22 F. Cas. 1070 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern Alabama | 1875
It is conceded that the petitioners are holders of the high numbered bonds for value and without actual notice of any infirmity attaching to them. These bonds are commercial paper, and as such are binding upon the railroad company when in the hands of a bona fide holder for value. Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. [62 U. S.] 539; Woods v. Lawrence Co., 1 Black [66 U. S.] 386; Mercer Co. v. Hackett, 1 Wall. [68 U. S.] 95; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, Id. 175; Van Hostrop v. Madison City, Id. 291; Meyer v. Muscatine, Id. 384; Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. [69 U. S.] 110. By the same authorities they are equitably binding upon the state by reason of its in-dorsement. Neither the railroad company nor the state enters into this controversy. The contention is between bondholders; the parties who hold bonds bearing numbers less than 4,721 insisting that their bonds only are secured by the mortgage, and what they style the overissue or high numbered bonds are not secured. The claim of the holders of bonds bearing numbers below 4,721 is based on two grounds: first, because the petitioners holding the high numbered bonds were put on notice of the fact that their bonds were not secured by the mortgage; and second, because by the very terms of the mortgage these bonds are not secured by it;' that mortgage declares what bonds it is intended to secure, and these bonds are not among them.
1. Were the holders of the overissue or high numbered bonds put on notice of the fact that the bonds they held were in excess of what the terms of the mortgage deed authorized? The power of the railroad company to issue, bonds was unlimited. It could issue as many as it chose. The bonds are therefore binding upon the railroad company. Were the holders of the bonds put upon sufficient notice of the facts that bonds held by them were not secured by the mortgage? .The holders of the bonds were bound to take notice of what was contained in or indorsed upon their bonds; they were bound to take notice of what was contained in their deed of mortgage, and of the laws of the state referred to in the deed of mortgage. Royal British Bank v. Turquand, 6 El. & Bl. 327. Upon a reference to this mortgage deed, the purchaser of bonds would have learned that the mortgage was only intended to secure bonds at the rate of $16,000' per mile. He was, therefore, bound to reasonable diligence to find out whether his bonds were secured by the mortgage deed or not..
By a perusal of the laws of the state referred to in the mortgage, and also upon the face of the bond, he would have learned that the governor of the state of Alabama was authorized to indorse the bonds of the railroad to the amount of $16,000 per mile of completed railroad; that the oath of the president and chief engineer of the railroad company as to the number of miles of completed railroad was required to be filed with the governor as the •. evidence of the fact that so many miles had been completed, and that he was authorized to act on that evidence in making his indorsement. By a reference to the bonds, they would have seen that the governor had indorsed them and recited in his indorsement that he had done so in pursuance of law; they would have seen that the face of the bon’d recited that it was one of a series of numbered ■bonds, issued in accordance with the laws of the state above recited, secured by the indorsement of the governor, made in pursuance of the same laws, and was a first lien upon the railroad and other property of the railroad' company, and they would have seen that the bonds bore the indorsement of the trustees named in the mortgage deed, to the effect that they were the bonds described in, and secured by the said mortgage. So it would seem that the very bonds and mortgage which put the purchasers upon inquiry lulled and satisfied inquiry. They had the right to presume that the governor had not violated his duty; that before he indorsed the bonds, he had on file the oath of the president and chief engineer of the railroad company, that a sufficient number of miles of railroad had been completed to authorize the indorsement. Besides this, they had the statement of the president and treasurer of the railroad company on the face of the bond, and of the trustees for all the bondholders upon the back of the bond, that the bonds were secured by the mortgage. To require the purchaser to go behind the indorsement of the governor, sustained, as they had the right to presume, by the oath of the president and chief engineer of the railroad company, and the statement of the railroad company itself, made by its president and treasurer, and of the trustees who were appointed to act for all the bondholders, would be to require every purchaser of a bond actually to measure the road for himself to ascertain its length. While, therefore, the mortgage put the purchaser upon inquiry as to the length of the road, the mortgage itself, and the bonds, with their statements and indorse-ments, answered the inquiry in such a way as to satisfy the most cautious and wary. But suppose the purchaser of bonds had ascertained the length of the road for himself by actual measurement, how would that help him to know whether his bonds were outside or inside the terms of the mortgage? The bonds all bear the same date, and fall due on the same day. Bond number one has, therefore, no advantage over any other bond, and no presumptions are to be indulged in its favor. There is no presumption of law that it was issued first or sold first. On the contrary, the presumption is that all were sold at the saíne time. Practically, we know that where a large number of bonds are put upon the market, the high numbered bonds are just as likely to be sold-first as the low numbered bonds. So that if the purchaser should, before purchasing, ascertain for himself the precise length of the road, he would have no
X conclude, therefore, that while it is true that the mortgage limits the number of bonds to be secured thereby, and the holder of bonds might be required to take notice of that limitation, there was nothing to put him upon notice that the limit thus fixed had been exceeded; on the eontraiy, that all the presumptions and all the evidence was that it had not; nor if he had ascertained that the limit had been exceeded, was he bound to conclude from the fact that his bonds bore the higher numbers, that they were the over-issue bonds, rather than others.
2. But it is claimed that the mortgage was executed to secure sixteen bonds of $1,000 each to the mile, and no more, and that no larger number of bonds can be secured by it than its terms authorize; that when the officers of the railroad company had issued sixteen bonds to the mile, they had no power to issue a greater number to be secured by that mortgage, and the overissue is not secured. But the difficulty recurs that there is no way of ascertaining which are the over issue bonds. The law presumes they were all issued at one and the same time, and the purchaser has the right to act on that presumption. The bonds are numbered, not for the purpose of giving one number any advantage over another, but as a matter of convenience in their registration and identification. The case is this: A mortgage is made to trustees to secure a given number of bonds, and as a matter of security to the bondholder-!, the trastees are required to place their certificate upon the bond to the effect that it is described in and secured by the mortgage. The common trustees of all the bondholders are unfaithful, and certify to a larger number of bonds than were intended to be secured by the mortgage. The result is that all must suffer from the unfaithfulness of the trustees. But no part of the bondholders can say that the loss shall fall exclusively on others. It is a case for the application of the rule that equality is equity. A second mortgage bondholder would have the right ito insist that the first mortgage should only secure bonds to the extent of $ÍG,000 per mile. But no first mortgage bondholder has the right to say that he shall be paid in full to the exclusion of others whose bonds purport to be secured by the same mortgage, and whose equities are equal to his.
The views expressed are illustrated by a fact in this case. The length of the railroad constructed is, in fact, only 290 miles; five miles of the line between Chattanooga and Meridian is not the property of this road, but is leased from the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad. So that according to the mortgage, the company should have issued and the governor indorsed only 4,640 bonds; yet it issued 4,720 as for the entire line between Chattanooga and Meridian. There is, therefore, among the 4,720 bonds an over issue of 80 bonds. Now I ask what 80 bonds of the 4,720 are to be excluded from the benefit of the mortgage? There is no rule by which any can be excluded. They must all share pro rata in the proceeds of the mortgage property. As the proceeds of the property sold are not sufficient to pay more than one-fourth of the first mortgage bonds, no second mortgage bondholder is injured by allowing the over issue bonds to share in the proceeds, and no first mortgage bondholder can exclude any other from sharing in the proceeds.
The result is that the prayer of petitioners must be granted.
