Staples v. PaltenStaples v. Palten
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Glass
Lead Opinion
On April 14,1988, the petitioner, Jules Staples, pursuant to a substitute information, pleaded guilty to assault on a police officer, in violation of
The petitioner has brought this writ of error claiming that the Sentence Review Division2 erred in declaring that the definition of a “plea agreement,” for the purposes of
The state argues, however, that the petitioner did enter into a “plea agreement” for the purposes of
Although “plea agreement” is not defined in
In addition, under the maxim of “noscitur a sociis,” the meaning of a particular word or phrase in a statute is ascertained by reference to those words or phrases with which it is associated. See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8, 105 S. Ct. 2458, 86 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985); General Electric Co. v.
Therefore, given the result of the application of “noscitur a sociis,” and given the fact that the “plea agreement” exception is to be construed liberally in favor of its intended beneficiary, we hold that “plea agreement” for the purposes of
There is error and the case is remanded to the Sentence Review Division for further proceedings.
In this opinion Peters, C. J., and Shea, J., concurred.
Notes
“[General Statutes] See. 51-195. application for review of sentence. Any person sentenced on one or more counts of an information to a term of imprisonment for which the total sentence of all such counts amounts to confinement for three years or more, may, within thirty days from the date such sentence was imposed or if the offender received a suspended sentence with a maximum confinement of three years or more, within thirty days of revocation of such suspended sentence, except in any case in which a different sentence could not have been imposed or in any case in which the sentence or commitment imposed resulted from the court’s acceptance of a plea agreement or in any case in which the sentence imposed was for a lesser term than was proposed in a plea agreement, file with the clerk of the court for the judicial district in which the judgment was rendered an application for review of the sentence by the review division. Upon imposition of sentence or at the time of revocation of such suspended sentence, the clerk shall give written notice to the person sentenced of his right to make such a request. Such notice shall include a statement that review of the sentence may result in decrease or increase of the term within the limits fixed by law. A form for making such application shall accompany the notice. The clerk shall forthwith transmit such application to the review division and shall notify the judge who imposed the sentence. Such judge may transmit to the review division a statement of his reasons for imposing the sentence, and shall transmit such a statement within seven days if requested to do so by the review division. The filing of an application for review shall not stay the execution of the sentence.”
The named respondent, Paul M. Paiten, is executive secretary of the Sentence Review Division of the Superior Court of the judicial district of Hartford. The three judge panel of the Sentence Review Division consisted of Hon. Francis R. Quinn, Hon. Joseph J. Purtill and Hon. Anne C. Dranginis.
The Sentence Review Division of the Superior Court was created by statute in 1957 pursuant to the recommendation of a special committee appointed by the Governor to study causes of prison unrest. The committee reported that the morale of many inmates, and consequently their desire for rehabilitation, is compromised by the belief that there is statewide inequality in the sentences imposed by different judges for the same crime. First Interim Report of the Governor’s Prison Study Committee (Nov. 19, 1956), Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary and Governmental Functions, Pt. 2, 1957 Sess., p. 377, on House Bill No. 276. The committee concluded that “[a]s long as a prisoner feels that he has been denied review of a sentence which he deems unfair or unduly harsh he remains a source of trouble in the prison system and efforts toward rehabilitation are seriously impeded.” Id.
The duties of the Sentence Review Division are set forth in
Furthermore, the “plea agreement” exception was added to
Furthermore, given that the expressed purpose of the Sentence Review Division is to prevent prison unrest that arises from inmates’ beliefs that there is statewide inequality in the sentences imposed by different judges for the same crime, it is apparent that this purpose is not furthered by denying review to petitioners who simply have pleaded guilty without an agreement as to sentence. See footnote 3, supra; State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 109, 118-19, 445 A.2d 304 (1982). In other words, if two inmates have pleaded guilty to the same crime and have received widely disparate sentences, then the same potential for unrest exists as if the inmates were sentenced after conviction.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I respectfully disagree with the majority that the term “plea agreement” for the purposes of
I first note that the majority, after observing that “plea agreement” is not defined in
Initially, the sentence review division’s (division) argument that the petitioner entered a plea agreement whereby he received a reduction in the charges against him, in consideration for his agreeing to be sentenced for a particular range of years, has not persuaded the majority. The record shows that at the time the petitioner appeared before the division Hon. Francis J. Quinn said: “Well, serious charges against [the petitioner] were dropped and he was allowed to plead to a lesser offense. That, along with the agreement of no
Counsel for the petitioner who argued his appeal before this court also represented the petitioner not only on the original three count information in the trial court but also at the sentencing for which sentence review was requested. At oral argument before this court, questions from the bench elicited further information from petitioner’s counsel. The following,- which we may properly consider,1 developed from that questioning. At the time of the petitioner’s arrest, he was also on probation following his adjudication as a youthful offender. There were, admittedly, discussions and negotiations concerning a disposition. As a result, the petitioner agreed to and did plead guilty to a substitute information charging him with assault on a police officer in violation of
It is this disposition that the majority has concluded is not a “plea agreement” under
The majority explicitly sets out certain principles of statutory construction upon which it bases its analysis. The first is that “ ‘ “[w]hen a statute creates an exception to a general rule, it is to be construed strictly and its language is not to be extended beyond its evident intent.” . . .’ ” I have no problem with this as a statement of one of a number of rules of statutory construction even where, as in this case, the statute is remedial. See State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 109, 118-19, 445 A.2d 304 (1982). Another statutory rule of construction used by the majority is the invocation and application of the rule of “noscitur a sociis.”
It is suggested, however, that the use of other rules of construction is appropriate here. One court aptly observed that “while [it was] not unmindful of the gen
In speaking to the rule of “noscitur a sociis,” the United States Supreme Court has said: “That a word may be known by the company it keeps is, however, not an invariable rule, for the word may have a character of its own not to be submerged by its association.
From the circumstances surrounding the petitioner’s decision to plead guilty, it is evident to me that he did so as the result of a “plea agreement” as that term is used in § 51-195. The majority correctly observes that “plea agreement” is not defined in § 51-195 and says that to do so, it must look to the other two exceptions listed in that statute. Then, “given” the application of “noscitur a sociis” and the requirement of strict construction, it concludes that “plea agreement” in § 51-195 “means an agreement encompassing a sentence of a specific term of years.” This result is flawed by the analysis, the application of rules of statutory construction and common sense. Moreover, it thwarts the statutory purpose, especially that of the 1978 amendment to § 51-195, Public Acts 1978, No. 78-191.
It is useful, in arriving at the construction of § 51-195, to consider certain aspects of plea agreements. The terms “plea agreement,” as well as “plea bargain,” are familiar and not undefined terms in the administration of criminal justice in this country.2 The United States
The obvious intent and dominant purpose of § 51-195 is to grant sentence review except in the three situations set out in the statute. The addition of the two exceptions by the 1978 legislature was made after the constitutional legitimacy of plea bargaining had been recognized by the United States Supreme Court — a significant circumstance that had not existed when the statute originally had been enacted twenty years earlier. From the common sense reading of § 51-195 after the 1978 amendment, tenets of statutory construction need not be invoked to demonstrate that the evident intent was to deny sentence review to defendants who had bargained and negotiated with the prosecutors for the most beneficial arrangement they could obtain in disposition of criminal charges against them in return for their plea of guilty. Such an agreement or “deal” could have a number of components, as it did here. In this case, the petitioner’s exposure to prison time was greatly reduced, his plea was to a lower charge, other charges were nolled3 and it was agreed
The rule of strict construction of exceptions and “noscitur a soeiis,” as explicated and applied by the majority, do not dictate the result reached. It does not follow that, because the other two exceptions under
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Oral concessions developed during oral argument before this court may properly be used even where the trial record is silent. Hirsch v. Braceland, 144 Conn. 464, 469, 133 A.2d 898 (1957); see W. Moller & W. Horton, Connecticut Practice-Practice Book Annotated, Supreme Court and Appellate Court Rules and Forms (1989) p. 184, § 4107, comment.
In addition, not infrequently, we have utilized concessions of counsel made in oral argument before this court. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Warden, 214 Conn. 23, 570 A.2d 673 (1990); State v. Stange, 212 Conn. 612, 624, 563 A.2d 681 (1989); Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 540 n.22, 562 A.2d 1100 (1989); Ruskewich v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 213 Conn. 19, 21 n.3, 566 A.2d 658 (1989).
The Connecticut
“(1) That the prosecuting authority will amend the information to charge a particular offense;
“(2) That the prosecuting authority will nolle, recommend dismissal of, or not bring certain other charges against the defendant; or
“(3) That the sentence or other disposition will not exceed specified terms or that the prosecuting authority will recommend a specific sentence, not oppose a particular sentence, or make no specific recommendation.” Section 692 is drawn from the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, the American Bar Association Standards and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (seeFed. R. Crim. P. 11 [e] [1]). L. Orland, Connecticut Criminal Practice (1981).
The petitioner does not consider the Practice Book provisions as anything more than guidelines as to what may be plea agreements, and, in any event, he maintains that they do not affect the statute. It is interesting, however, to note that the disposition of the criminal charges in this case involves elements of each of the three subdivisions of § 692.
In addition, at oral argument, petitioner’s counsel “suggested” that the fact that the petitioner filed an affidavit with the state that he had enrolled in a drug treatment program and admitted that he was drug dependent “played a part” in the prosecuting attorney’s decision to let the petitioner plead to lesser charges.