263 N.W. 433 | Minn. | 1935
For Mr. Stanton life came to an end about five o'clock p. m. of Sunday, October 15, 1933, in the course of his employment by the Minneapolis Street Railway Company, relator here. He was a long-time employe, having worked in the Lake street car barn since 1928. His principal tasks were those of utility repairman and electric control inspector. His was the duty to inspect and keep in repair the controls on 35 or 40 streetcars from time to time housed in the Lake street barn. In addition, he habitually worked with others of the crew in keeping the place clean and shoveling sand from work cars into sand chutes leading into a basement. The sand is brought in during the summer and stored for use as needed. He was shoveling sand at the time he died, just as he had regularly in the summertime during many years. His day off was Saturday. He worked eight hours a day, six days a week, including Sunday.
On the afternoon of October 15 he, with two fellow workers, Tomshek and Milliken, were removing sand from a work car into a chute leading to the storage basement. Two other employes had been working with them but had quit at four o'clock. The sand was damp, moistened to keep down the dust. The work was not being done hastily, the men shoveling for about 15 minutes and then resting for two or three. Stanton was using a lighter and smaller shovel than those of his two companions. They say that he, being older (he was 58), could not do and was not doing as much work as they. The Friday before he had complained of trouble with his "wind" — shortness of breath. That afternoon, during a rest period, the men had lighted cigarettes, and Stanton remarked that he might have to quit smoking. It was affecting his "wind." The sand going through the chute accumulated on the floor four feet below and piled up against the wall and clogged the chute. When three men were shoveling, it was customary to have another in the basement to keep the chute clear. The chute having *459 clogged when the car was about two-thirds empty, Stanton was directed by the acting foreman, Tomshek, to go down and clear it. Stanton appeared to be in his usual health. He went into the basement alone. The chute was promptly cleared. His companions on the car continued shoveling for at least five minutes, according to the testimony of both, when, the chute again clogging, a call to Stanton brought no reply.
Milliken went into the basement and found him dead, his body lying on the back, feet in the sand, the shoes covered with two or three inches of it, and the shovel standing upright with blade in the sand just in front of his feet. That is the whole ante-mortem story. There is no suggestion of accident or fortuitous event other than the death itself — no evidence of blow, sudden strain, more than ordinary exertion, excitement, or aught else to explain why death ensued.
An autopsy did expose the cause, coronary sclerosis with "a fairly recent thrombosis." In the heart itself "were several areas of extensive fibrosis, the muscles replaced by fibrous tissue." The anterior descending branch of the left coronary was completely closed. In that artery was much calcification of the wall, "in the center of the lumen [opening] there was a dark substance, which was a thrombosis * * *. The right coronary was completely closed, * * * due entirely to intimal thickening and calcification." All of these conditions had been of gradual development, save only the clot or thrombus.
The medical testimony for petitioner ascribes the thrombosis, not to any accident or fortuitous event, but solely to exertion, the opinion being that "over-exertion" caused death. But the term "over-exertion" is used only as indicating a degree of labor exceeding that which the doctors considered safe for any heart already as "tremendously damaged" as was Stanton's. Even so, their whole testimony comes near, if not quite, to being reducible to the arithmetical statement that there was a "fifty-fifty" chance that the man's work had nothing to do with his death; that is, in about one-half of such cases death is as likely to come while the victim is walking or under other slight physical stress, or even when he is *460 resting. Many such deaths have come without apparent connection with exertion of any kind, and even when the subject was in bed. There was admission from one of petitioner's doctors that "the majority of them" had died when they were not at work. We do not overlook the testimony of another that 50 per cent is "probably high" as an estimate of the number of such cases where death results without any particular work or exertion.
This summary of all medical testimony for petitioner indicates that, as to cause, the case even from the medical viewpoint is almost, if not quite, one of mere conjecture rather than reasonable inference. It comes close to leaving the evidence in such balance that petitioner has not sustained the burden of proof resting upon her to show the cause of death by fair preponderance of evidence. But we do not base decision upon that ground. We hold rather that there was no showing of accidental cause within the workmen's compensation law, which (1 Mason Minn. St. 1927, § 4326[h]) defines an accident as "an unexpected or unforeseen event, happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time injury to the physical structure of the body." Without stopping to examine the difference, if any, between that and "fortuitous event," used in argument (see Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Comm.
A fortuitous event is one "happening by chance or accident; occurring unexpectedly, or without known cause." Webster's New International Dictionary, Unabridged (2 ed.) 1935, p. 994. Were that the literal and only test, all sudden deaths happening during the course of an employe's work would be compensable. Obviously, that is not the intent of our law else it would not have defined "accident" as it has. Furthermore, sudden death from disease, in the course of employment, would not have been ruled out, as it is.
Death itself may be unexpected or unforeseen, and so fortuitous. But, even with antecedent change in "physical structure," death alone does not justify compensation. It is the cause rather than the result which makes the latter compensable. There must be a sudden, violent, extraneous happening, which can be assigned by *461 reasonable inference rather than mere conjecture as the cause of death. Preceding Stanton's death, there was nothing of sudden or violent nature. We assume that the thrombosis itself was an injury to the physical structure of the body within the meaning of the statute. But, without accidental and extraneous causation of the sort made condition precedent to compensation, it is without consequence.
Aside from the not unusual circumstance that the doctors disagree, those testifying for relator being of opinion that nothing in Stanton's work contributed to his death, the facts are not in dispute. As said by Commissioner Debel, "There is no evidence of either over-exertion, undue exertion, or excessive strain in this case." There was no suggestion of external violence of any degree. Without such a factor of causation, there can be no recovery, a conclusion well substantiated by the very cases, heretofore decided by this court, upon which counsel for relator place much but mistaken reliance.
This case falls under the rule of Young v. Melrose Granite Co.
Decisions elsewhere, under a similar statutory distinction between accident and disease as causes of disability, are in accord. Acceleration of disease by "ordinary and usual conditions" of work rather than some "sudden or extraordinary strain or fortuitous happening" do not make the resulting death compensable. Pierce v. Phelps Dodge Corp.
Basically the sunstroke cases, e. g., State ex rel. Rau v. District Court,
Coming nearer the argument for compensation is Kallgren v. C. W. Lunquist Co.
To allow compensation in this case would establish a precedent which, if followed, would so result in any case where an employe came to his death during normal employment, simply because his heart stopped functioning because of disease. Such a decision is expressly forbidden by 1 Mason Minn. St. 1927, § 4327(3), reading thus:
"Neither the employe nor his dependents shall be entitled to compensation for disability or death resulting from disease unless the disease is due to the nature of his employment and contracted therein within the twelve months previous to the date of disablement, whether under one or more employers."
The enumeration of compensable, "occupational diseases" by subd.
(9) of that section excludes arteriosclerosis and thrombosis.
Order reversed. *464