63 Vt. 244 | Vt. | 1891
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered by
It appears from the statement of facts filed in the County Court, that Michael Burns was adjudged an insane person, and a guardian appointed over him in February, 1888 ; that Burns lived in his own home and was cared for by Bridget Manghan; that, while Burns was under guardianship, the plaintiff rendered services for him and from time to time loaned him money, and the same was used by Bridget Manghan in the purchase of necessaries for his support.
The statement of facts, and the fair inferences to be drawn from them, would warrant the court in finding that the “insanity 55 which the Probate Court found as a ground for appointing a guardian was not of that character which disqualified the ward from entering into a valid contract for necessaries.
It does not necessarily follow,' when there has been an adjudication by the Probate Court that a person is insane, that the insanity is of that character which disqualifies him from making a valid contract for necessaries. Motley v. Head, 43 Vt. 633; Blaisdell v. Holmes, 48 Vt. 492. In the last named case the plaintiff was permitted to recover of the defendant for services rendered for him under a contract made with him, after he had been adjudged an insane person by the Probate Court, and while he was under guardianship.
Judgment affirmed, and cause certified to the Probate Court.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting opinion by
The majority of the court affirm the judgment below, on the ground that the items of plaintiff’s account were necessaries, furnished by him to defendant’s testate, under such circumstances as to entitle plaintiff to recover therefor. I am unable to concur in this opinion and decision.
It was conceded on hearing that judgment was rendered in the County Court for the plaintiff to recover $102.64, although ■this fact does not appear from the exceptions. The trial in the County Court was by the court who filed a statement of these facts signed by the judges, and this court is confined to a consideration of the facts thus found. Laws of 1888, No. 56, s. 1. The County Court found that the first nine items of plaintiff’s account with interest from October 13, 1888, to- date of judgment, amounted to $102.64, the amount for which judgment below was rendered; that said nine items are as follows:
1887.
(1) Dec. 27, Michael Burns, to one day at Rutland. .. .$ 2 00
(2) Car fare and hotel.................... 75
18.88.
(3) Feb. 7, Do................................. 2 75
(4) June 5, Do................................ 2 75
(5) 8, Cash................................ 40 00
> ......... 30 00
One day...... 2 00
Hotel, ear fare 1 40
That the plaintiff’s testate, Michael Burns, was adjudged to be an insane person, Feb. Y, 1888, and a guardian appointed over him Feb. 11, 1888, by the Probate Court for the district in which he then resided, and that the guardian duly accepted the appointment ; that at the time items Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 were contracted, the plaintiff had no knowledge that Burns had been adjiidged insane and á guardian appointed, but he had such knowledge when items Nos. 6 to 9 inclusive accrued ; that during the time covered by the account, Burns was a feeble, insane old man, living in his own house, cared for by Bridget Manghan; that both Burns and Bridget were not on friendly terms with the guardian, and when the latter applied to Bridget to learn if anything was needed for Burns, he was told that Burns was not in want, and did not at the time know of the loans by the claimant to Burns until the latter’s death; that had Bridget made known to the guardian the wants or needs of Burns, they would have been supplied by the guardian; that the services were rendered and cash paid as charged in the account; that “ the money speA iffed in items Nos. 5, 6 and Y was used by Bridget Manghan in the support of, and necessaries for, the testatethat Burns died July 14, 1889; that after the first nine items had accrued, the claimant presented his account to the guardian and he promised to pay the items of a date prior to the appointment of the guardian, but told the plaintiff he would not pay the items charged during the guardianship.
As the plaintiff did not except to the disallowance of items Nos. 10 to 14 inclusive of his account by the court below, it is unnecessary to consider them. No facts except as above stated were found bearing upon the question whether Burns was in need of necessaries or in regard to whether the items of plaintiff’s
An insane person, whether under guardianship or not may be bound by his contract for necessaries, if made in good faith by the other party and under circumstances which justify the contract. 1 Par. Cont. 387; Chit. Con. (10 Am. Ed. by Perkins) 150 ; Seaver v. Phelps, 11 Pick. 304; McCrillis v. Bartlett, 8 N. H. 569 ; Lawyer v. Lufkin, 56 Me. 308. The liability of an insane person, and of an infant, for necessaries, stand on the same footing, and are governed by the same rules of law. Metcalf Oon. 79 ; Thompson v. Leach, 3 Mod. 310; 2 Greenl. Ev. s. 369; Seaver v. Phelps, supra; Lincoln v. Buckmaster, 32 Vt. 652, which cites with approval Seaver v. Phelps, supra ; Sawyer v. Lufkin, supra.
The law allowing infants and lunatics to bind themselves by their contracts for necessaries, is solely for their benefit, and intended as a shield, not as a sword to their hurt.
It is well settled that it is a question of law whether the articles furnished to an infant are of the name and quality coming wdthin the term necessaries, and a question for the jury to determine to what extent the articles of that denomination were necessary to the particular case. In Thrall v. Wright, 38 Vt. 494, which was an action to recover for alleged necessaries furnished defendant, a minor, it was held that although the articles sued for are in the class denominated necessaries, yet the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to show affirmatively that they were in fact necessary for the infant when furnished. Peeve’s Dom. Rel. Nos. 227, 228; Bainbridge v. Pickering, 2 Wm. Black 1325 ; Ewell’s Lead. Cas. on Inf. Cov. & Id. 62, 63. In Johnson v. Lines, 6 Watts & Serg. 80, 40 Am. Dec. 542, which was an action to recover for alleged necessaries furnished defendant, a minor, and under guardianship, the court say: ££ The rule of law is that no one may deal with a minor; the exception to it is, that a stranger may supply him with necessaries proper
Reason and a sound public policy require that a plaintiff seeking to recover for alleged necessaries furnished an insane person should be held to the same measure and rule of proof as above laid down in the case of an infant, especially where the insane person is under guardianship. To hold otherwise, would make the appointment of guardians to an insane person under our statute, practically of no effect, and turn the insane ward over to the care of any person who might interfere in his behalf, without regard to how the guardian looks after or supplies the wants of his ward. In Lincoln v. Buckmaster, supra, the lunatic was not under guardianship. In that case the court said : “ This right to supply necessaries to lunatics will not justify any one in crediting them with what otherwise might be necessaries so long as they are rightfully under the care and control of family friends, on the ground that they are not properly supported, any more than one can so interfere in the mode of clothing and educating infants, while under the care of their natural or legal guardians. All the cases hold this.” This reasoning applies with far greater force in a case like the one at bar where the lunatic is under guardianship, and where the guardian is seeking to learn the wants of his ward and is ready and willing to supply them. The case shows no occasion for the interference of a stranger.
Burns was a “ feeble, insane, old man,” during the entire time covered by plaintiff’s account. The court below failed to find that Burns was in want or that any necessity existed which made any of the items charged necessaries at the time they accrued. There is nothing which tends to show that any of the
It is to be presumed that the County Court found and reported all the facts which the evidence before it warranted it in Ending, and it is not for this court in view of the statute requiring the finding of facts to be in writing and signed by the judges, to assume that the County Court found facts not included in such statement which is like and takes the place of a special verdict. This court cannot find or infer facts. Hence, I insist that the plaintiff cannot' recover on the ground on which the majority of the court put their decision, for the reason that he has failed to show affirmatively that the various items of his account were necessaries of which Burns stood in need at the time they were furnished him. It may be said that the money specified in items Nos. 5, 6 and 7 was used in the support of and necessaries for Burns, but this does not answer the objection that the plaintiff has failed to prove that Burns.was so without means of support at the time the money was furnished as to make it fall within the meaning of the term necessaries, when it was loaned him. If the plaintiff were entitled to recover for the money expended by Bridget Manghan for necessaries, it is incumbent upon him to show the amount so used, and this he has failed to do. But the fact that some of the money was subsequently expended for necessaries cannot avail the plaintiff. Infants and persons non eonvpos mentis stand on the same footing as to their liability for necessaries, and also as to what constitute necessaries,
Sehouler’s Dom. Rel. 555 ; Tyler Inf. & Cov. 114 s. 70; Chit. Con. (10 Am. Ed. by Perkins) 163 ; 2 Kent Com. No. 235; Ellis v. Ellis, 5 Mod. 368 ; Darby v. Boucher, 1 Salk. 279; Earle v. Peale, 1 Salk. 387; Swift v. Bennett, 10 Cush. 436; Bradley v. Pratt, 23 Vt. 386.
This would seem to dispose of any claim of the plaintiff to recover on this theory for the money that was expended by Bridget.
Is the plaintiff entitled on any ground to recover for all or any part of his account? The case shows that the Probate Court had jurisdiction of the person and property of Burns at the time it adjudged him to be an insane person, and that this adjudication was made on due notice and hearing. The first three items of plaintiff’s account, amounting to $5.50, accrued prior to the adjudication and the appointment of the guardian. As they accrued before the adjudication of insanity, it was incumbent on the defendant to show that the mental condition of Burns at the time these items accrued was such as to render him incapable of contracting. This he has not done. Indeed, the defendant’s counsel practically admit plaintiff’s right to recover for these
The plaintiff cannot recover for the remaining items as they all accrued subsequent to the adjudication of insanity and the apr pointment of a guardian, it not appearing that they were necessaries. After inquisition and adjudication of insanity, and the appointment of a guardian to an insane person, all his contracts, except for necessaries, are void, while such adjudication' and appointment remain in force.
Beverly’s case, 4 Coke. 126b,-127a ; 5 Bac. Abr. (Bouvier’s Ed.) 28; 15 Am. Dec. 368 note to Jackson v. King; Ewell’s Lead. Cases on Inf., Cov. & Id. 588 ; Wait v. Maxwell, 5 Pick. 217 ; Leonard v. Leonard, 14 Pick. 280; Lynch v. Dodge, 130 Mass. 458; Pearl v. McDowell, 3 J. J. Marsh. 658, (S. C. 20 Am. Dec. 199); L'Amoureaux v. Crosby, 2 Paige Ch. 422, (S. C. 22 Am. Dec. 655 and note;) 1 Greenl. Ev. (12th Ed.) S. 550.
The soundness of this proposition is especially apparent when applied to adjudications under the probate system established by statue in this and many other of our States. It should be kept in mind that an inquisition of lunacy in England and in those states which retain the English system of proceedings in such a ease, is very different from the proceedings under the system of Probate Courts, in this and other States. By B. L. ss. 2436, 2437, provision is made for the appointment of guardians by the Probate Court to insane persons and spendthrifts. The words “ insane person ” include every idiot, non compos, lunatic, and distracted person, and the word “ spendthrift ” includes every person who is liable to be put under guardianship on account of excessive drinking, gaming, idleness or debauchery. B. L. ss. 7, 2435. A spendthrift may be put under guardianship whenever he so spends, wastes or lessens his estate as to expose himself or family to want or suffering, or the town to charge for supporting himself and family. B. L. s. 2437. By statute, guardians of these several classes of unfortunate persons, and of minors, have prac
Motley v. Head, 43 Vt. 633 is cited in the opinion of the majority of the court, as holding that an adjudication of insanity relied upon in defence, to be available, must be accompanied with evidence showing that the insanity is of that character which disqualifies the defendant from making a valid contract, and it does in effect so hold. This case seems to be anomalous. There is a line of cases in England and in America in states following the English procedure in making inquisition of lunacy, which hold that such inquisition and office found is only prima facie evidence of the incapacity of the defendant to make a valid contract. Most of these cases relate to contracts entered into before office found, but within a time during which the inquisition finds the person to have been a lunatic. I have found no case which did not hold that the finding was prima facie evidence of the defendant’s lack of mental capacity to make a valid contract.
Under the doctrine laid down in Motley v. Head, in order to have the adjudication and appointment of a guardian afford him any protection, the ward must show affirmatively that at the túne of the alleged contract, his mental condition resulting from excessive drinking, was such as to render him legally incompetent to enter into a valid contract. Leonard v. Leonard, supra,
The plaintiff kept house for defendant, did his cooking and so far as appears performed the usual household duties connected with housekeeping. Her term of service extended one year from Nov. 18Y0. The guardian died June 11, 18Y3, and prior to the-bringing of her suit, and after his death the defendant had no> guardian. It would seem from the facts stated that the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, on reason and authority, might have been and should have been put on the ground that plaintiff’s services were necessaries furnished under such circumstances as to make defendant liable therefor. The court seem to have decided the case on the ground that practically- there was a termination of the guardianship. In delivering the opinion of the court, Redfield, J. says : “ The adjudication of the Probate Court that defendant was at the time a proper subject for guardian-ship, is, no doubt, conclusive. And that condition of the-ward is, ordinarily, presumed to continue. But when it affirm- • atively appears that the ward has recovered . from his infirmity and is in the possession of a sound mind, and is conducting business in his own right and name, like other citizens, and the guardian sees him buy and sell, hire and pay,,
I am aware that this whole' subject is attended with difficulty and that the decisions bearing upon it are somewhat conflicting ; but in view of the beneficial results intended by the law providing for guardians over this class of persons, and having in mind its ample provisions for the termination of such guardianship, I think that this court has adopted a view of the matter in the two cases cited and in the case at bar which practically nullifies the law.
I would reverse the judgment and render judgment for the flamitiff to recover $5.50 damages.