*1 prosecution contended purchasers prove failed of stock re- alleged
lied on untrue statements affirming
have been made. In the convic-
tion the court there stated : prosecutions said that in
Courts have 77q(a),
under 15 at least where U.S.C. § employed, fraudulent scheme was it is prove part-
unnecessary to that a victim money property
ed with in reliance
upon misrepresentations.
A number cases so are cited opinion.
in the It is to be remembered
that the instant case is criminal and not person
civil dam- where defrauded seeks
ages for the fraud. assignments
Other of error made but
they are merit without and therefore are
not discussed herein. refusing
The trial court did err in requested by appellant.
instruct as justify
evidence was sufficient to the ver- judgment
dict rendered. The is affirmed.
HENRIOD, J., CROCKETT, C. MAUGHAN, JJ.,
TUCKETT and concur. STANTON,
Thelma B. Respondent, STANTON, Jr.,
James Lawrence Appellant. Defendant
No. 14268. Supreme Court of Utah. Christian, Kipp Christian, Gary & D. June City, appel- defendant and Salt Lake
lant. Fowler, Roe,
Bryce E.
Roe
Salt Lake
&
respondent.
City, for
ELLETT, Justice:
appeal
challenges
plaintiff;
$2,700
support to
awarding
*2
H3
Legislature
in
of Utah
The
The territorial
and costs.
interest
together with
performance
duty
its
the
lawful
of
enacted
daughter of
made for a
was
award
C.L.U.1876,
which reads:
her
period ensuing after
Section
parties for a
culminating at her
birthday
period
in
eighteenth
and
of
The
birthday.
refer-
twenty-first
Statutory
age
twenty-one years
of
and
to the
eighteen years;
ences are to U.C.A.1953.
that of
in females to
1960, defendant, pursu-
In November of
been
in
language has
carried
The identical
divorce, was
original
ant to an
decree of
since.
our law ever
month
ordered to
for
minor
support payments
each
Obviously
provisions
two
parties.
two
children of the
There were
Supreme
separable
statute
and
children, daughter,
was born Febru-
a
remanding
States
the United
Court
son,
12, 1953,
birthday
ary
whose
decide
matter directed that we
which
this
Upon the
was
January
legislate
date
then
bit on
age was correct and
age
years, the
daughter attaining the
of 18
say
age majority
that the
our own
father, defendant,
sup-
paying
ceased
age
is
the one sex
also the
so chosen for
mother,
port
Subsequently, the
for her.
majority for the other sex.
plaintiff,
entry
judg-
filed a motion
jus-
chosen as
The oath we took when
$2,700,
sum
against
ment
Supreme
for-
tices of
Court
eight-
which
had accumulated
on
duties
func-
us to encroach
bids
birthday
daughter. The trial
eenth
However,
need
legislature.
we
tions of
ground that
court denied the motion on the
any
make
The
not
such determination.
decree,
obligation
support, under
to
age of the male child in this divorce case
at-
terminated at the time the
question.
never
called
into
Coun-
majority.
tained her
question
sel for the ex-wife raises a
girl
age.
child became of
The
when
appealed
this court
Plaintiff
on
1
Supreme Court never
that she did
held
uncon
ground
statute created an
that the
reached the
become
when she
stitutional classification
violation
years.
equal protection
clause of
Fourteenth
This court found the statuto
Amendment.
many times
re
We
said
have
too
ry
classification reasonable
affirmed
presumed
is
quire citations that
the trial court.2
clearly appears
be valid unless
provision of the Consti
some
conflict with
provi
some
in vain for
One looks
tution.
Supreme Court,
United States
which ruled
says
girl
sion of
Constitution
that the classification set
denied
so
at
not become
does
laws,
guaranteed
girl
that a
does reach
must hold
we
However,
the Fourteenth Amendment.3
majority
age.
at that
the court observed that its
Utah,
attempt
in an
Legislature of
The
terminate the
as it was the
satisfy
justices of
prerogative of the state court to determine
States, passed an
of the United
when
defendant’s
chil-
his
U.C.A.1953,
15-2-1,
amendment to Section
support pursuant
dren’s
divorce
it now reads:
so that
cree terminated under Utah law.
mat-
minority extends
ter was
remanded
eighteen
turn, the
and females to the
case
remanded
.
.
.
years;
trial court for
proceedings.
further
Stanton,
S.Ct.
Section
95
421 U.S.
U.O.A.1953.
3.Stanton
(1975).
L.Ed.2d 688
43
Stanton,
2. Stanton v.
30 Utah
P.
2d
(1974).
2d
that the statute hold-
law recognized
It thus
obvious
common
this differ-
at
ing-
majority
their
ence
girls
provided
attained
maturation when it
girls
give
could
marriage
constitutional.
consent to
12, while a boy had to
give
that a difference
The claim made
consent.
attains
person
which a
equal protection
of the law.
a denial
*3
Regardless
judge
what a
constitutionality of
Even if that be true the
equality,
thinking
think about
cannot
only by
can
be raised
one
change the
facts
life. The records of
lawsuit. Neither the
had an interest
marriage department
in Salt Lake
to,
boy
girl
party
is
nor interest-
nor the
County
per
show that 62
cent
all
of women
only
parents
in,
ed
is
this matter.
get
who married do so
between
by
fussing
obligated
who is
who are
about
only
14 and
cent of
while
support.
is no
give
the decree to
There
marry
years
age.
men who
are
under
question
that
about
each child
the fact
judicially
To
hold that males and fe-
supported.
properly
been
males
maturity
attain their
age
at the same
By
parents
our
statute4 both
biological
is to be blind to the
facts of life.
equally
duty
support
charged
with the
to
The order of the trial
is
court
reversed
question
be-
educate
children.
and costs are awarded
appellant.
to the
interpretation
to
given
fore us is the
to be
ap-
from which no
decree of divorce
peal
by
party.
either
has ever been taken
HENRIOD, Chief
(concurring) :
That
is final and cannot now be
decree
opinion’s
I concur in the main
conclusion
At
made
changed.
the time the decree was
that this
accept
court cannot
hun-
everybody knew that for almost one
effect,
of the lower
in determining
court
girls
dred
for
apparently, that a female is a minor until
judge
had been
is
right
she
as
support,
to the
simply
parties
proceeding all
assumed that
because a male has been considered such
when
decree
that
the father
by
legislative agencies
our
ever since this
support
should
one
furnish the
be the
memory
writer’s
contrary
runs to the
not.
during
minority it
their
for the children
also,
agree
that the mandate of the U.S.
meant that the father should furnish
be well intended but is
support
he reached 21 and
for
son until
wanting
somewhat
specificity, apparent-
she
for the
until
reached
ly inviting
this court to set an
interpretation of that
can
No honest
decree
support
termine when
for children ends in
contrary.
be made
This, my
divorce cases.
opinion, is not
girl
support
If the
needs
after
luxury
of this
but that of the
minor,
by
then if
she be a
claimed
branch,
legislative
that
com-
—nor
not),
parent
she
is
(which
mother
is
each
law,
by
appears
mon
that law there
support
for her
and the burden can-
liable
have been
more than
adult-
upon just
them.
be cast
one of
hood,
males,
respect
females,
crimi-
(of
sex),
raped,
nals
being
either
statu-
proper
If in a
case it could be held that
otherwise,
torily or
etc.
protection
it
equal
is a
of the
denial
recognize
upheld
law
that there is a difference
Because this
award
mature,
sexes
would not
of a
when the
female
until she became
thereafter,
certainly
denial
to en-
is
also be a
but not
no mat-
fact,
marry
therefore,
judicata
res
able a female to
fourteen
ter of
marry
particeps here),
must be
is
(who
while the male
order
that male
is
divorce, only
16?
until
entitled to
U.C.A.1953.
two
marily
between
with a
entitled
is
a female
that
he
—or
defendant;
parties:
en-
is so
he
because
she
support until
universality of
incidentally
with a
titled.
law.
Supreme Court
of the U. S.
The mandate
upon the
directly
Focusing attention
wording
its
by
is evidenced
they are involved
rights
parties as
any unconsti-
appellee
claims
lawsuit,
principles
are certain
in this
and fe-
inequity between
tutional
applied.
should be considered
treating
be remedied
is to
many times
place,
the first
as has
than
rather
adults at
males as-
said,
family
and the
relating
matters
of adulthood
privileges
withholding
equitable.1
of children are
Where-
they
until
reach 21.
from women
fore,
defendant, against whom
be resolved
issue
state law to
is an
sought, is entitled to have
courts on remand
*4
con-
equity
good
and
considerations of
although prevailing here
appellant,
The
applied in his behalf.
examined and
science
issue, may or
constitution
on the federal
decree,
entry of the
time of
At the
the
ultimately
her lawsuit.
win
not
pay
the
which ordered
$100
if
Logic
require
would seem
that
per
each of the
children
month for
minor
issue,
just
issue,
as much an
it
so
15-2-1,
the.parties, our statute Section
concerned,
say
constitutionality
far as
U.C.A.1953,provided:
inequality
by
“is
that
to be remedied
treat-
19.5,
ing
as
rather than
adults
twenty-one
and
males to the
by withholding the
privileges
adulthood
eighteen years.
that of
females to
from
they
women until
reach 19.5.”
plainer
that under both
courts of Utah
It could not be
set
respectively
21
and 18
males and fe-
and decisional law
this State
en-
that,
it
males. A statute did
as
existed at
time the decree
the remand
tered,
necessarily
as
people
mandate that the
and therefore
these
“is an
contemplation
parties,
by
and of
issue
law to be
of state
resolved
courts,”
imposed
it
historically
only obligation
has
trial
not been con-
concept
upon
he
acceptable legal
by
sidered
an
defendant was that
daughter
his
Sherri
judiciary.
per month until
legislature
our State
Our Utah
$100
Further,
satisfy
shown that
it
has tried to
the mandate of the
was 18.
U.
change Supreme
any
an
substantial
setting
S.
certain
pointed
justify changing the
upon
facts
for both sexes
out in the main
opinion,
opinion
decree as so made intended.
and I am
if
that
literally
carried
court
out the
important
picture
facts in the total
Other
proceedings
Court’s remand “for further
that the defendant has fulfilled the
are:
court,”
conformity
opinion
with the
of this
decree;
required of him the
duties
adulthood,
we could set
date of
impose
that
of this decree is to
the effect
up
therefore that
to which
would
which he had
upon
an
him
added burden
15, 19.5,
obligatory
thus
or —and
anticipate
plan
obligation
no
for.
fly in
legislature’s
the teeth of our own
upon
any
does not
confer
benefit
now
already
legislative
enacted
interdiction.
requires
to reimburse
daughter,
him
but
plaintiff
years’ additional
for three
CROCKETT,
(concurring):
month,
$3,600,-
support at
total
concur,
adding
following
com-
consist-
plus
This is not
interest thereon.
:ments
sup-
objective
award of
ent with the
of an
money.
provide for
port
purpose is to
What seems to have been almost lost
Its
life
sight
dealing
necessities of
pri-
ongoing
of here is that we are
the current and
U.C.A.1953;
Coffman,
for the and it the daughter at- taining father, provide years, a means for the accumulation fendant, upon charged debt paying a burdensome ceased duty. mother, Subsequently, plaintiff, under circumstances her. Indeed entry justice where the interests dictate filed motion for against $2,700, would be unfair or unconscionable do defendant for the sum of so, eight- the court restrain enforcement which had accumulated of such an Mason birthday daughter. accumulated debt. See eenth The trial Mason, 328; Or. 34 P.2d Frank- court denied on ground v. the motion Franklin, U.S.App.D.C. decree, lin v. under the ter- 12; Neb. minated Wassung Wassung, F.2d at the time the attained 340; Parenti, majority, Parenti v. which status was set forth in N.W. 15-2-1, U.C.A.1953, 71 R.I. 41 A.2d For the above as it then existed. it is even more true that the reasons provided: retroactively place such a should not period minority extends in males upon burden the defendant. the age twenty-one years fe- rights Considering as between eighteen years.1 to that defendant, my judg- to this court on the principles equity ment it is discordant to ground the statute created unconstitu justice add such a substantial bur- tional classification in violation of the upon post den an ex the defendant facto equal protection clause of the Fourteenth *5 change of during game. the rules For Amendment. This court found the statuto reasons, these in addition to those stated ry classification reasonable and affirmed opinion the main and in the concurrence of the trial court.2 Henriod, join Chief in the deci- Justice sion reversing judgment. Court, United States which ruled the classification set denied MAUGHAN, (dissenting): laws, guaranteed of appeal challenges However, the Fourteenth Amendment.3 $2,700 awarding support plaintiff; child the court observed that its together with interest and costs. terminate the as it was made, award was for a prerogative of state court to determine parties; period ensuing for a after the when defendant’s chil- for his eighteenth birthday girl, and culmi- support pursuant dren’s de- divorce nating twenty-first birthday. We cree under mat- terminated Utah law. The Statutory should affirm. references are to ter was remanded to this U.C.A.1953. turn, was case to the trial remitted pur- 1960, defendant, November of proceedings. court for further divorce, suant to a decree was ordered pay plaintiff appeal, On defendant contends the trial support month payments authority pay- court did not have to order each of the minor children children, support parties. ment of child had There were two after child daughter, urges attained the of 18. Defendant February born 1953; First, son, may and two alternatives. this court whose birth date was Stanton, v. 1.This statute Stanton Utah 2d was amended ch. currently provides: (1974). see. P.2d 1010 “The females eighteen Stanton, years; but 3. Stanton v. all minors 421 U.S. 95 S.Ct. majority by marriage. (1975). obtain their fur 43 L.Ed.2d It provided ther that courts in divorce actions order 21.”
H7 daugh- as a son infirmity This act defines a child does the constitutional termine years.7 entirety; ter under the in its invalidate the rather, may be construed the statute but of the matter here inception After upon emancipation, the benefit confer (L. decision, of 15-2-1 enactment classes male and female both legislative ex- 1975) continued the Second, if court determines pression Liability of the Uniform Civil effect, then statute in no governing Act, that “courts by providing Support set at be should actions order divorce conformity the national such, to the exclusion 21.” It does trend. majority, therein. authority to or- court had the The trial for the ac- explicit reason Although the defendant, for support, payment der forth, its trial court is not set tion of the eighteenth beyond her birth- daughter, theo- under two judgment can be sustained plaintiff. be awarded day. Costs should emphasized the invalidi- should ries. strict- ty statutory classification was TUCKETT, in the Justice, concurs ly concerning to its effect confined opinion dissenting in the expressed views the instant matter the issue of MAUGHAN, J. is so limited. theory, if the statute Under void, common law “shall be
deemed this state.” in all
rule of decision courts male
(68-3-1) the common law both Under majority at attain their
and female years.4 in- theory, rather than Under the second Plaintiff, CURTIS, Douglas Lee scheme, validating the entire un- classification has where effect *6 INC., ELECTRONIC, Defendant. HARMON granting class reasonably a benefit to one another, denying it the benefit WESTERN The DENVER & RIO GRANDE A re- extended the excluded class. Third-Party Defendant, RAILROAD, discriminatory viewing correct Appellant, in- invalidating classification v . exception exemption and thus vidious COMPANY, CONSTRUCTION DeWAYNE Third-Party Defendant and whom extend benefits those Respondent. legislature improperly excluded.5 No. 14354. fe- To extend the benefit Utah. odds is not at July 1976. society legislative expression, with or our support un- is. der a decree divorce would coincide every legal duty man and wom- their children under the Uni- Liability Support Act.6
form Civil
(C.A.
3, p.
Internal Revenue
Am.Jur.2d, Infants,
v. Commissioner
4.
10.
Sec.
1972),
