26 Ala. 26 | Ala. | 1855
— The first question presented upon the record is, as to the action of the court in refusing to exclude from the jury the statement of one of the witnesses, that Russell, the party to whom the liquor was sold, was a person of known intemperate habits. It is true, that the
We regard, however, the refusal of the court to exclude the evidence that the intemperate habits of Russell were generally known in the community, as erroneous. The question was simply whether these habits were known to the defendants (Elam v. The State, 25 Ala. 53), and unless the evidence tended to bring home this knowledge to them, it was prima facie irrelevant. We are aware that the proposition that the general knowledge of a fact in a neighborhood, raises an inference as to the knowledge of each individual in the same neighborhood, has, on more than one occasion, received the sanction of this court; but on a careful examination of the question, we are satisfied that the rule as laid down cannot be sustained. We agree, that where a fact is of such a nature, or is surrounded by such circumstances, as to impress itself upon a neighborhood, or particular community, it will then create a presumption, more or less strong, as to the knowledge of each individual composing the community. This is nothing more than the 'assertion of the common principle, that whatever affects the whole affects the parts; and the inference then rests upon the positive character of the fact itself, or the attending circumstances. But because a fact is generally known, it does not follow that it is universally known ; on the contrary, as that which is within the knowledge of the greater portion of the community, may be properly said to be generally known, the proposition is unsound and illogical, as it makes that which affects a part only, extend to the whole. It has been urged, that the whole theory of circumstantial
In this court the doctrine was first advanced in Ward v. Herndon, 5 Port. 382, in which the action was for a deceit, in representing one Simpson to be solvent and worthy of credit, under the influence of which representations the plaintiff sold him goods to a large amount. On the trial, the representations as to the solvency and credit of Simpson were established, and it was also proved that he was generally reputed to be insolvent in the neighborhood in which both the defendant and himself resided. This last evidence was objected to, and on error held to be admissible to bring home knowledge of the reputation to the defendants, on the ground. “ that no man is presumed to be so much of a recluse as not to know what is generally known and talked of in his neighborhood.” While with deference we dissent from the reason- . ing, we agree that the decision was correct, on the ground that the defendants occupied a relation to the party whom they recommended, which should have put them on inquiry as to his credit; and his general reputation where the law presumed he was best known, was a fact affecting his credit. — • Lawson v. Orear, 7 Ala. 784. In The Bank v. Parker, 5 Ala. 731, the same doctrine was again asserted, and Ormond, J., dissented ; but it will be found on an examination of that case, that what was there said upon the question we are now discussing was a dictum merely, as the point did not arise upon the record. The subsequent decisions rest entirely upon
The views we have expressed apply to the charge of the court, and as it is probable the other questions presented on the record may not arise on another trial, we deem it unnecessary to decide them.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.