8 Wyo. 144 | Wyo. | 1899
This was a suit brought by plaintiff (plaintiff in error) against the defendant (defendant in error) to enjoin the collection of taxes upon three thousand head of cattle assessed for taxation in Weston County at $36,000 for the year 1896. Upon final hearing the temporary injunc
By Section 3784, Rev. Stat. Wyo., it is provided that' personal property shall be listed for taxation in the county where it may be on the first day of April of the current year, and that cattle and other live stock shall be listed in the county in which they are being herded, ranged, or kept on that date. This section was amended in 1890, but by Section 3, Chapter 36, Laws of 1890-91, the amending act was repealed and Section 3784 re-enacted. Section 1, Chapter 65, Laws 1888, provides: “All live stock upon the open range shall, for the purpose of taxation, have their situs and be returned, listed, assessed, and taxed, in the county wherein is located the home range of such live stock; and the term “home range” shall be construed according to the general understanding and acceptation thereof among the range stock growers of the State; in case any question shall arise in relation to the situs or location of the home range, then, and in that case, the boards of county commissioners of the counties ' interested shall decide the matter in dispute, but in the event that such boards of county commissioners fail to agree they shall call in the chairmap of the next nearest board of county commissioners, and, with his assistance, they shall equalize the assessment. ’ ’
It is contended by defendant in error that the plaintiff having some property subject to taxation in Weston, the ground of its complaint is at most only an overassessment or overvaluation; that under the statute it should have applied to the board of equalization of that county for an adjustment of the assessment; that it did not do so, and is therefore remediless. The statute constituting the board
'The plaintiff maintains that the situs of the property in question is to be determined by reference to the Act of 1888; that is, that it is deemed to be in the county where the home range is located. While it is contended on the other hand that the Acts of 1890 and 1890-91, re-enacting Section 3784, Rev. Stats., operate as a repeal of the Act of 1888, leaving the provisions of Section 3784, that live stock shall be listed and taxed “in the county in which the same are being herded, ranged, or kept on the first day of April,” unmodified and in fqll force.
But it is urged by the defendant that conceding the Act of 1888 to be in force, and the home range of plaintiff to have been in Crook County, yet the plaintiff has no standing in this court, not having availed itself of its remedy
We are not convinced by the reasoning of counsel for defendant as applied to this provision. The section establishing the board of equalization provides a remedy for the taxpayer deeming himself aggrieved by applying to the board, and, under the general principles controlling equity jurisdiction, he must avail himself of that remedy before he can appeal to the courts. This is not such a provision.
The statute in terms mates it the duty of the boards of the two counties interested to decide the dispute whenever any question shall arise as to the situs of the home range, and the duty to act is not made to depend upon the application or request of the taxpayer. There is no provision for notice to him, or that he shall be heard, which is out of line with our other legislation upon the subject of taxation if he is to be deemed a party to the dispute. It is his interest that he pay taxes but once upon the same property; but it is not necessarily of any concern to him in which jurisdiction he pays. No doubt the question of the situs of the home range would often, and perhaps ordinarily, arise upon his suggestion that he was being taxed upon property in a particular county which was not properly taxable there; that is, by appearing before the boards and asking to have his assessment adjusted. But this, as we have held, the plaintiff has done; and we do not find in the statute that he is required or authorized to do more by attempting to get the boards of the two counties together, calling in the chairman of a third in case of disagreement, pr otherwise putting the machinery of the statute in motion,
All question of the plaintiff’s remedy is set at rest, however, by reference to our statute. Section 3053, Rev. Stats. 1887, provides that the ‘1 district courts shall have jurisdiction to enjoin the illegal levy of taxes and assessments, or the collection of either, and of actions to recover back such taxes and assessments as have been
The only objection of defendant remaining to be considered is that the Act of 1888 is special legislation, and in violation of the constitution! The substance of the objection as stated in defendant’s brief seems to be that ‘ ‘ the attempt to thus create two classes of live stock for purposes of taxation is purely arbitrary, and not based upon any reasonable ground or necessity.” We accept, as accurate the statement of the law upon the subject as quoted from the first case cited by defendant: “The characteristics' which serve as a basis for classification must be of such a nature as to mark the objects so designated as peculiarly requiring exclusive legislation. There must be a substantial distinction having reference to the subject matter of the proposed legislation, between the objects or places embraced in such legislation, and the objects or places excluded. The marks of distinction on which the classification is founded must be such in the nature of things as will, in some reasonable degree, at
In this case the necessity, and the sole necessity, for the legislation, arose out of the peculiar characteristics and situation of the property in reference to the subject matter of the legislation. Other personal property has a fixed situs either because incapable of locomotion or because in some way confined or restrained. Range stock, upon the other hand, is not confined or intended to be confined. That the animals shall roam at will is the essential characteristic of the range stock business, and out of this distinguishing characteristic arises the difficulty and injustice intended to be remedied by .the statute. It is to be kept in mind that classification is not prohibited. As has been said, “for the purpose of taxation real estate may be classified. Thus timber lands, arable lands, mineral lands, urban and rural, may be divided into distinct classes and subjected to different rates. ’ ’ And in like manner other subjects. Persons may be classified. Minors distinguished from adults, males from females, femes covert from single women, etc. Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. St., 338.” A law framed in general terms, restricted to no locality, and operating equally upon all of a group of objects, which having regard to the purpose of the Legislature are distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked and important to make them a class by themselves, is not a special or local law, but a general law.”
Neither do we think the legislation is special or otherwise objectionable, as contended by defendant in error, on account of the provision that ‘ ‘ the term ‘ home range ’ shall be construed according to the general understanding and acceptation thereof among the range stock growers of the State. ” It is contended that this in some way delegates the construction and execution of the statute to those engaged in this particular industry. We do not think so. The provision probably adds nothing to the force or meaning of the Act. The term ‘ ‘ home range ’ ’ is not used or known, as we believe, except in the range stock business. It is necessarily technical and must have a technical interpretation. The provision does not give a new definition of the phrase, and does not change the rule of evidence by which the courts when necessary may ascertain its meaning. Even if it did the legislation would not therefore be objectionable. The provision is at most a legislative definition of a term used in the statute. This is clearly within the power of the Legislature, and one very often exercised.
The case of O’Neill v. American Fire Ins. Co., 166 Pa. St., 72, relied upon by defendant, is not applicable. The Legislature of that State enacted that all insurance companies should use a particular form of policy to be thereafter prepared by the insurance commissioner. The court held that the Act attempted to delegate to the commissioner the power to make the law governing the form of insurance policies. There is no resemblance between the two provisions.
As in some of their aspects several of the questions presented are somewhat novel, and counsel for defendant in error have contended with great earnestness and ability and apparent candor for the correctness of their views, we have gone at considerable length and detail into the consideration of them. But we think there can be no question that the property involved was wrongfully assessed for taxation in Weston County, and that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief prayed for.