Starin v. New York, 29 L. Ed. 388

Mr. Chief Justice Waite

delivered the opinion of the court. After stating the facts in the language reported above, he continued:

We will first consider whether the suit is one which arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States ; for, if it is not, the order to remand was right, so far as the removal upon the application of all the- defendants is concerned.

The character of a case is determined-by the questions involved. Osborn v. Bank of United States; 9 Wheat. 737, 824. If from the questions it appears that some title, right, privilege, or immunity, on which the recovery depends, will be defeated by one construction of the Constitution or a law of the United States, or sustained by the opposite construction, the case will be one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, within the meaning of that term as u^ed in the act of 1875; otherwise not. Such is the effect of the decisions on this subject. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 379; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 737, 824; The Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252; Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 201; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 264; Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135, 140; Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 462 ; Kansas Pacific v. Atchison Railroad, 112 U. S. 414, 416; Provident Savings Co. v. Ford, 114 U. S. 635; 641; Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 11.

The questions in this case, as shown by the pleadings, are, 1, whether the city of -New York has; under its charter, the exclusive right to establish ferries between Manhattan Island and the shore of Staten Island on the Kill von Kull; and, if it has, then, 2, whether the defendants have, in 'law and in fact, interfered with that right by setting-up and operating such a ferry. The determination of these questions depends, 1, on the construction of the grant in' the charted óf the city; and, 2, on the character of the business in which the defendants- are ■ engaged. It is not contended that there is anything.either in the .Constitution or the laws of the United States which takes away the right from the city, if it was in fact granted by the original charter before the Revolution; or which defines what a ferry is or shall be, or provides that enrolled and licensed’ steamboats, managed by licensed officers, may be run on the public waters as ferry-boats, -without regard td. grants that may-have been made by competent authority of exclusive ferry privileges; and that is not the defence set np in the answers in this case. The question here is as to the extent of the ancient grant made to the city, not as to the rights of the defendants in the navigation of the waters of the United States irrespective of this grant.

It is not pretended that the United States have in any manner attempted to interfere with the power of a State to grant exclusive ferry privileges across public waters between places within its own jurisdiction. No attempt is made by the city to control the use of- the licensed and enrolled vessels of the defendants or their licensed officers, in any other way than by preventing them from running as a ferry between the points named. They may run as they please, and engage in any business that may be desirable, not inconsistent with the exclusive ferry rights of the city. The claim of the city is based entirely oh its charter, and it seeks in its complaint to control . only that part of the navigation of the public waters in question which is connected with the establishment and operation of ferries between New York and the specified landing places on Staten Island. Although the prayer for judgment when taken by itself may appear to go further, it must be construed in connection with the cause of action as stated in the complaint, and limited accordingly. The defence is that the defendants are not operating a ferry within the meaning of the charter, or, if they are, that it is not such a ferry as comes -within the monopoly - of the city. If they are not operating such a ferry, ór if they are, and it appears that the monopoly granted to the city does not include ferries between New York and Staten Island on the Kill von Kull, they must prevail in the final determination of the suit. The decision of these questions does not depend on the. Constitution or laws of the United States. There is nothing in the Constitution or laws of the United States entering into the determination of tlie cause which, if construed one way will defeat the defendants, or in another sustain them.

It remains to consider the removal on the application of the Independent Steamboat Company alone. The suit is against all the defendants jointfy, on the allegation that, acting in common, they are all engaged in violating the rights of the city by keeping up and maintaining the ferry in question. The averment in the complaint is that the defendant Starin is in reality the person actually operating the ferry, and that he uses the other defendants as his instruments for that purpose. It is conceded that the Independent Steamboat Company does not own the boats running on the route. They all belong to Starin or to companies in which he is the person chiefly interested. The Independent Company was not organized until a few days before this suit was begun. It has a capital of only $5,000, and while it claims to have chartered the boats in question from their respective owners and to be engaged in running them on the route, it does not deny that the other defendants are directly interested in the establishment and maintenance' of the ferry, if it be one, which is being operated by and in the name of the company. The only controversy in the case, as stated in the complaint, is as to the right of the defendants to keep up and maintain a ferry on the route in question. Upon one side of that controversy is. the plaintiff, and upon the other all the defendants. There cannot be a full determination of this one controversy, unless all the defendants are parties. The case as stated in the complaint makes Starin the principal defendant, and the Independent Company only an instrument of his. The object is to prevent him, as .well as the others, from, using these boats or- any others they may own or control in the way these are being used. There is, according to the complaint, but a single cause of action, and that is, the violation of the exclusive ferry rights of the plaintiff by the uñited efforts of all the defendants. The case is, therefore, within the rule established in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Ide, 114 U. S. 52; Putnam v. Ingraham, 114 U. S. 57; Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 U. S. 41, that a separate defence by one defendant in a joint suit against him and others upon a joint or a joint and several cause of action, does not create a separate controversy so as to entitle that defendant, if the necessary citizenship exists as to him, to a removal of the cause under the second clause of § 2 in the act of 1875.

It follows that the case was properly remanded, and the orders of the Circuit Court to that effect are Affirmed.

Case Details

Case Name: Starin v. New York

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Nov 2, 1885

Citations: 29 L. Ed. 388; 6 S. Ct. 28; 1885 U.S. LEXIS 1834; 115 U.S. 248

Court Abbreviation: U.S.