199 Ky. 699 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1923
Opinion op the Court by
— Reversing.
On December 2, 1920, the Standard Anto Insurance Association issued.to Larry E. Neal a policy insuring his automobile against loss or damage by fire, theft, etc., in the sum of $800.00. On December 6, 1920, the machine was destroyed by fire, and the company having declined to pay the loss, this action was brought to recover on the policy. Prom a verdict and judgment in favor of Neal for $800.00 the company appeals.
Appellant defended on the ground that in his ap~ -plication for the insurance Neal falsely stated that the purchase price of the automobile was $1,200.00, when,, as a matter of fact, it was much less than that sum, and on the further ground that at the time of the accident the machine was being operated contrary to law.
The question of fraudulent representations was submitted to the jury, and we are not prepared to say that its finding was flagrantly against the evidence.
The contract contains the following provision:
"This contract was issued by the association subject to the following conditions, limitations and agreements, which are a part of the contract, and to which the subscriber, by acceptance of this contract, agrees.”
Under the head of "Conditions, Agreements and Limitations” is section 4 of the contract, which in part is as follows:
"This contract does not cover loss or damage when the automobile herein described is being used or maintained under the following conditions: (a) While being operated or manipulated in any race or speed contest; (b) while driven by any person prohibited by law from driving an automobile or any person intoxicated or under sixteen years of age; (c) while rented, loaned or leased; or while the automobile is carrying passengers for hire;*701 (d) while being driven or operated by any person other than the subscriber, a member of his immediate family or by his paid driver; (e) loss or damage purposely inflicted by the subscriber or any one at his request; (f) while the automobile is being driven contrary to law.”
Section 2739g-l, Kentucky Statutes, is as follows:
“Whenever and wherever the word ‘chauffeur’ is used herein, it shall mean a person whose business or occupation, in whole or in part, is the operation of an automobile for compensation, wages or hire.”
Section 2739g-15 is as follows:
2. “Before any chauffeur shall operate or drive an automobile upon any public highway in this Commonwealth, and before any person, firm or corporation shall employ any chauffeur as defined under this act, said chauffeur shall register with the commission through the clerk in the county in which he resides or intends to operate as such.”
Section 2739g-2 contains the following provision:
“Before the owner of an automobile shall operate, or be permitted to operate same, or shall permit the operation of same upon any public highway,- such owner shall register with the commission, through the clerk in the county in which he resides, or in the county in which the automobile is to be operated.”
Section 2739g-22 contains the following provision:
“No person shall use, display or keep registration plates, badges or receipts that do not belong, or have not been issued, to such person.”
Subsections (a) and (b), section 2739g-65 provide penalties for the violation of the foregoing provisions.
In- paragraph 2 of its original answer the company pleaded in substance that at the time the automobile was destroyed by fire, it was being driven contrary to law, in that the chauffeur in charge and operating same, namely, Leslie Wilson, was driving -said -automobile'upon a public highway in the state of Kentucky, and was operating same as a part of his occupation and for compensation, and that he had never procured a license to act as chauffeur, or complied with the laws regarding registration and licensing of chauffeurs; and that the plaintiff himself had not registered said automobile, or made application for the registration of same with the tax commission of the .state of Kentucky, or with the clerk of the McLean county court. In an amended an
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.