13 Ky. 399 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1823
Opinion op the Court.
THIS was a bill filed by Cannady against Stark, to coerce a conveyance of 108 acres of land in Bourbon county, 50 acres of which he claimed under a bond executed by Stark to Kirthly, assigned by him to Creelc, and bythe latter to Cannady, and four acres by purchase from Stark himself; but as to these 54 acres, the controversy was adjusted between the parties, during the progress of the cause, and need not be further noticed. With respect to the remaining 54 acres, Cannady alleges that on the 11th of July 1794, he advanced to Stark $60, with which he was to purchase for Carina-dy, land, upon as good terms, and as convenient to Can-nady, as he could; and he exhibits a written receipt of that import, signed by Stark. He charges, that Stark purchased of Pickett, in Virginia, whither he was then
Stark, in his answer, admits that when he was about going to Virginia, to purchase the land of Pickett, Can-* nady furnished him $60, for which he was to have a part of the land; and that he made the purchase of 300 acres, and on his return had the same surveyed, and laid off for Cannady 54 acres; but he does not admit that any part of the money advanced by Cannady was paid for said land; and he alleges that in addition to the hundred pounds, he was to render other services for Pickett in relation to the title of the 5,000 acre tract, as a consideration of the 300 acres, and that he never agreed to convey to Cannady the land laid off for him, unless he would contribute his proportion of the charges and expences incurred in relation to the 5,000 acre tract, which Cannady always refused to do. This he avers gave rise to the controversy, which was verbally referred to arbitrators, with whose award he was willing to comply, and insists upon Cantiady’s failing to do so. He answers evasively as to the agreement to ex
The circuit court disregarded the agreement to exchange, and the submission to arbitrators, as being merely verbal, and not such as could be enforced under the statute against frauds and perjuries; but was of opinion that the agreement of Stark to purchase for Cannady, was binding, and that Cannady was entitled to the same proportion of 300 acres, as $60 bears to the whole price paid by Stark'; and that the price consisted of the £100 and all the expences and trouble incurred by Stark relative to the title of Pickett’s claim, over and above the .£ 100 which Pickett, by the agreement with Stark, was to have paid towards that object; and for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of those expences, and the compensation for Stark’s trouble, and of laying off Cannady’s proportion of the'300 acres accordingly, commissioners were appointed, who were moreover directed to assess the value of the improvements and the amount of rents, of the part allotted to Cannady, and make report.
In this state of things, Stark died; and the suit being revived against his heirs and administrator, the commissioners made a report, by which it appeared that they had laid off for Cannady 38 acres and 29 poles, as his proportion, and that there was a balance of rents in his favor against Stark, of $399 10, and the court pronounced a final decree accordingly, from which Stark’s heirs and administrator have appealed to this court.'
It is very evident, that the statute of limitations is no bar to the relief sought by Cannady; for time never runs against one in possession. And besides, Stark, as he admits, did not obtain the legal title until shortly be
1. There is, however, no doubt, that the statute against. and perjuries precludes the court from giving' re^'lcfnPon R*e agreement to exchange lands, as well as upon the award of the arbitrators; for the agreement to exchange, and the agreement of submission to the. ar'>*trators, were both verbal, and cannot, under the statute, be enforced. But the same thing cannot bo predicated of the original agreement by Stark, to pur-cbase land for Cannady.
2. Though Stark docs not admit the fact, yet it is satisfactorily proved, that he paid towards the price of the 300 acres, the $00 advanced by Cannady; and it may well be doubted, whether, from this circumstance ^01™, an equity would not have resulted to Cannady by implication of law; for we apprehend where an agent verbally employed to purchase land for his principal, d°es so with tiie money of his principal, but makes the contract in his own name, that a trust for the principal will result by implication, which is not affected by the sía(uí:c ngainst frauds and perjuries; for the statute on-. ly forbids the enforcement of a trust or equity created by contract, and not such as results from the nature of y3e transaction by implication of law, But whatever raay be the, rule in a case of that kind, there can, we think, be no doubt, in one like the present, where the party, by a writing signed by himself, acknowledges the receipt of the money, and binds himself to make the purchase, which he accordingly does, with the money which he received for the purpose. We concur, therefore, with the circuit court, in the opinion that the original contract by Stark, to purchase for Cannady, is not within the statute against frauds and perjuries, and that Cannady is entitled to a decree for part of the 300 acres purchased of Pickett; hor is there any doubt, but 1.ha.t the part which should he decreed to him, should bear the same proportion to the 300 acres, as $60 bears to the whole consideration paid therefor by Stark. By the written agreement between Stark and Pickett, filed in the cause, it appears, that in addition to the £! 00, Stark agreed to have a general plat of the whole 5,000 acre tract, with the interfering claims, made out, as a consideration of the 300 acres, Pickett agreeing to
3. We are inclined to thin]?, however, that as each was permitted by the other to enjoy as bis own, the land be possessed under the contract for the exchange, be ought not to be accountable to the other for the profits he has received. But the improvements«on the respective parcels of land may he of unequal value; and in proportion as this may be the case, the one will be ben-efiltedto the prejudice of the other, unless he who receives the parcel in the greatest degree enhanced in value by the labor of the other, is made to account to
The decree of the circuit court must be reversed with costs, arid the cause be remanded, that a decree may ©nl-ered not inconsistent with the foregoing opinion, and such other decrees and orders as may he agreeable to equity.