STANLEY SNEAD v. FLORIDA AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES
No. 17-10338
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
February 21, 2018
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-10338
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:15-cv-00325-RH-CAS
STANLEY SNEAD,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
FLORIDA AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL UNIVERSITY BOARD OF
TRUSTEES,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(February 21, 2018)
Before ROSENBAUM, JORDAN, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Aрpellee Stanley Snead was a campus police officer at the Florida
Agricultural and Mechanical University from May of 2005 until December of
2013. In August of 2013, under the supervision of a new police chief, the
supervision, officers were scheduled to work eight-hour shifts, under the new
chief, officers were scheduled to work for twelve hours at a time (though one shift
every pay period remained eight hours long). Snead tried working these new shifts
for a while but soon found himself experiencing symptoms related to high blood
pressure. After his doctor identified the twelve-hour shifts as the culprit, Snead
requested to work shorter shifts. The department refused, and Snead retired.
Snead then sued the university’s Board of Trustees, the appellant in this case
(“FAMU”), under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), claiming that the
university effectively forced him into retirement by refusing to provide him with a
reasonable disability accommodation.
The district court held a jury trial lasting two days. After Snead put on all
his evidence, FAMU moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that Snead
had failed to put on any evidence (1) that twelve-hour shifts were not an “essential
function” of his job, and (2) that the accommodation he requested was reasonable.
According to FAMU, Snead had “not provided any evidence whatsoever” to show
that twelve-hour shifts were not a required part of the job, nor had he shown that
new scheduling regime.1
sides had finished putting on all their evidence. The judge told the parties that he would “treat
the motion as renewed now at the close of all the evidence.” Neither side objected.
The district court took the motion under advisement and let the case go to
the jury. The jury found FAMU liable for violating the ADA and awarded Snead
$142,268.00 for “lost wages and benefits” and $108,810.00 for “mental and
emotional anguish.” The court then denied FAMU’s outstanding motion for
judgment as a matter оf law. On appeal, we must decide whether that was correct.
I.
We review de novo a district court’s decision to deny judgment as a matter
of law. Pickett v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 420 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005).
A district court should grant judgment as a matter of law when the plaintiff
“presents no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for
him on a material element of his cause of action.” Id. Otherwise, the motion
should be denied. Id. We must construe the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Carruthers v. BSA Advertising, Inc., 357 F.3d 1213,
1215 (11th Cir. 2004).
Snead’s claim arises under the ADA, which provides that employers shall
not discriminate against a qualified employee based on that person’s disability. 42
accommodation for an otherwise qualified disabled employee . . . .” D’Angelo v.
ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)). To establish a failure to accommodate, the employee “must
demonstrate that (1) he has a disability, (2) hе is a ‘qualified individual,’ which is
to say, able to perform the essential functions of the employment position that he
holds or seeks with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) the [employer]
unlawfully discriminated against him because of the disability.” D’Angelo, 422
F.3d at 1226 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The ADA defines a “qualified individual” as someone with a disability
“who, with or without rеasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42
U.S.C. § 12111(8). “Essential functions” are the “fundamental job duties of a
position that an individual with a disability is actually required to perform.” Id. at
1257; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i). Whether a job function is “essential”
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Holly v. Clairston Indus., 492 F.3d
1247, 1256 (11th Cir. 2007). Factors to evaluate include the employer’s judgment
as to whether the function is essential, the amount of time the function requires, the
consequences of not requiring the employee to do it, the terms of any collective
bargaining agreements, the experience of those who previously held the job, and
burdеn of identifying an accommodation, and of demonstrating that the
accommodation allows him to perform the job’s essential functions.” Lucas v.
W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2001).
Even if an employer failed to provide a reasonable accommodation, the
employer may still avoid liability by showing “that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business . . . .” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A).
II.
We conclude that a reasonable jury could have determined Snead was
entitled to relief under the ADA. FAMU argues that Snead failed to prove (1)
what the “essential functions” of his job were, (2) that he could perform them, and
(3) that his requested accommоdation was reasonable. FAMU also asserts that the
district court erred by declining to find that Snead’s requested accommodation
would have caused FAMU undue hardship. The record, however, shows that
Snead in fact provided evidence of all three items raised by FAMU. And the
record further shows that FAMU did not meet its burden to make out the
affirmative defense of undue hardship.
First, Snead provided evidence of the job’s essential duties by entering into
evidence FAMU’s “Position Description” for the Law Enforcement Officer
the document defined as “those tasks or functions that are fundamental to the
position and аffects [sic] position classification.” The Position Description sheet
does not list any specified shift length among those job functions labeled as
“essential.” Instead, a separate section of that form entitled “WORKING HOURS”
states the following: “80-hour biweekly pay period, consisting of six (6) 12-hour
workdays and one 8-hour day,” noting аlso that “[d]epending upon the needs of the
departments, shifts may be changed.” In other words, FAMU’s own form
specified a number of “essential” job functions but did not include shift length
among them. And in the section in which it did address working hours, the form
specified that those hours could change (without specifying whether they might be
shortened or lengthenеd). From all of this, the jury could have reasonably
concluded that the essential functions of Snead’s job were those functions—and
only those functions—listed as “essential” on the job description.
FAMU argues on appeal that the section of the form listing “essential” job
functions is not exhaustive. It points out the form does specify that officers’
working hours consist of twelve-hour shifts, a fact it says demonstrates that twelve-
hour shifts are essential to the job. This might be a reasonable interpretation of the
Position Description form. But the question we must decide is whether that is the
only reasonable interpretation. As discussed, it is not. FAMU also points tо the
importance of officers working twelve-hour shifts. This, too, might amount to
some evidence that working those shifts was an essential job function. But our
task is not to weigh evidence or make credibility judgments. A reasonable jury
could have looked tо the Position Description form and decided that the form’s
plain labeling outweighed any other evidence presented. Our inquiry must end
there.
Second, Snead’s testimony and a letter from his cardiologist provided ample
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude he could perform his job functions.
Snead testified at trial that he was able to perform each and every job duty listed as
either “essential” or “marginal” on his job description. And a letter from Snead’s
cardiologist, admitted into evidence as a trial exhibit, stated that after reviewing
FAMU’s job description for Snead’s job, the cardiologist believed Snead was
“caрable of performing the listed job duties” but should “be restricted to working
daytime hours and 8-hour shifts.”
FAMU characterizes Snead’s testimony as “self-serving” and
“unsupported.” But whether or not it is self-serving, his cardiologist’s letter does
away with any contention that his testimony was “unsupported.” Snead put on
enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude he could have performed all
essentiаl job functions even with his requested accommodation.
to revert to his previous shift schedule and that such a request was reasonable. He
entered into evidence a letter from his physician, Tracey Hellgren, specifying the
аccommodation she recommended on his behalf. Hellgren’s letter served as
evidence of what the accommodation itself would have entailed because in the
letter, she requested “a medical accommodation to return Mr. Snead to his previous
daytime eight hour shift duties and to be off permаnently from his nighttime twelve
hour shifts.” Snead also entered into evidence a copy of his Position Description
sent to FAMU by Hellgren containing Hellgren’s markups. On this document,
Hellgren wrote in the margins that Snead should work “7am-3pm M-F,” that he
should work a “40 hour work week,” and that he is “unable to do 12 (twelve) hour
shifts safely.” Snead testified at trial that his “рrevious daytime 8-hour-shift
duties” included finishing up work beyond his scheduled end time, working
football games, and covering a variety of other unlisted duties. Based on all of
this, a jury could have reasonably interpreted “his previous daytime eight hour shift
duties” to mean the shifts he used to work before the department’s switch. The
jury could have cоncluded that this language Hellgren employed allowed for Snead
to engage in all of his pre-switch duties, even the ones that included finishing up
his work beyond his scheduled end time.
to have prohibited him from working anything beyond an eight-hour work day and
a forty-hour work week. True, Hellgren’s instructions could reasonably be read as
prescribing firm limits to Snead’s work hours with no exceptions. But, again, that
is not our inquiry. We must ask only whether the jury could have reasonably
interpreted her instructions as allowing FAMU to return Snead to his previous
work schedule, which included occasional shift extensions and special events
outside of his regular hours. Again the answer is yes.
Of course, even if Snead rеally was asking to work exactly the same kinds of
hours he worked before, it is a separate question to ask whether that was a
reasonable-accommodation request. An accommodation is reasonable under the
ADA “only if it enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the
job.” Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1256 (11th Cir. 2007).
Rеasonable accommodations may include “job restructuring, part-time or modified
work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations,
training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and
other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12111 (9)(B). As we have discussed, Snead provided enough evidence for a
reasonable jury to conclude he could perform all essential job functions with his
accommodation request was reasonable.
III.
Finally, we must consider whether the jury could have reasonably concluded
that FAMU could not have accommodated Snead without undue hardship. “Undue
hardship” means “significant difficulty or expense incurred by a covered entity,
when considered in light of” several factors. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1). Those factоrs
include “[t]he nature and net cost of the accommodation needed”; “[t]he overall
financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the
reasonable accommodation, the number of persons employed at such facility, and
the effect on expenses and resources”; “[t]he overall financial resources of the
covered entity, the overall size of the business of the covered entity with respect to
the number of its employees, and the number, type and location of its facilities”;
“[t]he type of operation or operations of the coverеd entity, including the
composition, structure and functions of the workforce of such entity, and the
geographic separateness and administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility or
facilities in question to the covered entity”; and “[t]he impact of the
accommodation upon the operatiоn of the facility, including the impact on the
ability of other employees to perform their duties and the impact on the facility‘s
ability to conduct business.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2). Because undue hardship is
Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 286 (11th Cir. 1997).
FAMU relies on the testimony of Terence Calloway, chief of the
univеrsity’s police force, who explained the effects he believed Snead’s requested
accommodation would have on the department. Calloway testified to several
negative consequences: (1) Snead would miss the department’s daily briefings at
6:00 a.m.; (2) letting Snead off promptly after eight hours would disrupt the
handling of any ongoing situations and potentially endanger the officer replacing
him; (3) Snead would have multiple supervisors per week, which would disturb the
accuracy of his evaluations; (4) the department would have diminished manpower
on weekends; (5) there would not be enough patrol cars on weekdays for еveryone
working; and (6) the department would have to pay someone overtime to work the
remaining hours of the day after Snead’s shift ended. FAMU contends that
because Snead provided no evidence the contrary, the only reasonable conclusion a
jury could have reached is that Snead’s requеsted accommodation would have
imposed an undue hardship on the department.
This argument falls short for two reasons. First, much of Calloway’s
hardship testimony assumed a rigid interpretation of Snead’s requested
accommodation. Had Snead in fact requested to work only between 7:00 a.m. and
3:00 p.m. five days per week with no exceptions, then perhaps no reasonable jury
jury could have found that Snead instead requested to revert back to his former
schedule in which he stayed beyond the end of his shifts as needed and worked
both football games and special events. Assuming as we must that the jury made
this finding, it was free to ignore as irrelevant Calloway’s testimony about any
hardships that would have arisen from accommodating Snead through any other
work schedule he was not actually asking for.
But second, even as to the rest of the purported hardships Calloway
identified, a reasonable jury could have disregarded them wholesale in light of
severаl bits of less plausible testimony Calloway gave. Calloway testified that as a
result of changing officers’ default shifts from eight hours to twelve, the
department saved enough money to purchase new police vehicles, computers,
guns, and uniforms, among other things, and started training its officers in-house
instead of contracting training to an outside entity. On cross-examination,
however, Calloway testified that the department would not have been able to afford
any and all of those things if he had given Snead his requested accommodation.
The jury was not required to believe the claim that reducing the shift length of a
single line-level employеe would have required such extreme results. Calloway
did of course offer other testimony that was plausible on its own. For instance, he
testified that the department would have incurred costs from paying overtime to
inherently unbelievable, a jury is within its right to disregard the rest of that
witness’s testimony, too. See N.L.R.B. v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 656, 659
(1949) (“[I]n the determination of litigated facts, the testimony of one who has
been found unreliable as to one issue may properly be accorded little weight as to
the next.”); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 171 F.2d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1948)
(jury “may reject all of [a witness’s testimony] if the jury believes that such
witness has willfully and corruptly sworn falsely to any material fact). A
reasonable jury could have heard Calloway’s implausible testimony here and
chosen to disregard the rest of what he said, too. Since Calloway’s testimony was
the only evidence of hardship FAMU presented, the jury’s verdict was reasonable.
For all these reasons, we find no error in the district court’s decision to deny
judgment as a matter of law.
AFFIRMED.