154 P. 887 | Or. | 1916
delivered the opinion of the court.
Summarizing the detailed statement already made, the case presented here is one where a society of Methodists established a mission church in 1848, constructed a house of worship at the corner -of Third and Taylor Streets in 1850, and was incorporated in 1867 as the ‘ ‘ First Methodist Episcopal Church in Portland, Oregon”; in 1884 the “Grace Methodist Episcopal Church of Portland, Oregon,” was organized, and its house of worship was located at Twelfth and Taylor Streets; each society was a constituent body of the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States of America, and was subject to the customs, usages, and discipline of Methodism; the two societies continued to exist separately until 1912, when they were regularly and by order of competent ecclesiastical authority consolidated, and the Grace Methodist Episcopal Church was merged into the First Methodist Episcopal Church, the former ceasing to exist, and the property owned by it being transferred to the latter; all the church activities were transferred to Twelfth Street, the building at Third Street was closed, and services were not permitted to be held in that building; a number of the members of the First Methodist Episcopal Church as it existed prior to the consolidation of the two churches and who had worshipped at Third Street refused to go to Twelfth Street; the plaintiffs claim that the building at Third Street cannot be lawfully closed, and they therefore are attempting to enjoin the defendants from closing the building.
Before attempting to state our conclusions, it may be of interest to call attention to the customs prevailing in 1850 and the regulations observed at that time concerning lands. On July 5, 1843, the inhabitants of Oregon, assembled in mass meeting held at Champooick, agreed to adopt certain laws and regulations “until such time as the United States of America extend their jurisdiction over us,” and Article VIII of the regulations provided for the election of a recorder who was required to “record all boundaries of land presented for that purpose.” On July 2, 1845, the legislative committee adopted, and on July 26, 1845, the people ratified at the polls, certain “rules and regulations, until such time as the United States of America extend their jurisdiction over us.’’ Article III of “the
“All future contracts, by any person or persons entitled to the benefit of this act, for the sale of the land to which he or they may be entitled under this act, before he or they have received a patent therefor, shall be void”: 1 L. O. L., p. 48.
Daniel H. Lownsdale filed on the land under the provisions of the donation law on March 11, 1852, and on October 17, 1860, he received a donation certificate which recited that he was entitled to a patent and, as stated in Barney v. Dolph, 97 U. S. 652 (24 L. Ed. 1063):
“When the right to a patent once becomes vested in a settler under the law, it was equivalent, so far as the government was concerned, to a patent actually issued”: Hall v. Russell, 101 U. S. 503 (25 L. Ed. 829); Quinn v. Ladd, 37 Or. 261 (59 Pac. 457).
' Daniel H. Lownsdale never signed any contract or conveyance affecting the land in dispute, except the instrument dated November 5,1850, quitclaiming five lots to James H. Wilbur as trustee; and the defendants argue that this writing was void because it was a future contract prohibited by the express terms of the donation law. The plaintiffs answer the defendants by contending that the evidence shows that prior to September 27, 1850, the grantors orally dedicated the land for “the purpose of a parsonage, church, etc.”; and also that the evidence leads to the necessary inference that James H. Wilbur and the grantors made an oral agreement prior to September 27, 1850, the terms of which were afterward reduced to writing on November 5, 1850, and that therefore the agreement was not a future contract within the meaning of the donation law.
It is fair to assume that some kind of an understanding was had before September 27,1850, but there is no evidence of the terms of an oral agreement, unless it be said that the writing of November 5,1850, furnishes the evidence. John Flynn, a Methodist minister, known to pioneer history as Father Flynn and 98 years of age at the time of the trial, testified that he met James H. Wilbur, who was also known as Father Wilbur, in Portland on September 19, 1850, and that Father Wilbur was at that time constructing a church on the land described in the writing of November 5,1850; that the building was not finished until some day in the following October when the structure was dedicated by a Congregational minister preaching in the morning, Father Flynn preaching in the afternoon, and Father Wilbur in the evening. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that some oral agreement was entered into before commencing the construction of the building, and if that conclusion is correct it necessarily follows that the agreement was prior to September 27, 1850, and consequently not prohibited by the donation law. There is also in evidence an old map, known as the Brady map, which was made some time in 1850 from the field-notes of a survey made in the spring of that year. Beferences to this map appear in Carter v. Portland, 4 Or. 340, 344; Lownsdale v. Portland, 1 Or. 397, 408 (Fed. Cas. No. 8579, Deady’s Rep. 39, 47); Portland v. Whittle, 3 Or. 126 (note); Leland v. Portland, 2 Or. 47; Lang v. Portland, 75 Or. 385 (147 Pac. 378). A number of blocks which are now used for public purposes are colored on this map; the north half of block 23, including lots 1, 2, 7 and 8, but not including lot 6, is colored, and plaintiffs rely upon this circum
While it is doubtful whether the writing of November 5, 1850, considered as an agreement made before September 27, 1850, even though it was followed by a user of the land, had the effect of impressing the realty with a trust which the heirs in conjunction with Wilbur or his successors could not revoke, nevertheless we shall assume, but do not decide, that the writing of November 5, 1850, exerts the same effect that would have resulted if, after he received his donation certificate, Lownsdale had made a warranty deed describing the same land, stating the same consideration, and containing the same recital: “For the purpose of a parsonage, church, etc.,” found in the writing of November 5,1850.
In passing, it may be of interest to note how the property has been used since 1850. The church, as erected in 1850, faced Taylor Street; in about 1860 it was enlarged by a cross-addition on the rear, and in 1869 was moved so as to face Second Street, the present brick church having been completed. After the old church was moved to Second Street, on lots 1 and 2, it was rented for secular purposes. In 1851 James H. Wilbur sold lot 6, and afterward the title was quieted in a suit against the heirs and administrator of Daniel H. Lownsdale. On April 26, 1892, the First Methodist
‘ ‘ The only remaining question is, as to the effect of the clause in the contract to convey the block, and which, it is not denied, is also contained in the deed executed by Collins. The deed conveys the absolute fee, without any conditions or restrictions whatsoever. The power of alienation is not limited or confined in any way. Had the grantors in the deed imposed as a condition of the sale, that the block should be used for county buildings and for no other purpose, they perhaps, might invoke the power of a court of chancery to restrain a threatened sale of it, but the facts show that the grantors received the price demanded for the property, abating nothing, on the ground that the purchase 'was made for the purpose of erecting upon it county buildings, gnd it was quite immaterial to them to what purpose the block would be devoted, they having received full price for it. It, no doubt, was the intention of appellants, when the purchase was made, to devote it as expressed in the deed, but that formed no part of the consideration, nor was it the inducement to the grant. Subsequent events may have admonished those authorities, that the financial condition of the county*175 did not justify an expenditure such as contemplated when the purchase was made, and that the best interests of the county required a sale of the property. We fail to see anything in the transaction to take from them the power expressly conferred upon them by statute, to sell the land. There is no covenant in the deed that the land shall be devoted to a particular purpose, but by its terms the county became possessed of an absolute estate in fee simple to the land, uncontrolled by any condition, restriction, limitation or reservation, whatever. If A buys a lot of ground of B and it is declared in the deed that he purchases it as a site for a mill or other operative establishment, the fee being conveyed to him, he has the undoubted right to dispose of it without carrying out his intention. But if a grant be made by A to B on condition B erects on the land granted a certain structure, and he fails so to do, the land might revert to the grantor. But it is needless further to argue the case. Here was an unqualified sale of the fee in this block; it became vested in the county, and appellants, as their lawful agents, have full right and authority to sell it, and should not have been enjoined from so doing.”
It appears from the quotation that the grantors were paid money for the land, and that the conveyance was not a gift. The same rule, however, was applied without any modification to a case where the deed was quite like the one here. In Downen v. Rayburn, 214 Ill. 342 (73 N. E. 364, 3 Ann. Cas. 36), the deed made on July 28, 1856, recited that William R. Downen and wife, “for and in consideration of the sum of one dollar,” sold to the trustees of the Industry Congregation of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church a parcel of land “to be used for a church location”; a church was erected and remained on the land until 1904, when it was removed. In 1901 the land was conveyed to Rayburn. The land had not been used for church purposes for several years, prior to the transfer to Ray
‘ ‘ There is nothing in the words in question to indicate that the premises conveyed were to be used as a church location for any particular length of time.”
The doctrine was reaffirmed in Walker v. Illinois C. R. R. Co., 215 Ill. 610 (74 N. E. 812), and in Weihe v. Lorenz, 254 Ill. 195 (98 N. E. 268). Other authorities give support to the principle announced in the Illinois cases: Beach v. Haynes, 12 Vt. 16; Fuquay’s Heirs v. Trustees of Hopkins Academy, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 744 (58 S. W. 814); 2 Devlin, Deeds (3 ed.), p. 1829. See, also, Fussell v. Hail, 134 Ill. App. 620, 636; Rankin R. B. Church v. Edwards, 204 Pa. 216 (53 Atl. 770; Cushman v. Church of the Good Shepherd, 14 Pa. Co. Ct. 26; Hardy v. Wiley, 87 Va. 125 (12 S. E. 233); City of Huron v. Wilcox, 17 S. D. 625 (98 N. W. 88, 106 Am. St. Rep. 788); Fitzgerald v. Modoc Co., 164 Cal. 493 (129 Pac. 794, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1229); and the note to Doan v. Vestry of the Parish of the Ascension, as reported in 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1119. The language employed in the instrument of November 5, 1850, does no more than to express the motive of the grantors or to announce the intention of the grantee; the words used are not appropriate for the creation of a charitable trust so as to require the land to be used, for all time for church and parsonage purposes only.
‘ ‘ There is a very palpable distinction between a gift of land from motives of charity, and a dedication of land to charitable uses; and there are most intrusive reasons giving a judicial bias in favor of satisfying the motive without establishing a perpetual dedication. Our law discourages the fettering of estates and putting them into mortmain, and therefore favors the construction which relieves from restraints upon alienation. And it seems unreasonable to suppose that a devisor even means that his heirs shall get back the land in such cases, except when he says so; or that, amidst the rapidly changing opinions of society, he means that his opinions shall be imbibed by others just as he left them, and shall forever withstand the changes necessarily incident to the progress of society; or that he means that no change in the number, circumstances, and habits of the people shall ever justify any sort of conversion of the gift. It would seem contrary to public policy to favor a construction that would give to a man, who died a hundred or a thousand years ago, the control of land that ought to be controlled by the present generation. Such an intention ought to be expressed, not implied. When we look at the varied institutions of the last few centuries, and at the constant and rapid changes which are going on in the circumstances, habits, opinions, and institutions of our own age, we see how unreasonable are many perpetual dedications of*178 land, and how much caution there should he in implying an intention to create perpetuities. ’ ’
We are not unmindful of the statement in Chapman v. Wilbur, 4 Or. 362, 364, that “the grant here was an absolute grant to the defendant in trust for a certain purpose specified”; but that remark was obiter dictum, because the case was decided and ended the very moment the court, determined that the deed did not contain a condition subsequent.
‘ ‘ That the old church property, corner of Third and Taylor Streets, be kept separate and leased or improved so as to be made as productive as possible, the entire net revenue from this property to he used under the direction of the board of trustees of the consolidated church for church purposes. After five years ’ time, from date of consolidation, unless the consolidated church requires the full income in payment of its improvement obligations, the board of trustees are directed to distribute at least half of the net income for city church extension and other missionary or charitable work in the Methodist Episcopal Church.”
The Loveland resolutions reaffirm the original articles of consolidation and provide for the selection of trustees to whom the land at Third and Taylor Streets shall be conveyed “to be perpetually held in trust by said trustees for the support of Methodist City Church Extension in the City of Portland, the revenue from same to be expended according to Article IV of the original agreement of consolidation, which agreement was dated July 30, 1912, and signed by the joint committees of the two churches in interest.” Trustees were chosen and a deed was executed, but the deed was annulled by order of the quarterly conference because of the commencement of this suit. It must be admitted that the deed itself is perhaps broader than the resolutions authorizing its execution, and contains a provision which contemplates the possibility of a sale by the trustees; but such sale can be made “only upon written application to the quarterly conference of said
While our conclusions result in an affirmance of the decree, we think that it will be just and fair for the litigants to pay their own disbursements. Around the old Taylor Street Church cling recollections which cover most of life’s journey and sound every note in the gamut of human sentiment for some of those who worshipped there so long; and this in part accounts for the earnest contentions made by plaintiffs. Furthermore, even after the consolidation of the two societies the church authorities in various ways acted upon the assumption that the land at Third Street was burdened with a trust; the condition of the title to the land was not free from doubts; and in view of all the circumstances surrounding the parties we think it is equitable that the decree be without costs or disbursements in this court.
The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed, but without judgment for costs and disbursements in this court.
Affirmed.