46 Conn. 595 | Conn. | 1879
In 1862 R. J. Atkinson, the respondent’s decedent, made a contract with the petitioners whereby he bound himself to assist them in the enforcement of a claim against the United States, and accept in full compensation for such service five per cent, of the amount allowed. He completed his undertaking, the sum of $45,925.17 was allowed, and he became entitled to receive $2,296.25. This sum remained unpaid at his death, which occurred on February 25th, 1871. The respondent having been duly appointed
“J. W. Stanton and W. L. Palmer, to estate of R. J. Atkinson, deceased, Dr.
“ To amount due for professional services of R. J. Atkinson in prosecution of claim against the United States for the services of the Steamer Anglo American from May 22d to July 28th, 1862, and for services of Steamer Saint Charles from April 27th to July 28th, 1862, being five per cent, of amount allowed by the United States.
“Amount allowed by the United States, $45,925.17
“Amount due estate, 2,296.25 ”
This sum the petitioners refused to pay in full, claiming that they had overpaid Atkinson for other services to the extent of $1,534.36. They insisted upon their right to off-set this sum, offering to pay the balance. Thereupon the respondent instituted a suit against them in the Superior Court for the County of New London in this state, in November, 1871. The declaration contained a special count for a commission of five per cent.; also general counts upon a quantum meruit demanding $10,000. He withdrew this suit in March, 1872, having in the previous January instituted another in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in which the bill of particulars filed was as follows:—
“ J. W. Stanton and W. L. Palmer, to R. J. Atkinson, Dr.
“1870, Eeb. 3d. To services in prosecution of your claim against the United States before the third auditor and second comptroller from the year 1865 to date, $10,000
“ To subsequent services in same case, before the Secretary of the Treasury and other officials, by said Atkinson and by plaintiff as administrator, included in the above.”
Upon the trial of this cause the respondent offered evidence in support of the count upon the quantum meruit, and recovered a judgment for $9,185.18, with interest and costs; and, having brought an action of debt thereon in this jurisdiction, this petition asks for a pei’petual injunction against the enforcement thereof to a greater amount than for $2,296.25.
In Pierce v. Olney, 20 Conn., 544, the respondent having instituted a suit in New York against the petitioner, a resident of Connecticut, counsel of the former informed the latter that nothing would be done in relation to it until further notice to him. Resting upon this he omitted to enter an appearance. Without such further notice to the petitioner the respondent took a judgment against him, and brought his action of debt thereon in Connecticut. The petitioner asked for and obtained a perpetual injunction against the prosecution of that action. The court said:—“ The object of injunctions to stay proceedings at law, is to prevent injustice by an unfair use of the process of a court. They are granted on the ground of the existence of facts not amounting to a defence to the proceeding enjoined against, but of which courts of equity have jurisdiction, and which renders it against conscience that the party enjoined should be permitted to proceed in the cause. It is well settled that this jurisdiction will be exercised whenever a party having a good defence to an action at law has had no opportunity to make it, or has been prevented by the fraud or improper management of the other party from making it, and by reason thereof a judgment has been obtained which it is against conscience to enforce. Indeed, this falls directly within, and is but an illustration of, the general rule, that equity will interfere to restrain the use of an advantage gained in a court of ordinary jurisdiction, which must necessarily make that court an instrument of injustice, in all cases where such advantage has been gained by the fraud, accident or mistake, of the opposite party.”
We think that the case at bar falls within the principle thus stated. The petitioners of course had from the beginning full knowledge of the terms of their contract with the respondent’s decedent; knowledge that under it he could not recover a judgment for a greater sum than five per cent, upon the amount allowed by the United States, unless he
The finding is that “ at the time of the trial of this case at Washington neither Mr. Stanton nor Mr. Palmer was present in court. Mr. Palmer was in Stonington; his attendance might have been secured by reasonable diligence, if such attendance had been deemed very important. Mr. Stanton was ill at his hotel in Washington; too ill to attend the trial. His counsel asked for a postponement on that account; but no affidavit was offered in support of the motion and it was denied. The petitioners’ counsél appears to have been content to proceed with the trial in the absence of his clients. He had full, and, as it turned out, undue confidence in the legal defences, which appear by the record to have been set
Thus it is made certain that the decedent, if living and enforcing his claim, would have had no right to ask for or take a judgment for more than five per cent.; if he had offered, either in the presence or absence of the petitioners, evidence in support of the count upon a quantum meruit, it would have been the suggestion of a falsehood, for by his contract he had barred himself from making that claim in any form or for any reason. Neither in the forum of law, nor in that of equity or conscience, could he have asked for or received or retained the judgment which was rendered in his name upon the motion of his representative. The case stands as if the decedent had obtained the judgment and now stood in person in this court asking its aid in enforcing it. The administrator is no stronger in law or equity or morals. The fact that the latter failed to come to the knowledge of the truth as to the debt and in ignorance misled the court into the rendition of a wrongful judgment, does not destroy the right of the petitioners to have the wrong corrected now that it is pointed out. The court in this jurisdiction knowing the truth cannot be made the instrument of injustice. Eor the decedent to have obtained this judgment would have been fraud; for he had all knowledge. He could not have used the forms of law in any court for the enforcement of it; equity would bar him in every jurisdiction. As the respondent had not “full knowledge” that the contract was as he originally stated it to be, for him to have obtained it was unintentionally to have moved the court to an act of injustice. That act cannot be made to rest upon his ignorance; the judgment still remains without foundation.
To grant this petition is not to put any restriction upon or in any manner to interfere with the court of the District of
It is claimed by the counsel for the respondent that this right to go into the court which rendered the judgment and ask for a new trial, a remedy which it is claimed is open to the petitioners under the laws of the District of Columbia, is an adequate legal remedy, and that this court can not assume equitable jurisdiction over the matter while the petitioners have this remedy. But no legal remedy can be considered as adequate which a party is compelled to go into a foreign jurisdiction to avail himself of. It must be a remedy which our own courts can apply.
The Superior Court is advised to grant the prayer of the petitioners upon payment by them of the sum of $2,296.25 with interest from March 16th, 1871.
In this opinion the other judges concurred; Judge Beardsley of the Superior Court sitting in the place of Judge Granger who was absent.