Judy Johnson Stapleton, Ashley Nicole Johnson, Paul Edward Stapleton, and Paul Edward Stapleton III (collectively “Stapleton”) appeal from the grant of summary judgment to Colonial Insurance Company of California in a declaratory judgment action. The record shows Stapleton obtained two policies of automobile insurance from Colonial, but as she did not make timely payments of premiums on the policies, Colonial sent notices canceling the policies for non-payment. Later, Stapleton was in an automobile accident and when claims were filed against the policy, Colonial filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of coverage under the policies. Held:
1. Although no suit was pending against Colonial, this is a proper declaratory judgment action. Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Fountain,
2. Stapleton correctly asserts there are four requirements for proper cancellation of an automobile insurance policy by mail: The policy must provide for cancellation; a post office certified receipt must be obtained; the cancellation notice must be sent to the insured’s last known address; and the evidence must show that the envelope mailed contained the statutory cancellation notice. OCGA § 33-24-44; Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Renfroe,
Stapleton’s attack on the Colonial supervisor’s affidavit for lack of actual knowledge of the events in this case seeks to impose a requirement not recognized in our law. This affidavit shows the supervisor was the custodian of the documents showing that the notice of cancellation of Stapleton’s policy was properly mailed, and the purpose of her affidavit was to satisfy the criteria necessary for admissibility of these documents as business records. See OCGA § 24-3-14 (b). Accordingly, it is not required that this supervisor have actual personal knowledge of the preparation of and mailing of the notice. OCGA § 24-3-14 (c); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Buck,
Moreover, the absence of the signature of the postal clerk on the receipt is not fatal, since the document has the official U. S. postal service stamp showing receipt by the U. S. postal service. See Mad
3. Stapleton also contends that summary judgment was improperly granted because the cancellation of the policy was not effective as Colonial did not establish that the notice required by the former OCGA § 33-34-11 (a) (1) was sent to the Georgia Department of Public Safety. See Ga. Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Phillips,
Examination of Exhibit C, however, reveals that it is not a copy of the FR4 form. Instead, the exhibit apparently is a copy of another form that has information about Stapleton, her automobile, and the insurance policy, but does not refer to the Department of Public Safety. The only possible reference on the exhibit to either the Department of Public Safety or FR4 is a handwritten notation stating: “FR4 - 6/9 Notice to State.” The exhibit, however, also contains another notation that states: “Mailed 6/5/89.” Viewing this exhibit in the light most favorable to Stapleton (OCGA § 9-11-56 (c); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins,
Judgment reversed.