STANKEVICH v MILLIRON (ON REMAND)
Docket No. 310710
Court of Appeals of Michigan
Submitted October 5, 2015. Decided November 19, 2015.
313 Mich App 233
2015] STANKEVICH V MILLIRON (ON REMAND) 233
On remand, the Court of Appeals held:
Under the United States Supreme Court‘s opinion in Obergefell, plaintiff had standing to bring this action under the equitable-parent doctrine because Michigan was required to recognize the parties’ same-sex marriage and plaintiff‘s complaint alleged facts that, if proved, were sufficient to establish equitable parenthood. The equitable-parent doctrine holds that a
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
PARENT AND CHILD — EQUITABLE-PARENT DOCTRINE — SAME-SEX MARRIAGES — MARRIAGES PERFORMED OUT OF STATE.
Under the equitable-parent doctrine, a spouse who is not the biological parent of a child born or conceived during the marriage may be considered the natural parent of that child if (1) the spouse and the child mutually acknowledge a relationship as parent and child, or the mother of the child has cooperated in the development of such a relationship over a period of time prior to the filing of the complaint for divorce, (2) the spouse desires to have the rights afforded to a parent, and (3) the spouse is willing to take on the responsibility of paying child support; a person who entered into a same-sex marriage and alleges facts that meet these requirements has standing to seek the status of an equitable parent if the marriage was valid under the laws of the nation, state, or province in which the marriage was performed and satisfied the applicable legal and contractual requirements.
Finch & Finch, PC (by Nancy B. Finch and Andrea Mashak), for plaintiff.
Michele Hebner, PC (by Michele Hebner), for defendant.
ON REMAND
Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and MARKEY and K. F. KELLY, JJ.
I. BACKGROUND
In our October 17, 2013 opinion in this matter, we summarized the factual background of the case:
The parties entered into a same-sex marriage in Canada in July 2007. Before that date, defendant had been artificially inseminated, and later gave birth to a child. Defendant is the biological mother of the child.
The parties’ [sic] separated in March 2009. While they initially agreed to a visitation schedule, they subsequently found that they could not agree. Thus, plaintiff filed a verified complaint, asserting that she fully participated in the care and rearing of the minor child. She requested relief from the trial court, which included an order dissolving the marriage, an order affirming that she is the parent of the child, and orders regarding custody, parenting time, and child support.
Defendant, however, filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). She asserted that plaintiff did not have standing to petition for custody of the child. The trial court granted defendant‘s motion. Plaintiff now appeals. [Stankevich v Milliron, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 17, 2013 (Docket No. 310710), p 1, vacated and remanded 498 Mich 877 (2015).]
In our previous opinion, we upheld the grant of summary disposition to defendant because plaintiff lacked standing to bring this action. Stankevich, un-
On November 25, 2013, plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. In light of the pending appeals from the decision in DeBoer v Snyder, 973 F Supp 2d 757 (ED Mich, 2014), rev‘d 772 F3d 388 (CA 6, 2014), rev‘d sub nom Obergefell, 576 US ___; 135 S Ct 2584; 192 L Ed 2d 609 (2015), on April 25, 2014, our Supreme Court entered an order holding the application in the instant matter in abeyance. Stankevich v Milliron, 844 NW2d 724 (Mich, 2014).
II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the grant of summary disposition de novo. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint,” and “[a]ll well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and construed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Id. at 119. Furthermore, the motion only should be granted when the claims are “so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Whether a party has legal standing to assert a claim constitutes a question of law that we review de novo.” Heltzel v Heltzel, 248 Mich App 1, 28; 638 NW2d 123 (2001).
B. ANALYSIS
As a result of the United States Supreme Court‘s opinion in Obergefell, plaintiff has standing under the equitable-parent doctrine because Michigan now is required to recognize the parties’ same-sex marriage, and plaintiff‘s complaint alleges facts that, if proven, are sufficient to establish equitable parenthood.2
“Generally, a party has standing if it has some real interest in the cause of action, . . . or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.” In re Anjoski, 283 Mich App 41, 50; 770 NW2d 1 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). But “this concept is not given such a broad application in the context of child custody disputes involving third parties, or any individual other than a parent[.]” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).
However, this Court adopted the equitable-parent doctrine in Atkinson, 160 Mich App at 608-609, holding:
[W]e adopt the do[c]trine of equitable parent and find that a husband who is not the biological father of a child born or conceived during the marriage may be considered the natural father of that child where (1) the husband and the child mutually acknowledge a relationship as father and child, or the mother of the child has cooperated in the development of such a relationship over a period of time prior to the filing of the complaint for divorce, (2) the husband desires to have the rights afforded to a parent, and (3) the husband is willing to take on the responsibility of paying child support.
This Court stated that, given its recognition that “a person who is not the biological father of a child may be considered a parent against his will, and consequently burdened with the responsibility of the support for the child,” such a person, in being treated as a parent, may also seek the rights of custody or parenting time. Id. at 610. This Court also has applied the equitable-parent doctrine in later cases. See, e.g., York v Morofsky, 225 Mich App 333, 335, 337; 571 NW2d 524 (1997); Soumis v Soumis, 218 Mich App 27, 34; 553 NW2d 619 (1996). However, as mentioned earlier, our Supreme Court declined to extend the equitable-parent doctrine outside the context of marriage in Van, 460 Mich at 337.
In our previous opinion, we concluded that the equitable-parent doctrine should not be expanded to include same-sex couples, such as the parties in this case, because Michigan statutory and constitutional provisions precluded recognition of the parties’ same-sex marriage, and Van limited the application of the equitable-parent doctrine to the confines of marriage. Stankevich, unpub op at 3-5. However, under Obergefell, Michigan now is required to recognize the parties’ same-sex marriage.
In Obergefell, 576 US at ___; 135 S Ct at 2604-2605, the United States Supreme Court held:
[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex [sic] may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be denied to them.
The Supreme Court therefore held invalid state laws — including Michigan‘s constitutional provision defining marriage as a union between one man and one woman,
The Court also addressed “whether the Constitution requires States to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed out of State” and concluded that “the
Plaintiff‘s complaint alleges that the parties in the instant matter were married in Canada in 2007 and that defendant‘s biological child was born during the course of that marriage. As Obergefell requires that same-sex couples be permitted to exercise the fundamental right to marry on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples, an application of a legal doctrine excluding same-sex married couples from the doctrine of equitable parenthood goes against the dictates of Obergefell, which we are bound to follow.
Should it be determined by the trial court that the parties’ proffered marriage was valid under Canadian, or applicable provincial, domestic relations law and other legal and contractual requirements,3 plaintiff
As set forth, plaintiff‘s allegations would establish factually her standing to file this action seeking equitable parenthood. The facts alleged in the complaint, if proved, would support the elements of the equitable-parent doctrine as set forth in Atkinson, 160 Mich App at 608-609. Therefore, we remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether plaintiff is entitled to be deemed an equitable parent.
III. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Obergefell requires Michigan to recognize same-sex marriages. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant and remand for an evidentiary hearing concerning the validity of the parties’ alleged Canadian marriage and the applicability of the equitable-parent doctrine. We do not retain jurisdiction.
RIORDAN, P.J., and MARKEY and K. F. KELLY, JJ., concurred.
Notes
On remand, the trial court must determine the validity of the parties’ Canadian marriage by applying the domestic relations law of the place in which the plaintiff alleges that she was married to the defendant.