277 Mass. 278 | Mass. | 1931
The plaintiff sues upon a promissory note dated June 11, 1930, made by the defendant payable to the order of The Maykel Automobile Company and indorsed without recourse by the payee to the plaintiff for value. At the trial the judge denied' a motion to direct a verdict for the plaintiff; the jury found for the defendant, and answered “Yes” to the question: “Did the plaintiff at the time of the negotiation of the note in suit have knowledge of such facts that its action in taking the note amounted to bad faith?” Under leave reserved, pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 120, the judge subsequently granted the plaintiff’s motion to order a verdict for the plaintiff. The case is before us upon the defendant’s exceptions to this ruling and order.
The only matter argued is whether there was evidence
There was evidence as follows: The defendant, an architect, signed the note and an agreement of conditional sale with The Maykel Automobile Company to accommodate his brother who was a salesman for that company and who represented that he wished to purchase the automobile described in the agreement but could not buy in his own name because the seller refused to accept a salesman’s note. The defendant had no intention of purchasing for himself or of taking delivery. He did not know that the note was to be discounted with the plaintiff. The brother represented, and the sales manager of The Maykel Automobile Company, in writing,. agreed, that no liability on note and agreement should attach to the defendant. No delivery of the automobile was made. In fact the machine described in the agreement had been sold and delivered to another customer several months before June 11, 1930. The agreement signed by the defendant contained the statements: “The purchaser hereby acknowledges receipt of said motor vehicle”; and, in italics and heavy print just below the place for signature: “Purchaser sign here if motor vehicle is actually in your possession, but do not sign here unless you have actually received motor vehicle, since by doing so you might place yourself in position of being party to a fraud.” The plaintiff, when note and agreement were delivered to it and when it paid the amount of the discount to The Maykel Automobile Company, did not know that no car had been delivered to the defendant. It did not check to see if cars were delivered in such transactions as such a practice “would be a physical impossibility.”
The plaintiff specialized in financing the notes and “leases” of automobile dealers. It had an office in Worcester where The Maykel Automobile Company was a large dealer. Prior
On May 28 or 29 the plaintiff discovered that the Maykel company had made sales of cars in violation of mortgage agreements, and had the first definite knowledge of the company’s failure to live up to its agreement. On June 13 it had its first definite knowledge of the company’s obtaining discount on notes and agreements of salesmen for cars previously sold and delivered to other purchasers. This agreement and note were signed by the defendant on June 11, and, on the same day, the plaintiff discounted the note and received the agreement. On June 23 or 24 The Maykel Automobile Company was petitioned into bankruptcy.
The judge was right in ruling that this evidence does not justify a finding of bad faith toward the defendant in the transaction. Russell v. Bond & Goodwin Inc. 276 Mass. 458. See Reynolds v. Park Trust Co. 245 Mass. 440; Paika v. Perry, 225 Mass. 563; Beacon Trust Co. v. Barry,
There was error in refusing, at the trial, to direct a verdict in its favor. The motion to enter a verdict for the plaintiff was granted properly under the leave reserved.
Exceptions overruled.
Judgment for the plaintiff.