22 Wash. 670 | Wash. | 1900
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This is an action brought by the appellant, a domestic corporation, for the recovery of certain furniture and house furnishing goods. The complaint
It is urged on behalf of the appellant that the evidence before the trial court upon which it based its judgment showed, at most, nothing more than that the appellant, at the time it entered into the contract of conditional sale and delivered the property to the vendees named therein, had knowledge that the vendees intended to put the property to an unlawful use; and that this fact is not sufficient
It is true that it is held in many well considered cases, and it is perhaps the weight of authority, that mere knowledge on the part of a vendor of goods that the vendee designs to and will put them to an immoral or illegal use, is not of itself sufficient to bar'an action brought to recover the purchase price of the goods sold. But in all of the cases announcing this rule which have been brought to our attention, the transaction was one in which the owner of the goods at the time of their delivery to the vendee parted with his title and right of possession, so that thereafter the relation between the vendor and vendee was that of debtor and creditor merely, or that of debtor and creditor with a mortgage over to secure the deferred payments of the purchase price. The sale and delivery of the property was complete, and no element of participation or aid in the immoral or illegal design of the vendee could be imputed to the vendor. On the other hand, it is held by all of the cases, even those which announce the rule contended for by the appellant, that if the vendor has knowledge of the immoral or illegal design of the vendee, and in any way aids or participates in that design, or if the contract of sale is so connected with the illegal or immoral purpose or transaction of the vendee as to be inseparable from it, the vendor cannot recover. Tatum v. Kelley, 25 Ark. 209 (94 Am. Dec. 717); Tracy v. Talmage, 14 N. Y. 162 (67 Am. Dec. 132); Kill v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253 (9 Am. Rep. 205); Gaylord v. Soragen, 32 Vt. 110 (76 Am. Dec. 154); Aiken v. Blaisdell, 41 Vt. 665; Schankel v. Moffatt, 53 Ill. App. 382; Ralston v. Boady, 20 Ga. 449; Webster v. Munger, 8 Gray, 584; Adams v. Coulliard, 102 Mass. 167; Graves v. Johnson, 156 Mass. 211 (30 N. E. 818, 15 L. R. A. 834, and note to this case in 32 Am. St. Rep. 450); Beach, Modern Contract Law, § 457.
Where the sale is absolute, though on credit, the vendee becomes the owner of the property purchased and has all the rights therein that any owner has over his own property, and he may make such use of it as to him seems fit, without let or hindrance from his vendor. Under an ordinary contract of conditonal sale, the law is different. The vendee thereunder, the title being reserved in the vendor, is a mere bailee of the property. If the use of the property be not prescribed in the contract of sale, the purchaser must, nevertheless, use it for a lawful and proper purpose, and in the way its nature contemplates it should be used, or else suffer a forfeiture of his contract. It is clear that the relation between the parties to the contract in the present case was something more than that of debtor and creditor merely, and it would seem it was something more than an ordinary contract of conditional sale. The appellant not only reserved “title, ownership, and possession of the property,” but reserved the right to “take possession of the aforesaid personal property whenever it may deem itself insecure, even before the maturity” of the deferred
We are aware that the appellant, though it admits that it had knowledge at the time it entered into the contract that its vendees were prostitutes, and that the house where they lived and where the goods were delivered was in a section of the city known as “The Tenderloin” district, contends that the evidence fails to show that it had knowledge that the house was kept as a house of ill fame. A
It is further contended that the trial court erred in refusing to permit the appellant to offer proofs of the matter alleged in the reply by way of estoppel, hut in this we find no error. Ho principle of law is better settled than that a contract prohibited hv law or morality is void as against public policy. It is. because of the public interest, and not the desire to aid the defendant, that the courts refuse to enforce such a contract, and hence the doctrine of estoppel has no application. Greenhood, Public Policy, Pule 126, and illustrations there given; Beach, Modern Contract Law, § 1499; Turnbull v. Farnsworth, 1 Wash. T. 444; Ah Doon v. Smith, 25 Ore. 89 (34 Pac. 1093).
The judgment is affirmed.
Dunbar, C. J., and Reavis and Anders, JJ., concur.