EDWARD STANCIL, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN MATEO COUNTY, Respondent; CITY OF REDWOOD CITY, Real Party in Interest.
S253783
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
May 3, 2021
First Appellate District, Division Four A156100; San Mateo County Superior Court 18UDL00903
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban and Jenkins concurred concurred.
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar,
Because tenants and landlords have differing interests, they can disagree sharply about the nature of their relationship and sometimes engender disputes that end up in court. When that happens, certain sections of the
The landlord in this case is the City of Redwood City (the City), which operates Docktown Marina (Docktown). The City filed a complaint in unlawful detainer against a tenant of Docktown, Edward Stancil. In response, Stancil filed a motion to quash service of summons, relying on Delta Imports, Inc. v. Municipal Court (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1033, 1036 (Delta Imports), in which the Court of Appeal concluded that a “motion to quash service is the only method by which the defendant can test whether the complaint states a cause of action for unlawful detainer and, thereby supports a five-day summons.” The City opposed the motion to quash, relying on a more recent case, Borsuk v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 607 (Borsuk), which disagreed with this statement in Delta Imports. We granted review to decide whether a defendant may use a motion to quash service of summons pursuant to
What we conclude is that a defendant may not use a motion to quash service of summons to dispute the truth of the allegations contained in an unlawful detainer complaint. Rather, a motion to quash under
Here, the superior court correctly found that Stancil improperly lodged his motion to quash to dispute the truth of the City‘s allegations concerning its legal relationship with Stancil. A defendant who disputes the veracity of an allegation in a complaint can file an answer to the complaint. (
I.
On September 21, 2018, the City filed a summons and complaint in unlawful detainer against Stancil. The complaint alleged that in July 2013, the City as operator and manager of Docktown, gave Stancil the right to use a berth for residential purposes. The original term of the “Live Aboard Rental Agreement” was for 12 months; after expiration of the initial term, the agreement renewed on a month-to-month basis, terminable by the City upon 60 days’ notice.
In December 2016, the City Council of Redwood City adopted the “Docktown Plan,” which provided relocation assistance to eligible Docktown residents through financial assistance and relocation advisory services, and also detailed the process for terminating residential use at Docktown. Some Docktown residents accepted the relocation benefits and assistance, but others — including Stancil — remained.
The City served Stancil a 60-day notice to quit and surrender possession of the premises pursuant to
In response, Stancil filed a motion to quash under
Following a hearing on the motion, the superior court denied Stancil‘s motion to quash and concluded his challenge to the City‘s complaint had to be raised on demurrer. Stancil requested an immediate stay, which the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of San Mateo County denied. Stancil then filed a petition for writ of mandate and prohibition challenging the superior court‘s order in the Court of Appeal, which was summarily denied. He subsequently filed a petition for review with this court, which we granted, limiting the issue for our determination to whether a motion to quash service of summons is the proper remedy to test whether a complaint states a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
II.
The parties in this case disagree about how an unlawful detainer defendant may use a motion to quash service of summons under
A.
Ordinarily, a court gains jurisdiction over the defendant from the time the defendant is served with a copy of the summons and the complaint on which it‘s based, as required under the
Animating this dispute is the possibility that a motion to quash can interfere with the speedy adjudication of an unlawful detainer claim. Using such a motion, a defendant makes a special appearance for the narrow purpose of contesting personal jurisdiction where the summons is defective. (Greene v. Municipal Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 446, 451 (Greene); 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2020) Jurisdiction, § 217.) A plaintiff who files a claim for unlawful detainer has the substantial benefit of an expedited timeframe for the defendant‘s response. For the defendant, a motion to quash offers a potential reprieve from this expedited procedure. Pursuant to
What Stancil contends here is that any defect in a complaint renders the unlawful detainer five-day summons invalid. He urges this court to expand the scope of a motion to quash far beyond its typical application. But neither the statutory language nor any other indicia of
A defendant may serve and file a motion to quash only for limited purposes. (
We find no support for such a construction. Before the Legislature enacted the statutory provisions governing motions to quash service of summons, litigants had to specially appear and carefully limit their personal jurisdiction challenges, or risk making a general appearance. In 1955, the Legislature enacted former section 416.1 et seq., which established a statutory motion to quash service of summons and provided an automatic extension of time for the moving party to plead pending the final determination of the motion to quash before the trial or appellate court. (Stats. 1955, ch. 1452, § 1, p. 2639; Stats. 1955, ch. 1452, § 3, p. 2640; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Jurisdiction, § 217.) The purpose of this legislative action was to correct inadequacies in the law obstructing litigants from raising jurisdictional objections early in litigation. (McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 70 Cal.2d 252, 257; Note, Special Appearance in California (1958) 10 Stan. L.Rev. 711, 712.)
The “obvious purpose” of former sections 416.1 to 416.3 was to permit the defendant to challenge personal jurisdiction without waiving the right to defend on the merits. (Hartford v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 447, 452.) Former sections 416.1 to 416.3 were repealed in 1969 and their essential provisions were transferred to current
B.
The Unlawful Detainer Act governs the procedure for landlords and tenants to resolve disputes about who has the right to possess real property. (Losornio v. Motta (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 110, 113; Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 480.) Given the need for quick, peaceful resolutions of unlawful detainer actions, the statutory procedures must be strictly adhered to, including the stringent requirements for service, notice,
Stancil asserts a motion to quash service of summons is the proper procedure to challenge personal jurisdiction where an unlawful detainer complaint contains any defect or its allegations are not true. Neither the purpose nor the provisions of the Unlawful Detainer Act support Stancil‘s broad contention. A plaintiff may file an unlawful detainer complaint under certain circumstances detailed in
The Unlawful Detainer Act also sets out pleading requirements specific to unlawful detainer claims. The complaint must be verified; set forth the facts on which the plaintiff seeks to recover; describe the real property with
No provision of the Unlawful Detainer Act expressly authorizes a defendant to use a motion to quash to challenge any defect contained in an unlawful detainer complaint, such as failure to comply with
C.
The unique context of unlawful detainer does not transform a motion to quash to encompass challenges to the merits of a complaint, as Stancil suggests. Instead, the motion to quash remains a limited procedural tool appropriate where the court lacks personal jurisdiction because the statutory requirements for service of process are not fulfilled or the summons is defective. (
The abbreviated five-day summons period obviously provides a great benefit to the unlawful detainer plaintiff. But the statute conferring that benefit also constrains. A plaintiff who does not assert an unlawful detainer action in accordance with the requirements of
Our conclusion also harmonizes the existing case law addressing challenges to personal jurisdiction based on defects in an unlawful detainer complaint or summons. Stancil urges us to conclude that Delta Imports authorizes his expansive interpretation that a motion to quash may be used to challenge any defect in an unlawful detainer complaint. We decline to adopt Stancil‘s position and instead conclude a defendant may choose to use a motion to quash to challenge an unlawful detainer five-day summons served alongside a complaint that does not allege an unlawful detainer claim under
Delta Imports and other subsequent appellate decisions approved of defendants using motions to quash service of summons to challenge unlawful detainer complaints. (Parsons v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1; Garber v. Levit (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1.) But commentators and practitioners alike have addressed the tension between Delta Imports and the more recent decision in Borsuk, which expressly disagreed with Delta Imports’ holding that a “defendant can test whether the complaint states a cause of action for unlawful detainer and, thereby supports a five-day summons.” (Delta Imports, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 1036; Weil & Brown Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group) 4:417.)
In Delta Imports, the defendants filed a motion to quash service of summons arguing the complaint could not support the five-day unlawful detainer summons. (Delta Imports, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 1035.) The Court of Appeal explained that where a plaintiff claims the defendant breached the lease, the unlawful detainer complaint must also allege the plaintiff‘s compliance with the notice requirements of
What the Court of Appeal reasoned in its brief opinion is that “[a] motion to quash service is the only method by which the defendant can test whether the complaint states a cause of action for unlawful detainer and, thereby,
Delta Imports relied on Greene, supra, 51 Cal.App.3d 446. The Court of Appeal in Greene held that an unlawful detainer five-day summons did not confer personal jurisdiction when the accompanying complaint — though labeled as a complaint for unlawful detainer — in fact alleged nothing more than a claim for breach of a contract for the purchase of real property. (Id. at p. 449.) The Greene court reasoned the plaintiff improperly used the
Relying on Greene, the Delta Imports court concluded that “[i]f the underlying complaint fails to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer, then use of the five-day summons is improper and the defendant is entitled to an order quashing service as a matter of law.” (Delta Imports, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 1035, citing Greene, supra, 51 Cal.App.3d at pp. 451–452.) Greene and Delta Imports clarify that where a five-day summons is served with a complaint that fails to allege the defendant is guilty of unlawful detainer as defined in
Thirty-two years later, the Court of Appeal decided Borsuk. There, the defendant filed a motion to quash, asserting the court lacked jurisdiction over her because the lessor failed to properly serve her with the three-day notice to pay or quit. (Borsuk, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 610.) The court held that a defendant may not use a motion to quash to contest whether a landlord properly served the requisite three-day notice to pay or quit. (Id. at pp. 609-610.) In reaching that conclusion, the Borsuk court rejected the reasoning of Delta Imports, explaining the case had created confusion among practitioners and finding its “broad declaration that a motion to quash is the
What these appellate courts held is not in conflict: under Delta Imports, a defendant may use a motion to quash to challenge service of summons on the ground the accompanying complaint lacks even the minimal allegations required under
Delta Imports had a more specific holding, supported by a more narrowly tailored logic, than what the appellate court in Borsuk understood: the defendant used a motion to quash to contest the unlawful detainer five-day summons as defective because the accompanying complaint did not allege the defendant was guilty of unlawful detainer as defined in
Having reviewed these cases, we glean two related conclusions. First, a motion to quash service of summons under
These cases also support a second, equally important conclusion: that a defendant may properly use a motion to quash to challenge personal jurisdiction in an unlawful detainer case.
D.
Stancil‘s arguments in this case underscore the need for clarity about the statutory requirements for unlawful detainer complaints. Stancil does not allege that the City‘s complaint cannot support the unlawful detainer five-day summons. Nor does he identify a defect with the summons or service of process. Instead, he challenges the truth of the City‘s allegation that it has the right to terminate his rental agreement. Stancil‘s challenge to the City‘s complaint is therefore improperly raised on a motion to quash. We conclude that a motion to quash service of summons is not the proper procedure for Stancil to challenge the merits of the allegations contained in the City‘s unlawful detainer complaint.
Under the relevant statutory provisions, the speedy adjudication of unlawful detainer cases for lessors is balanced by ensuring their strict adherence to the rigorous requirements for service and notice. But a motion to quash or set aside the summons pursuant to
The superior court was right when it found Stancil improperly used a motion to quash to argue the City didn‘t have the right to terminate his rental agreement. Unlawful detainer is a special procedure available only for
III.
Motions to quash service of summons provide defendants with an important tool to quickly challenge personal jurisdiction without waiving the right to defend on the merits or risking entry of default. The unlawful detainer statutes reflect the importance of resolving landlord-tenant disputes quickly. Rather than expanding the limited scope of motions to quash in the unlawful detainer context, the purpose and rationale of these statutes reinforces the need for such limitations. We therefore conclude that a motion to quash service of summons can‘t be used to challenge any conceivable defect or the truth of the allegations contained in an unlawful detainer complaint. A motion to quash service of summons permits a defendant to challenge personal jurisdiction where the summons is improper or the statutory requirements for service of process are not fulfilled. In the context of unlawful detainer, a defendant may properly file a motion to quash to challenge an unlawful detainer five-day summons accompanied by a complaint that fails to include even the minimal allegations necessary to justify an unlawful detainer action as defined in
We affirm the Court of Appeal‘s denial of writ relief from the superior court‘s order. We conclude the superior court was correct in its
CUÉLLAR, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Stancil v. Superior Court
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding XX
Review Granted (published)
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S253783
Date Filed: May 3, 2021
Court: Superior
County: San Mateo
Judge: Susan L. Greenberg
Counsel:
Thorsnes Bartolotta McGuire, Vincent J. Bartolotta, Jr., Karen R. Frostrom, Neal A. Markowitz, David E. Kleinfeld; Madden Law Office and Alison Madden for Petitioner.
Matthew Warren, Madeline Howard, Crystal Sims and Richard A. Rothschild for Western Center on Law & Poverty as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Michelle Marchetta Kenyon, Kevin D. Siegal, Randall G. Block and Maxwell Blum for Real Party in Interest.
Heidi Palutke; Dowling & Marquez and Curtis F. Dowling for California Apartment Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Karen Frostrom
Thorsnes Bartolotta McGuire
2550 Fifth Ave., #1100
San Diego, CA 92103
(619) 236-9363
Madeline Howard
Western Center on Law & Poverty
3701 Wilshire Blvd., #208
Los Angeles, CA 90010
(213) 235-2628
Kevin D. Siegel
Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP
1901 Harrison St., Ste. 900
Oakland, CA 94612-3501
(510) 273-8806
Curtis F. Dowling
Dowling & Marquez, LLP
625 Market St., 4th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 977-0444