Lead Opinion
The sole issue before us is whether appellant’s “for fee” exclusion in the uninsured motorist coverage of appellee’s personal automobile insurance policy is enforceable in the commercial setting in which this case arose. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the exclusiоn is not enforceable. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
The General Assembly determined by enacting R.C. 3937.18 that automobile liability carriers must offer uninsured motorist coverage tо their customers. Watson v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. (1988),
The General Assembly has determined, however, that automobile liability carriers must only offer uninsured motorist coverage to their customers; it has not made the purchase of uninsured motorist coverage mandatory. Orris v. Claudio (1980),
II
In 1992, this court stated in State Farm, supra, that automobile insurance policies may not eliminate or reduce uninsured motorist coverage. Specifically, the court held:
“An automobilе insurance policy may not eliminate or reduce uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, requirеd by R.C. 3937.18, to persons injured in a*114 motor vehicle accident, where the claim or claims of such persons arise from causes of action that are recognized by Ohio tort law.” Id. at syllabus.2
When the syllabus law in State Farm is applied to the faсts in this case, it is clear that appellant’s “for fee” exclusion is unenforceable. Notwithstanding appellees’ argument that the exclusion is ambiguous, the exclusion plainly eliminates coverage to at least those persons, like appellee, who are injured while driving vehicles that are being used for commercial purposes. In addition, appellant does not dispute that appellеe has a cause of action in tort against the uninsured motorist whose car caused the accident. Thus the facts of this case fit squarely within the syllabus law in State Farm. Appellant argues, however, that this court should still enfоrce the “for fee” exclusion in appellee’s insurance policy.
Appellant argues in its briеf that public policy does not favor extending the syllabus law in State Farm to a commercial setting. Appellant asserts that the commercial use of a vehicle entails a greater risk of loss than does the personal use of a vehicle; that appellee did not contract for commercial exposure coverage but instead paid only personal automobile premiums; and that if this court dоes not enforce the “for fee” exclusion, insurance companies will have no choicе but to raise personal automobile premiums to account for the increased risk of loss. Appellant concludes by stating that everyday, non-commercial drivers should not have to pay for this incrеased risk.
Despite the cogency of appellant’s arguments, we decline to carve out a commercial-context exception from the syllabus law set forth in State Farm. This is a matter of public poliсy best left to the General Assembly. We believe that enforcing appellant’s “for fee” exclusion аt this time would only frustrate the policies of predictability and stability found in the doctrine of stare decisis.
Accordingly, we hоld that an exclusion in the uninsured motorist coverage of an automobile liability policy which states thаt uninsured motorist coverage does not apply to the use of any motor vehicle by an insured to сarry persons or property for a fee is unenforceable.
For the foregoing reasons, thе judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. See, e.g., Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Finch (1987),
. State Farm gave a different interpretation to R.C. 3937.18. The writer authored Dairyland and dissented in State Farm. However, the General Assembly has not reacted to State Farm,. Given a time frame of well over one year, State Farm, must be regarded as settled law and the doctrine of stare decisis must apply.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring. I concur in the syllabus and judgment of the mаjority. I do not concur in some of the gratuitous comments set forth in the opinion, which comments are not only unwarranted but also unnecessary in the deciding of this case.