214 Pa. 189 | Pa. | 1906
Opinion by
We cannot agree with the defendant company, the appellant, that the court’s charge imposed on it the burden of explaining to the jury the manner in which the injuries to Mrs.
Where there are several disinterested witnesses whose testimony contradicts the testimony of a party himself or of any interested witness in his behalf, the trial judge should dii'ect the attention of the jury to the fact and point out the value and
Another question in the case is'as to the measure of damages. This was a joint action, brought under the Act of May 8, 1895, P. L. 54, by Henry G. Standen and his wife to recover damages for the injuries she sustained by reason of the alleged negligence of the appellant company. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for each of the plaintiffs. The appellant company paid the wife’s judgment but took this appeal from the judgment entered in favor of the husband. For more than forty years, Plenry G. Standen has been engaged in and has conducted the business of a florist. The greenhouses are connected with his home at Haverford. It appeared by evidence on the trial that the wife performed her household or domestic duties and in addition thereto assisted her husband in his business as a florist. He testified : “ She would do her own household duties, do her own washing and ironing, and while I was not working she would attend to the greenhouses, yes, and pot plants, and hybridize seed, and propagate and make cuttings/’ He also testified that he had to employ a man to take the place, and to perform the services, of Mrs. Standen in his greenhouses and about his business. The husband was permitted, against the objection of the defendant, to recover for the loss of the value of his wife’s services to him in his business as a florist. This is assigned for error.
The appellant contends, as stated in his printed brief, “ that the only services for which a husband is entitled to recover are those which he has a right to expect and demand of the wife as a wife, that is, for-the loss of her service in her domestic duties, the care of himself, Iris household, and his children, and not for loss of services in the conduct of his business.”
At common law, tbe husband, during the existence of the marital relations, was entitled to the services and earnings of his wife. It was held by this court that at common law the husband was entitled to the person and labor of his wife and the benefits of her industry and economy: Raybold v. Raybold, 20
As the earnings of the wife for services performed in the business of her husband belong to the latter, any deprivation of those earnings or any diminution or loss of her capacity to assist her husband in his business caused by the negligent act of the appellant company was an injury to the husband for which he was entitled to recover in this action. The value of her services of which he was deprived or the extent of the diminution of her capacity to assist him in his home and business affairs was his loss and not that of his wife. There was, therefore, no error in the rulings of the learned trial judge in this branch of the ease.
As suggested by appellant’s counsel, the wife received no wages from her husband for her services in assisting him in his business, and on the trial she claimed no damages for the loss of such services. This was because the husband was entitled to her services in the absence of a contract stipulating to the contrary, and in this action he proved their value to him and asked a verdict compensating him for their loss. The learned court affirmed the appellant’s seventh point for the reason, as stated by him, “ that I do not understand that the plaintiffs are pressing for any loss of earning power by the plaintiff, Ruth Standen.”
Aside from the above reasons, the judgment must be affirmed for the reason that the appellant was not injured by the court’s ruling that the husband was entitled to the services of his wife in the conduct of his own business. The act of 1895, under which the action was brought, requires, in cases like the present, that the action shall be brought in the name of the husband and wife, that separate verdicts shall be rendered, one determining the right of the wife and the other verdict determining the right of the husband, and that separate judgments shall be entered thereon with the right to separate executions. The rights of both parties for the injuries inflicted on the wife are redressed in one action, and the amount of damages is appor
The requirements of the act were observed in this case aird separate verdicts were rendered in favor of the wife and the husband. The appellant company alleges that the court erred in charging that the husband was entitled to recover for the loss of his wife’s services, and that, therefore, the verdict of the husband was predicated on an erroneous measure of damages. Conceding that to be true, it is not the appellant who was injured but the wife, and she is not complaining. She raises no question as to the' correctness of the rulings of the court, but has accepted from the appellant the amount of her judgment. The loss of her services was an element of damages to be considered and compensated for in the action, and the damages therefor must necessarily be recovered by the husband or the wife. Had the trial court sustained the appellant’s contention, the effect would have been to award the damages for loss" of her services to the wife instead of the husband. The ruling of the court, however, would not have diminished or affected the aggregate amount of the two verdicts. The appellant company would have the same, and no greater, sum to pay as damages resulting from the wife’s injuries. It was, therefore, not injured by the ruling of the trial court on the measure of damages, and hence its appeal is without merit.
The judgment is affirmed.