STANTON v. STANTON
No. 73-1461
Supreme Court of the United States
April 15, 1975
421 U.S. 7
Bryce E. Roe argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was William G. Fowler.
J. Dennis Frederick argued the cause for appellee. On the brief was D. Gary Christian.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether a state statute specifying for males a greater age of majority than it specifies for females denies, in the context of a parent‘s obligation for support payments for his children, the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
I
Appellant Thelma B. Stanton and appellee James Lawrence Stanton, Jr., were married at Elko, Nev., in February 1951. At the suit of the appellant, they were divorced in Utah on November 29, 1960. They have a daughter, Sherri Lyn, born in February 1953, and a son, Rick Arlund, born in January 1955. Sherri became 18 on February 12, 1971, and Rick on January 29, 1973. During the divorce proceedings in the District Court of Salt Lake County, the parties entered into a stipulation as to property, child support, and alimony. The court awarded custody of the children to their mother and incorporated provisions of the stipulation into its findings and conclusions and into its decree of divorce. Specifically, as to alimony and child support, the decree provided:
“Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of $300.00 per month as child support and alimony,
$100.00 per month for each child as child support and $100.00 per month as alimony, to be paid on or before the 1st day of each month through the office of the Salt Lake County Clerk.” App. 6.
The appellant thereafter remarried; the court, pursuant to another stipulation, then modified the decree to relieve the appellee from payment of further alimony. The appellee also later remarried.
When Sherri attained 18 the appellee discontinued payments for her support. In May 1973 the appellant moved the divorce court for entry of judgment in her favor and against the appellee for, among other things, support for the children for the periods after each respectively attained the age of 18 years. The court concluded that on February 12, 1971, Sherri “became 18 years of age, and under the provisions of [
The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah. She contended, among other things, that
“[I]t is our judgment that there is no basis upon which we would be justified in concluding that the statute is so beyond a reasonable doubt in conflict with constitutional provisions that it should be stricken down as invalid.” Id., at 319, 517 P. 2d, at 1013.
If such a change were desirable, the court said, “that is a matter which should commend itself to the attention of the legislature.” Id., at 320, 517 P. 2d, at 1013. The appellant, thus, was held not entitled to support for Sherri for the period after she attained 18, but was entitled to support for Rick “during his minority” unless otherwise ordered by the trial court. Ibid., 517 P. 2d, at 1014.
We noted probable jurisdiction. 419 U. S. 893 (1974).
The appellee initially suggests that the support issue is moot and that, in any event, the appellant lacks standing. These arguments are related and we reject both of them.
A. The mootness suggestion is based on the propositions that both the appellant and Sherri are now over 21 and that neither possesses rights that “can be affected by the outcome of this proceeding.” Brief for Appellee 9. At the time the case was before us on the jurisdictional statement, the appellee suggested that the case involved a nonjusticiable political question. Appellee‘s Motion to Dismiss 6-7. Each approach, of course, overlooks the fact that what is at issue is support for the daughter during her years between 18 and 21. If appellee, under the divorce decree, is obligated for Sherri‘s support during that period, it is an obligation that has not been fulfilled, and there is an amount past due and owing from the appellee. The obligation issue, then, plainly presents a continuing live case or controversy. It is neither moot nor nonjusticiable.
B. The suggestion as to standing is that the appellant is not of the age group affected by the Utah statute and that she therefore lacks a personal stake in the resolution of the issue. It is said that when the appellant signed the stipulation as to support payments, she took the Utah law as it was and thus waived, or is estopped from asserting, any right to support payments after the daughter attained age 18.
We are satisfied that it makes no difference whether the appellant‘s interest in any obligation of the appellee, under the divorce decree, for Sherri‘s support between ages 18 and 21, is regarded as an interest personal to appellant or as that of a fiduciary. The Utah court has described support money as “compensation to a spouse
The appellant herself thus had a legal obligation under Utah law to support her daughter until Sherri became 21. That obligation, however, obviously was not in derogation of any right she might have against the appellee under the divorce decree. Her interest in the controversy, therefore, is distinct and significant and is one that assures “concrete adverseness” and proper standing on her part.
We turn to the merits. The appellant argues that Utah‘s statutory prescription establishing different ages of majority for males and females denies equal protection; that it is a classification based solely on sex and affects a child‘s “fundamental right” to be fed, clothed, and sheltered by its parents; that no compelling state interest supports the classification; and that the statute can withstand no judicial scrutiny, “close” or otherwise, for it has no relationship to any ascertainable legislative objective. The appellee contends that the test is that of rationality and that the age classification has a rational basis and endures any attack based on equal protection.
We find it unnecessary in this case to decide whether a classification based on sex is inherently suspect. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498 (1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U. S. 484 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971).
Reed, we feel, is controlling here. That case presented an equal protection challenge to a provision of the Idaho probate code which gave preference to males over females when persons otherwise of the same entitlement applied for appointment as administrator of a decedent‘s estate. No regard was paid under the statute to the applicants’ respective individual qualifications. In upholding the challenge, the Court reasoned that the Idaho statute accorded different treatment on the basis of sex and that it “thus establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.” Id., at 75. The Clause, it was said, denies to States “the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute.” Id.,
The test here, then, is whether the difference in sex between children warrants the distinction in the appellee‘s obligation to support that is drawn by the Utah statute. We conclude that it does not. It may be true, as the Utah court observed and as is argued here, that it is the man‘s primary responsibility to provide a home and that it is salutary for him to have education and training before he assumes that responsibility; that girls tend to mature earlier than boys; and that females tend to marry earlier than males. The last mentioned factor, however, under the Utah statute loses whatever weight it otherwise might have, for the statute states that “all minors obtain their majority by marriage“; thus minority, and all that goes with it, is abruptly lost by marriage of a person of either sex at whatever tender age the marriage occurs.
Notwithstanding the “old notions” to which the Utah court referred, we perceive nothing rational in the distinction drawn by
Only Arkansas, as far as our investigation reveals, remains with Utah in fixing the age of majority for females at 18 and for males at 21.
We therefore conclude that under any test—compelling state interest, or rational basis, or something in between—
IV
Our conclusion that in the context of child support the classification effectuated by
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
The Court views this case as requiring a determination of whether the Utah statute specifying that males must reach a higher age than females before attaining their majority denies females the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
The Utah statute which the Court invalidates “in the context of child support,” ante, at 17, does not by its terms define the age at which the obligation of a divorced parent to support a child ceases. The parties concede that the Stantons could have provided in their property settlement agreement that appellee‘s obligation to support Sherri and Rick would terminate when both turned 18, when both turned 21, or when one turned 18 and the other turned 21. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, 14, 23. This case arises only because appellant and appellee made no provision in their property settlement agreement fixing the age at which appellee‘s obligation to support his son or daughter would terminate. The Supreme Court of Utah, faced with the necessity of filling in this blank, referred to the State‘s general age-of-majority statute in supplying the terms which the parties had neglected to specify themselves.
Had the Supreme Court of Utah relied upon the statute only insofar as it cast light on the intention of the parties regarding the child support obligations contained in the divorce decree, there would be no basis for reaching the constitutionality of the statute. In supplying the missing term in an agreement executed between two private parties, a court ordinarily looks to the customs, mores, and practice of the parties in an attempt to ascertain what was intended. If, upon consideration of these factors, including the age-of-majority statute, the Utah Supreme Court had concluded that the Stantons intended to bestow more of their limited resources upon a son than a daughter, perhaps for the reasons stated in the opinion of that court, that strikes
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Utah may have concluded that, the parties having failed to specify this term of the agreement, the question became one of Utah statutory law rather than one of determining the intent of the parties. If that were its determination, the constitutionality of
I do not think it possible to say with confidence which of these two approaches was taken by the Supreme Court of Utah in this case. In addition to this difficulty, there is another element of attenuation between the claim asserted on behalf of Sherri to be treated like her brother for purposes of child support, and the actual case before us. Utah has a comprehensive scheme dealing with child support in its Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
These factors lead me to conclude that the issue which the Court says is presented by this case, and which it decides, cannot properly be decided on these facts if we are to adhere to our established policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional adjudication. I would dismiss the appeal for that reason. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, supra; Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583 (1972).