STARKO, INC., d/b/a MEDICINE CHEST #1, and JERRY JACOBS, d/b/a PILL BOX PHARMACY #4, for and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Respondents and Cross-Petitioners, v. NEW MEXICO HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT and MEDICAL ASSISTANCE DIVISION OF THE NEW MEXICO HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Defendants-Petitioners and Cross-Respondents, and PRESBYTERIAN HEALTH PLAN, INC., a New Mexico corporation, d/b/a PRESBYTERIAN SALUD and CIMARRON HEALTH PLAN, INC., a New Mexico corporation, d/b/a CIMARRON HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION, a/k/a CIMARRON HMO, Defendants.
Docket No. 33,382, 33,383, 33,384
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
August 25, 2014
MAES, Justice
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS ON CERTIORARI, Linda M. Vanzi, District Judge
Jerome Marshak, Special Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
N.M. Human Services Department
Larry Heyeck
Santa Fe, NM
for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents New Mexico Human Services Department and Medical Assistance Division of the New Mexico Human Services Department
John B. Pound, L.L.C.
John Bennett Pound
Santa Fe, NM
Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.
Edward R. Ricco
Melanie Bret Stambaugh
Albuquerque, NM
Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A.
Lisa Mann
Jennifer A. Noya
Emil John Kiehne
Anna Elizabeth Indahl
Albuquerque, NM
for Petitioner Cimarron Health Plan, Inc., a New Mexico Corporation, d/b/a Cimarron Health Maintenance Organization, a/k/a Cimarron HMO
Peifer, Hanson & Mullins, P.A.
Charles R. Peifer
Robert E. Hanson
Lauren Keefe
Elizabeth K. Radosevich
Albuquerque, NM
Cavin & Ingram, P.A.
Stephen Dean Ingram
Sealy Hutchings Cavin, Jr.
Albuquerque, NM
for Respondents and Cross-Petitioners
OPINION
MAES, Justice
{1} In these consolidated appeals, we consider whether pharmacists who dispense prescription drugs to Medicaid recipients must be paid under the formula set forth in
{2} The district court and our Court of Appeals held that
I. BACKGROUND
{3} Starko, Inc. and Jerry Jacobs (collectively, Plaintiffs) are representatives of a certified class of pharmacists. Plaintiffs argue in these consolidated appeals that New Mexico law requires that pharmacists be reimbursed for dispensing prescription drugs as part of the Medicaid program at the same rate, whether done under a fee-for-services model or a managed care model.
{4} Presbyterian Health Plan and Cimarron Health Maintenance Corporation are MCOs that administer a portion of the State of New Mexico‘s Medicaid program under the supervision of HSD. All three are defendants in these consolidated appeals. Defendants argue that
{5}
{6} Congress established the Medicaid program as part of the Social Security Act in 1965 “to provide medical assistance to persons whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary care and services.” Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 156 (1986). If a state elects to participate in the Medicaid program, it receives federal funds as long as it “compl[ies] with requirements imposed by the Act and by the Secretary of Health and Human Services” in administering the program. Id. at 157. Some Medicaid benefits are mandatory under the Medicaid program, and others, such as prescribed drugs, are provided at the discretion of the participating state. See
{7} New Mexico is a participating state and has opted to provide a prescribed drug benefit. See
{8} Unfortunately, the fee-for-services model drained the public coffers at what appeared to be an ever increasing rate. “During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Mеdicaid expenditures soared, rising an average rate of 16.4% per year.” William Alvarado Rivera, A Future for Medicaid Managed Care: The Lessons of California‘s San Mateo County, 7 Stan. L. & Pol‘y Rev. 105, 111 (1996). As a result New Mexico, like many states, sought to find a way to continue to provide necessary medical services to its citizens while maintaining its fiscal stability.
{9} According to testimony by Ramona Flores-Lopez, the Assistant Director of the Medical Assistance Division at HSD, by 1992 the Medicaid program in New Mexico was in “dire financial straits . . . [and] running out of money. . . . We were asked to look at all optional services [pharmaceutical benefits were one of those optional services not required by the federal Medicaid program], and [consider our options,] from eliminating optional benefits to reducing benefits to reducing eligibility.” In an attempt to control the costs, following hearings and discussions, the New Mexico Legislature authorized the transition to a managed care system for the Medicaid program and required the new system to “ensure access to medically necessary services . . . [to] maint[ain] the rural primary care delivery infrastructure . . . [and] that the department‘s approach is consistent with national and state health care reform principles. . . .” 1994 N.M. Laws, ch. 62, § 22 (codified at
{10} Managed care is neither inconsistent with nor prohibited under the Social Security Act or the federal law governing the Medicaid program. See
{11} In 1997, “HSD implemented SALUD!, a managed care program,” under which HSD contracts with private MCOs that provide health care services to Medicaid recipients. Starko, 2012-NMCA-053, ¶ 6. Under SALUD!, HSD negotiated pharmaceutical costs with the MCOs, which in turn negotiated contracts with pharmacists. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. The MCO-pharmacist contracts provided that pharmacists would be reimbursed by the MCOs, not HSD. Id.
{12} Plaintiffs argue that because
{13} There has been much procedural and legal wrangling over the years in this case. See Starko, 2012-NMCA-053, ¶¶ 7-16 (providing a discussion of some of the procedural history). Ultimately, and most importantly for this opinion, the Court of Appeals held that
{14} Because our determination that
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{15} This case requires this Court to construe whether
III. DISCUSSION
Section 27-2-16(B) was not intended to apply to managed care.
{16} The Legislature enacted
{17} Plaintiffs counter that
{18} In interpreting a statute, the Court‘s “primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent оf the Legislature.” State v. Office of the Pub. Defender, 2012-NMSC-029, ¶ 13, 285 P.3d 622. “[W]e examine the plain language of the statute as well as the context in which it was promulgated, including the history of the statute and the object and purpose the Legislature sought to accomplish.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court “avoid[s] adoption of a construction that would render the statute‘s application absurd or unreasonable or lead to injustice or contradiction.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{19}
{20} Plaintiffs argue that it is possible to comply with the requirements of both
{21} However, simply because the language of two statutes permits them to be read to apply to a single situation, it does not necessarily follow that the Legislature intended the statutes to be read so that they both apply. In this case, the Legislature‘s intent is ambiguous at best. Since
{22} As discussed earlier, at the time the managed care system was established, Medicaid
{23} The managed care system is a risk-based system, meaning an MCO bears the risk of loss if the State‘s fee does not cover all the costs for the healthcare that the Medicaid program requires MCOs to provide to individuals. In part, states moved to the new model to get away from the fixed rate imposed by the fee-for-services model, in an attempt to scale back the costs to stаtes associated with the Medicaid program.
{24} When the Legislature enacted
{25} Under the fee-for-services model, it is difficult to accurately estimate the annual program cost and budget appropriately. The annual cost to the State depends upon a number of variables, including the number of рrogram participants and the number of prescriptions filled, which in turn depends upon how many participants become ill and to what degree. The wholesale cost of the prescribed drugs also is a variable the State is required to consider under a fee-for-services model when budgeting. Thus, the State bears a substantial fiscal risk that depends on the accuracy of its budgetary estimates.
{26} The Legislature did not eliminate the fee-for-services system and replace it with a managed care system. Instead, it added a managed care system to New Mexico‘s Medicaid program. HSD presumes enrollment in the managed care system for all Medicaid recipients, “although HSD still maintains the fee-for-services system for a limited set of recipients.” Starko, Inc. v. Gallegos, 2006-NMCA-085, ¶ 3, 140 N.M. 136, 140 P.3d 1086 (observing that Native Americans are exempt from managed care); see also 8.308.6.9 NMAC (“An eligible recipient is required to participate in a HSD managed care program unless specifically excluded as listed below [including, among others, certain individuals qualifying for Medicare benefits, refugees, and children and adolescents in out-of-state foster care or adoption placements].“); 8.309.4.9 NMAC (providing an alternative benefit program under
{27} Under the fee-for services system, HSD continues to reimburse providers directly, but “[u]nder the managed care system, services are neither provided nor reimbursed directly by HSD.” Starko, Inc. v. Gallegos, 2006-NMCA-085, ¶ 3. As part of the managed care model, HSD negotiates a fixed fee and transfers the risk that medical costs will be higher than the fee to the MCOs. The MCOs provide health care to Medicaid recipients, including “coverage for prescription medications sold by pharmacists and pharmacies.” Id. Pharmacists and pharmacies are reimbursed pursuant to the contracts they execute with MCOs under the managed care system. Id.
{28} Under a managed care system model, the State may more accurately budget and reduce the risk of unanticipated expenditures because it pays the MCOs a fixed fee per program participant. Once that number of participants is determined there are no further variables to consider. The State simply multiplies the fixed per-person fee by the number of participants and compensates the MCOs. This model shifts the risks of rising drug costs, unexpected increases in illness, and all the other variables from the State to the MCO, which must bear the cost of any loss. Even though the State had shifted its risk, the MCO is still required to follow the federal law regarding prescription drug reimbursements.1 See, e.g.,
{29} With this background in mind, we turn to Plaintiffs’ argument that
{30} Ms. Flores-Lopez testified regarding discussions about New Mexico‘s federal waiver application to establish managed care as part of the State‘s Medicaid program when asked if it included a reimbursement policy for pharmaceuticals.2 According to Ms. Flores-Lopez,
{31} According to HSD‘s Chief of the Management Information Systems Bureau Robert Stevens, after the legislation was passed, HSD determined that
{32} We agree with Plaintiffs that this Court is not bound by an agency‘s interpretation of a statute. Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm‘n, 2009-NMSC-013, ¶ 7, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.3d 135. However, we also have observed that “[w]hen an agency that is governed by a particular statute construes or applies that statute, the court will begin by according some deference to the agency‘s interpretation” and “will confer a heightened degree of deference to legal questions that implicate special agency expertise or the determination of fundamental policies within the scope of the agency‘s statutory function.” Morningstar Water Users Ass‘n v. N.M. Pub. Util. Comm‘n, 1995-NMSC-062, ¶ 11, 120 N.M. 579, 904 P.2d 28 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Medicaid program requirements, and healthcare generally, are intricate and complicated areas of law. HSD is the State agency charged with administering Medicaid. Its long-standing interpretation of
{33} The Court of Appeals appeared to rely in part on the fact that “[t]he Legislature twice rejected amendments [to
{34} Plaintiffs also advance an argument that
{35} Statutory interpretation requires that we “construe the entire statute . . . so that all . . . provisions [are] considered in relation to one another.” N.M. Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Riegger, 2007-NMSC-044, ¶ 11, 142 N.M. 248, 164 P.3d 947 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When “expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.” U.S. Nat. Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{36}
{37} The above definitions in
{38} In
[HSD] shall carry out the medicaid program changes as recommended by the medicaid reform committee that was established pursuant to Laws 2002, Chapter 96, as follows . . . identify entities that are eligible to participate in
the federal drug pricing program under . . the federal Public Health Service Act[,] . . . make a reasonable effort to assist the eligible entities to enroll in the program and to purchase prescriptiоn drugs under the federal drug pricing program . . . [and] ensure that entities enrolled in the federal drug pricing program are reimbursed for drugs purchased for use by medicaid recipients at acquisition cost and that the purchases are not included in a rebate program. . . . [HSD shall also] work toward the development of a prescription drug purchasing cooperative . . . to obtain the best price for prescription drugs.
(Emphasis added.)
{39} Drug purchasing cooperatives that operate to obtain the best prices for prescription drugs necessarily cannot contemplate paying the fixed rate determined by the Legislature. The Legislature gives HSD the responsibility to identify and make a reasonable effort to assist entities to purchase prescription drugs for use by Mеdicaid recipients, reimbursed at acquisition cost, that are not included in the rebate program. In doing so, it is clear that the Legislature does not intend that a statutorily fixed rate apply. Construing the entire statute and the provisions in relation to one another, the Legislature intends to find new ways to acquire prescription drugs at a rate cheaper than the rebate program contemplated by
{40} Despite the Legislature‘s intent to procure prescription drugs at a lower cost than that established by
IV. CONCLUSION
{41} The Legislature enacted
{42} Requiring HSD and MCO contracts to comply with
{43} IT IS SO ORDERED.
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
WE CONCUR:
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice, Dissenting
VIGIL, Chief Justice (dissenting).
{44} I believe that pharmacists who dispense prescription drugs to Medicaid recipients must be paid under the formula set forth in
A. The Legislature Intended Section 27-2-16(B) to Apply to Managed Care
{45} In order to determine whether
{46} To glean the Legislature‘s intent, we consider the plain language used in the statute. “[W]e look first to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The first and most obvious guide to statutory interpretation is the wording of the statutes themselves.” Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 37, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In fact, “the Legislature has mandated that [t]he text of a statute or rule is thе primary, essential source of its meaning.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
{47}
{48} The central question in this case is what the Legislature intended by its use of the words “medicaid program” in
{49} The majority notes that ”
{50} Likewise, the statute does not explicitly refer to either fee-for-service or managed care, but rather, it refers only to the Medicaid program—which as stated, encompasses both fee-for-service and managed care. The majority opinion ignores the use of the broad terms “the medicaid program” in its contemplation of the dispensing fee. The majority construes this language as ambiguous and by doing so interprets the statute beyond its plain meaning. Because the language used by the Legislature is clear, the majority errs in proceeding beyond its plain meaning. “We do nоt depart from the plain language of a statute unless we must resolve an ambiguity, correct a mistake or absurdity, or deal with a conflict between different statutory provisions.” Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Riegger, 2007-NMSC-044, ¶ 11, 142 N.M. 248, 164 P.3d 947. Finding no ambiguity in the statute, I believe the majority‘s interpretation beyond its plain meaning is erroneous.
{51} Further, considering that
{52} The Legislature‘s intent that
The human services department shall establish a rate for the reimbursement of physicians, dentists, optometrists, podiatrists and psychologists for services rendered to medicaid patients that provides equal reimbursement for the same or similar servicеs rendered without respect to the date on which such physician, dentist, optometrist, podiatrist or psychologist entered into practice in New Mexico, the date on which the physician, dentist, optometrist, podiatrist or psychologist entered into an agreement or contract to provide such services or the location in which such services are to be provided in the state.
The human services department shall establish a rate for the reimbursement of physicians, dentists, optometrists, podiatrists and psychologists for services rendered to medicaid patients . . . provided, however, that the requirements of this section shall not apply when the human services department contracts with entities pursuant to Section 27-2-12.6 NMSA 1978 to negotiate a rate for the reimbursement for services rendered to medicaid patients in the medicaid managed care system.
{54} Likewise, the statutory scheme includes a section that specifically limits its application to the fee-for-service system.
In providing coverage for mammograms under the medicaid program, the department shall ensure that . . . any fee for service payment that shall be made on behalf of the medicaid program for a mammogram of a medicaid
recipient shall be consistent with and not exceed the usual and customary charge that reflects the reasonable fair market value of the cost of a mammogram.
{55} The Court of Appeals noted, “[t]he Legislature twice rejected amendments that specifically would have either lowered payments or required periodic renegotiation. See H.B. 400, 45th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2002) (not passed); S.B. 183, 46th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2004) (not passed).” Starko, 2012-NMCA-053, ¶ 30. The proposed amendment, which would have created separate reimbursement requirements for the fee-for-service and the managed care systems, would have replaced Subsection (B) of Section 27-2-16 with the following language:
Reimbursement by the human services department to pharmaceutical providers participating in the medicaid fеe-for-service program shall be determined by the human services department as provided by applicable state and federal law, including regulations adopted by the human services department. Reimbursement by organizations with a contract with the human services department to provide medicaid services to their respective pharmaceutical providers shall be determined by negotiation between such organizations and such providers, or their representatives.
S.B. 183, 46th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2004) (not passed). This proposed amendment to
{56} The majority dismisses the Legislature‘s refusal to amend
{57} When the Legislature intended a particular provision to apply to either fee-for-service or managed care, but not both, it said so. See, e.g.,
B. The Application of Section 27-2-16(B) Supports the Policy Behind the Managed Care System
{58} I agree with the majority that the Legislature‘s intent in authorizing and adopting a managed care system was to reduce the growth in Medicaid costs. See Maj. Op. ¶ 23 (“[S]tates moved to thе new model to get away from the fixed rate imposed by the fee-for-services model, in an attempt to scale back the costs to states associated with the Medicaid program.“). However, this was not the only basis for the enactment of the new system and because this cost savings to the State is not thwarted by applying
{59} The majority accepts the MCOs’ contention that by imposing the statutory reimbursement rate on prescriptions, the “sought after savings due to managed care would not materialize.” Maj. Op. ¶ 31. The majority reasons that “where lowering cost is a substantial concern, creating a new system but importing the old cost model is antithetical to the goals contemplated by the new system,” and “this cannot have been the Legislature‘s intent.” Maj. Op. ¶ 40. It concludes that “[i]n creating the managed care system, New Mexico attempted to implement a strategy to insulate the public coffers from variable expenditures associated with the medical аssistance programs and shift the risk of loss.” Maj. Op. ¶ 41.
{60} The majority discusses costs savings in general, but where it states that applying the statute to MCOs as being antithetical to the Legislature‘s intent, it conflates two concepts: cost savings to the State and cost savings to the MCOs. The former is the policy objective that supported the shift to a managed care system, and that goal was achieved when the shift took place. The managed care system, as the majority acknowledges, allows the State to have
{61} In order to effectuate the cost savings goal of managed care, HSD enters into capitated risk contracts with MCOs. See 8.305.11.9(A) NMAC (07/01/2001) (repealed and recodified at 8.308.20.9 NMAC) (“HSD shall make actuarially sound payments under capitated risk contracts to the designated MCO[].“). These contracts set a capitated per-person rate, which HSD pays to MCOs, and the rate includes payment for both the services to be provided to the recipient and the administrative costs of delivering the services. See 8.305.11.9(B) NMAC (“HSD shall pay a capitated amount to the MCO[] for the provision of the managed care benefit package at specified rates . . . . The MCO[] shall accept the capitation rate paid each month by HSD as payment in full for all services to be provided pursuant to the agreement, including all administrative costs associated therewith.“) In turn, MCOs are responsible for delivering all services offered by the Medicaid program; they cannot pick and choose which services to offer. See 8.305.11.9(A) NMAC (“The MCO[] shall be responsible for the provision of services for members during the month of capitation.“); and 8.305.11.9(B) NMAC (“The MCO[] does not have the option of deleting benefits from the medicaid defined benefit package.“). Perhaps most important tо the cost savings function of the managed care system is that MCOs bear the risk of loss should the cost of services exceed the capitated rate they receive for any particular recipient. See 8.305.11.9(E) NMAC (“The MCO[] is at risk of incurring losses if its costs of providing the managed care medicaid benefit package exceed its capitation payment. HSD shall not provide retroactive payment adjustments to the MCO[] to reflect the actual cost of services furnished by the MCO[].“).
{62} The MCOs’ issue with the statute‘s dispensing fee mandate rests upon how it affects the cost borne by the MCOs, not the State. In other words, the concern is with the mandated dispensing fee‘s impact on the MCOs’ profit margin—the difference between what they are paid by the State for managing Medicaid services and the cost associated with doing so. Where the majority reasons that imposing a fixed statutory cost on the MCOs under the statute is antithetical to the cost savings purpose of the managed care system, it incorrectly identifies by whom the risk of loss is borne. It is borne by the MCOs, not the State. The cost to the State is fixed by virtue of the managed care contracts between the State and the MCOs, and becomes certain at the time the contracts are entered into, not at the time the dispensing fee is paid to the pharmacists. The cost to the MCOs of paying the dispensing fee to pharmacists is the MCOs’ cost of doing business managing Medicaid for the State. That cost is voluntarily assumed by the MCOs at the time they contract with the State. Once that contract is entered into, the risk of loss is shifted from the State to the MCO. Thus, the policy objective to contain Medicaid costs is achieved at the time the contracts between the State and the MCOs are entered into.
{63} Additionally, in my view, applying the statutory reimbursement rates to the MCOs also advances the stated goals of the Public Assistance Act to ensure an adequate pool of providers across New Mexico. Reimbursement for dispensing generic medication must be
{64} Finally, as the majority notes, the managed care system was established to address the increasing cost of Medicaid, placing higher burdens on taxpayers. See Maj. Op. ¶ 22. It is counterintuitive to imagine that the Legislature, in an effort to save the State money on Medicaid, would design a statutory scheme which allows the MCOs to forgo payment of the statutorily-prescribed fee—a risk that they voluntarily agreed to assume—while still requiring HSD to pay the same in the fee-for-services system. This scheme would save only the MCOs money—not the State. In my view, this is antithetical to the principle of saving the State money.
C. Conclusion
{65} The Legislature‘s intent is unequivocal—Section 27-2-16(B) applies to both the fee-for-service and managеd care systems, which together comprise the State‘s Medicaid program. The overall underlying policies supporting the provision of medical care for Medicaid recipients are supported by this interpretation. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice
