43 So. 300 | Miss. | 1907
delivered the opinion of the court.
The contract in this case expressly provides in article four that “the contractor shall, within twenty-four hours after receiving written notice from the architect or owner, proceed to remove from the grounds or buildings all material condemned by him, whether worked or unworked, and to take down all portions of the granite which the architect shall by like written notice condemn as unsound or improper, or as in any way failing to conform to the drawings and specifications.” By article six it is likewise expressly provided that “all granite must be equal to the samples which the contractor has submitted to the owner and must be satisfactory to the architect.” Article nine expressly provides that “payment will be made in full within thirty days after the granite has been delivered and accepted by the architect.” These are the plain and unequivocal provisions of this contract. There is no ambiguity whatever about them. The stipulation is that the granite must be satisfactory to the architect and must be accepted by the architect; and it is expressly provided that all not so satisfactory shall be removed from the grounds and building, and actually taken down, although the granite may have been put into the building. The parties were entirely competent to make such contract if they so desired. There is no conflict whatever in the testimony as to the fact that the granite was not satisfactory to the architect and
The principle has been over and over settled by the supreme court of the United States, some of the best authorities being very carefully collected in the very able brief of the learned counsel for appellant. The principle was laid down by Judge Harlan in Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U. S., 398, 24 L. Ed., 1106, as being this: That in such case, wherever the parties by their contract have expressly delegated to a tribunal' or persons the determination of the question whether the material is of the required quality, the determination of such persons is final, “in the absence of fraud or such gross mistake as would necessarily imply bad faith or a failure to exercise an honest judgment in the premises.” This principle is reiterated in Sweeney v. United States, 109 U. S. 618, 3 Sup. Ct., 344, 27 L. Ed., 1053, in which case it is further stated that the decision of such person or tribunal is not subject to the revisory powers of the courts, in the absence of fraud as stated above. In the case of United States v. Gleason, 175 U. S., 590, 20 Sup. Ct., 233, 44 L. Ed., 284, the court said: “While we are to determine the legal import of this provision according to its own terms, it may be well to briefly recall well-settled rules in this branch of the law. One is that if a party by his contract charges himself with an obligation possible to be performed, he must make it good, unless his performance is rendered impossible by the act of God, the law or the other party. Difficulties, even if unforeseen, and however great, will not excuse him. If parties have made no provision for dispensation, the rule of law gives none; nor in such circum
It follows, from, these views, that the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the cause remanded.