Thе plaintiff brought this action, pursuant to § 4307 of the General Statutes, 1 to recover damages for personal injuries which he claimed were caused by the intoxication of a person to whom the defendant had sold alcoholic liquor when *454 that pеrson was in an intoxicated condition. The defendant pleaded a general denial and, in a special defense, thе one-year Statute of Limitations, § 8324. The plaintiff demurred to the special defense, and the trial court sustained the demurrer. Aftеr trial to the court a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant has appealed.
The facts are as fоllows: The plaintiff was struck and injured by an automobile operated by Henrietta Warner when he was crossing Franklin Avenue in Hartford at 10 p.m. on November 3, 1950. The defendant, Bernard Lucas, was the owner and permit-tee of a restaurant and tavern on Franklin Avenuе. The only people who worked there were the defendant and his wife and two bartenders. Mrs. Lucas worked in the kitchen during the dаy. One bartender worked full time during the day and the other part time at night. Shortly before the accident, Mrs. Warner had entered the defendant’s restaurant and tavern and ordered a glass of beer. She had been drinking beer elsewhere and was intoxicated. Thе defendant, or a waiter employed by him, served her a glass of beer, which she paid for and drank. She left the tavern, enterеd an automobile and had driven it a short distance on Franklin Avenue when she struck the plaintiff. At the time, of the accident and immediаtely afterwards she was intoxicated. The plaintiff’s injuries were the consequence of her intoxication. This action was instituted by a writ, summons and complaint served upon the defendant on November 18, 1952. The trial court concluded that the defendant, by himself or his agent, had sold alcoholic liquor to Henrietta Warner while she was intoxicated and that the plaintiff’s injuries were the cоnsequence of her intoxication, and ordered judgment entered for the plaintiff.
*455 The appeal presents two questions of law: (1) Does the one-year limitation for an action for damages imposed by General Statutes, § 8324, bar this action? (2) Is the finding thаt the defendant, by himself or his agent, sold alcoholic liquor to Henrietta Warner while she was intoxicated sufficient to fix liability on thе defendant under § 4307 ?
Section 8316 of the General Statutes imposes a three-year limitation upon all actions “founded upоn a tort.” The pertinent provisions of § 8324 state that “[n]o action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct, or by malpracticе of a physician, surgeon, dentist, chiropodist, chiropractor, hospital or sanatorium, . . . shall be brought but within one year from the date of the act or omission complained of.” In
Tuohey
v.
Martinjak,
The defendant argues that § 8324 applies in the case at bar because the plaintiff’s injuries were causеd by negligence or wanton misconduct. The gravamen of the plaintiff’s cause of action is not negligence or wanton misconduct but rather a violation of §4307. 2 This statute establishes a cause of action based upon a specified course of conduct and the consequences of such conduct. It creates a new tort liability which is subject to the three-year limitation fixed by § 8316 for tort actions not caused by negligence. The court properly sustained the demurrer.
The defendant cоntends that the court’s finding that “[t]he defendant, or a waiter employed by the defendant,” and its conclusion that “[t]he defendant, by himself or his agent,” sold alcoholic liquor to Mrs. Warner, without specifying which one, is not sufficient to fasten liability upon him. The complaint alleged that “the Defendant, acting himself or through one of his agents,” sold the alcoholic liquor to an intoxicated person. No more specific statement of this alternative allegation was demanded. A sale by either one meets the requirеment of the statute. It could not advantage the defendant to
*457
claim that not he, but his waiter or bartender, sold the alcoholic liquor unless he was prepared to prove that it was sold by his employee in violation of his instructions and without his knowledge — а defense not offered in this case.
State
v.
Lamperelli,
There is no error.
1’n this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
“Sec. 4307. liquor seller liable por damage by intoxicated person. If any person, by himself or his agent, shall sell any alcoholic liquor to an intoxicated person, and such purchaser, in сonsequence of sueh intoxication, shall thereafter injure the person or property of another, sueh seller shаll pay just damages to the person injured, to be recovered in an action under this section.”
The substance of this statute, enacted in 1933 (Cum. Sup. 1935, { 1088c), is not new, A similar statute was in force prior to the period of national prohibition. Public Acts 1882, c. 107, pt. 6, § 12; Rev. 1918, § 2815.
