taxed, the amount of the poll-tax, a description of the personal property owned by each person, the value of it, ancl the amount of the tax ; a description of the land owned by each person, the number of acres, the situation and the value, with amount of tax, and the total amount of tax assessed upon each person for all the property listed.” And in section 96 this author says : “ The proper description of property on the roll is of the first importance; for, if it is not sufficiently described, all the subsequent proceedings for the collection of the tax are invalid.”
In Cooley on Taxation, 258-9, it is said : “ This [assessment] is always requisite, when the taxes are to be levied in proportion to an estimate, either of values, of benefits, or the results of business. . . Of the necessity of an assessment no question can be made. Taxes by valuation can not be apportioned without it. Moreover, it is the first step in the proceedings against individual subjects of taxation, and is the foundation of all which follow it. Without an assessment they have no support, and are nullities. It is, therefore, not only indispensable, but in making it the provisions of the law under which it is to be made, must be observed with particularity.” This is supported by numerous authorities, cited by the author. In Hilliard on Taxation, chap. 10, pp. 290-1, it is said : “ Assessment is defined as the making out of a list of property, and fixing its valuation or appraisement. . . Assessment is so far an inseparable incident to taxation, that no right of action arises until a legal assessment is made. . . So, a payment of money as
In the case of Perry County v. Railroad Co., 58 Ala, 546, we declared that, as the record was then presented, no taxes had been assessed on the railroad for the years 1870, 1871, 1872, 1873, 1874; that the power to assess back, or omitted taxes, was statutory; and that there was no statute authorizing the assessment of railroads and their rolling-stock,¡for back taxes, or taxes of previous years, which had been omitted in assessment. That case originated in a petition to the Chancery Court, praying that the receiver, in whose hands the road had been placed by a decretal order of the court, be ordered to pay the taxes alleged to be due from the railroad for the years from 1869 to 1874, inclusive. The petition set forth that the taxes for the year 1869 had been properly assessed as State taxes, on a valuation of $202,-515.60 at'three-fourths of one per-cent; that the court of county commissioners of Perry county had thereupon levied a county tax on said railroad for that year,which amounted to $1,291.03, which was not paid, in consequence of the enactment of February 9th, 1870, attempting to amend section 24 of the act of December 31st, 1868; and that said enactment of February 9fch, 1870, was unconstitutional and void. According to the averments of the petition, all the steps required by the revenue law of 1868 had been taken in the assessment and levy of taxes on that railroad, for the year 1869. Nothing remained to be done, but to enforce the collection of the taxes. The averments of the petition relating to the taxes of 1870-74, inclusive, were as follows : “ And petitioner further states and shows,^that a similar or like tax became due and payable from said railroad corporation, for and during each of the succeeding years 1870, 1871, 1872, 1873, and 1874, but which was never assessed or paid, and ■ is still due and unpaid to your petitioner.” Hence we said in that case, “it is shown by the averments of the petition that no county tax was levied for the years 1870, 1871, 1872, 1873, 1874.” Levy of county taxes succeeds assessment for State taxes* and the petition in that case showed there had been no levy or payment of county taxes for those years.'
The record before us shows, that in April in each of the years 1870 to 1874, inclusive, the officers of the railroad made their sworn report to the auditor of State, setting forth all that was required of them by law, except that in neither of said reports is “ the total length of the railroad ” given. These reports were filed, and remain on file in the auditor’s office. The record also shows, that these reports
Total length main track.................. 155 2-10 miles.
“ “ side track. 8 8-10 “
“ “ main track, Jackson County... 40 9-10 “
“ “ side track .................. 2 5-10 “
Yaluation, whole track, equalized.......... $1,835,000
“ rolling-stock ......... 253,050
In reference to the printed reports of the auditor, the testimony was as follows : Tables were made in the auditor’s office, by the clerks, showing the values of the several railroads and their rolliDg-stock, as fixed by the board of equalization ; and these were deposited in the auditor’s office; but they were not signed by the members of the board. These tables were handed to the printer, to be used as copy in setting up the types to print the reports, and were not afterwards preserved. The original manuscript tables are lost, or destroyed, but the printed tables have been preserved in the auditor’s office, and are correct copies of the originals, as originally made out and filed. The proof is that this method was pursued in each of the years, up to, and including the year 1874.
The reports made by the railroad officials to the auditor, in each of the years 1871-2-3-4, showed the whole length of main and side track in Alabama, with the value of each, description and value of all the rolling-stock, and length and value of main and side track in Jackson county. The audi
There is a record of the meeting of the board in 1872, which shows that all the members were present, and raised the valuation of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, main track, from $7,500 to $14,000 per mile ; side track increased to $9,000 per mile ; and fixed the value of the several classes of rolling-stock. This signed by two members of the board, and by the secretary. Report of the auditor shows main track, 155 2-Í0 miles, at $14,000 per mile ; 8 8-10 miles, at $9,000 per mile; total value, rolling-stock, $294,900. Eor Jackson county; main track, 40 9-10 miles, $572,600; side track, 2 5-10 miles, $22,500 ; and rolling-stock, $77,715.24. These all equalized values.
The statute requires, that the board of equalization shall keep a record of their proceedings, which shall be signed by all the members present. It is shown above that, when the board entered upon its duties in 1872, all were present, and yet only two of their three names are signed to the record. Two, a majority of the members, constitute a quorum, and are competent to decide all questions that come before the board. The making and signing a record of their proceedings is an official duty, which the law casts on these officers— a duty covered by their official oaths — and it is a presumption of law that sworn officers do their duty. We feel bound to presume, in support of the correctness of their conduct, that before their labors were completed, one of the members absented himself, and that the record was in fact signed by all the members present.
The record, or rather the absence of a record, for the year 1873, leaves the subject of assessment and equalization for that year, in the condition the tax for the year 1871 was left in, with the exception that there is no ascertainment of the proportion of miles, values, or rolling-stock, which belong to Jackson county. All we can learn is contained in the auditor’s report, which shows the following, and only the following, as the equalized values: Whole length, main track, 155 2-10 miles, at $14,000 per mile ; whole length, side track, 8 8-10 miles, at $7,500 per mile ; total value, rolling stock, $284,000.
The year 1874 is in precisely the same condition as the year 1873. True, the record book in the auditor’s office
In Perry County v. S., M. & M. R. R. Co., we declared, that the auditor of State is the assessor of railroads proper and their rolling-stock, for taxation. True, the board of equalization, of which he is a member, aid him in fixing the values. But on him is devolved the duty of receiving the returns, and of apportioning the assessment among the several counties. Assessment, in this connection, means the ascertainment and determination of the number of miles and value of the main track and of the side track, and the description and valuation of the rolling-stock. Then, the number of miles of track in each county fills up the measure of information, — the ascertainment of all the material facts, involved in assessment. All else is mere arithmetic. These facts being determined, the share of the burden which pertains to each county is, in legal effect, ascertained; for id certwrn est, quod cerium reddi potest. While we find no authority the law confers on the auditor to assess back or escaped taxes, and think there is a want of machinery in the law to enable him to do so, we hold he is not without power to certify at any time, to the county tax-assessor, the ascertained value of the track of the road in his county, and the proportion of the value of the rolling-stock which is subject to tax in his county. And if the facts have been so ascertained, and shown by legal evidence, that by mere calculation he can determine the proportion of values that may be liable to taxation in any given county, this mere clerical function he can perform at any time. There is nothing judicial in this. It is scarcely necessary to add, that the duty the statute requires of the auditor, to “ notify the assessors of each county, through which such railroad runs, of the numbers of miles of track and value thereof, and the proportionate value of personal property taxable in their respective counties,” is purely ministerial, and may be performed at any time.
Under the principles here declared, petitioner was and is entitled to relief for the taxes of the years of 1870 and 1872. As to the other years named, no relief can be granted on the facts shown. The judgment of the City Court is reversed, at the cost of the appellee, so far as the costs of appeal are concerned.
The writ of mandamus is ordered, commanding the auditor, Jesse M. Carmichael, in whose name this appeal is revived, to certify to, and notify the tax-assessor of Jackson county, for the tax years 1870 and 1872, of the numbers of
On a subsequent day of the term, in response to the. application for a rehearing, the following opinions were delivered:
— The. argumentjor a rehearing in this case is certainly able, and, on the main point, is strengthened by many citations. There is much contrariety of opinion in the adjudged cases, on the question when statutory provisions for assessing and collecting taxes are mandatory, and when they are simply directory. No amount of learning or logic can reconcile the various rulings. In some of the States, great strictness is required in the observance of statutory regulations; while in others, liberal intendments are indulged in favor of the correct performance of duties the law casts on the officials, to whom it confides this trust. Government earn not exist without a revenue; and hence taxation is one of the attributes of governmental power, which even thé sovereignty cannot surrender. The preservation of peace and order, the repression of crime, the right to acquire and.enjoy property, the protection of the weak against the strong and lawless, — all these are functions of government, whose very life and continued existence must depend on revenue — on taxation. All are alike bound to contribute, because all are alike protected. We agree with that class of decisions which presumes that sworn officers do their duty, and that taxes are levied and assessed according to law, unless the contrary is .shown, or unless somó mandatory provision of the law requires that some ¡particular act or acts be affirmatively shown in the proceedings. — Hilliard on Taxation,' ch. 1, § 78.
In our opinion heretofore delivered in this cause, we held that the revenue law of 1868, section 26, which fixes the time
Since the liability for the taxes claimed in this suit has accrued, the law in reference to the county and State boards of equalization has been changed in phraseology. The provisions constituting the State board for equalizing the valuation of railroads and their rolling-stock are found in section 383 of the Code of 1876. That statute, like the act of 1868, makes no provision for the presence of any one representing the railroads. It directs the board to meet on the 3d Wednesday in April, and constitutes the governor president of the board. But it provides that, if a quorum fails to meet on that day, the governor may appoint another day, and may make new appointments as often as may be necessary, until a quorum can be assembled. It requires notice of the appointed days for meeting to be given to the other members of the board, but fails to require any other notice. It is manifest that, under this statute, a meeting of the board may táke place, and rightfully take place, of which no one save the members will have any notice. There are other provisions of this statute which tend strongly to show the officers of^the railroad are not expected to be present, unless
The differences between the State and county boards of equalization, under the later statute, are much more marked, than they were in the act of 1868. — See Code of 1876, sections 428 to 432. We might again ask, why- this change, if attendance and contestation before the State board were contemplated.
We adhere to our former opinion, and overrule the application for a rehearing.
— I am unable to concur in the opinion of the majority of the court in this case, or in the judgment refusing the application for a rehearing, and therefore respectfully dissent therefrom.
I am of opinion that the statute, which fixes the time and place for the meeting of the State board of equalization, is clearly mandatory, and not merely directory. It is, as it ought in justice to be, a matter of constitutional right, that every person, whose property is affected by the action of such a body, should have notice, either actual or constructive, of the time when, and the place where such meeting is to be constituted and held. To refuse arbitrarily the opportunity of personal presence to interested parties, would be a denial of that “ due process of law ” guaranteed by the constitution. Mead v. Larkin, at the present term. It can neither be intended, nor should it be tolerated, that such proceedings, which are gwasi-judicial in their nature, should be conducted in secret deliberation, and ex parte. The owner of property assessed may be prejudiced by undue partiality in the matter of valuation, or by manifest errors of bad judgment, or even ignorance of fact or law on the part of the members of the board. Though the statute may secure no right of appeal in these cases to the tax-payer, it does not contemplate that he shall be remediless, for all such proceedings are subject to review by certiorari. This right might be rendered practically nugatory, if the meetings of this body could be held,
I think these views are sustained by ample and almost uniform authority, including both the text-writers and the adjudged cases.— Thomas v. Gain, 35 Mich. 164; Philadelphia v. Miller, 49 Penn. St. 440; Hambleton v. Dempsey, 20 Ohio, 173; Lehman, Durr & Co. v. Robinson, 59 Ala. 219; Darling v. Gunn, 50 Ill. 424; State Railroad, Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 609; Nixon v. Ruple, 30 N. J. (Law Rep.) 60; State v. Parker, 34 N. J. (Law Rep.) 352.