L. L. STANARD, Appellant, v. RAYMOND J. BOLIN, Respondent.
No. 44544
Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc
June 2, 1977
88 Wn.2d 614
We affirm the holding of the trial court.
WRIGHT, C.J., and ROSELLINI, HAMILTON, STAFFORD, UTTER, BRACHTENBACH, and HOROWITZ, JJ., concur.
Jack H. H. Dibblee, for appellant.
Delay, Curran & Boling, J. Donald Curran, Va Lena Scarpelli Curran, and Martin L. Salina, for respondent.
Because plaintiff‘s complaint was dismissed under CR 12(b)(6), the factual contentions of her complaint must be accepted as true for purposes of review. Barnum v. State, 72 Wn.2d 928, 435 P.2d 678 (1967). Plaintiff‘s complaint stated two claims for relief. Both claims alleged the
In October 1974, plaintiff and defendant (respondent) were introduced to each other by mutual friends, and their courtship developed soon thereafter. During the course of their courtship, defendant assured plaintiff that he was worth in excess of $2 million, was planning to retire in 2 years, and that the two of them would then travel. Defendant also promised plaintiff that she would never have to work again and that he would see to the support of her two teen-age boys. He also promised to see that the plaintiff‘s mother would never be in need.
On September 22, 1975, plaintiff accepted defendant‘s proposal of marriage. Thereafter, defendant took her to a jewelry store and purchased an engagement ring and matching wedding rings. The parties found a suitable home for their residence and signed the purchase agreement as husband and wife. At the insistence of defendant, plaintiff placed her home on the market for sale and sold most of her furniture at a public auction. The parties set December 13, 1975, as their wedding date, reserved a church, and engaged a minister to perform the service. Dresses for plaintiff, her mother, and the matron of honor were ordered, and a reception was arranged at a local establishment. The parties began informally announcing their plans to a wide circle of friends. After the wedding date was set, plaintiff‘s employer hired another person and requested plaintiff to assist in teaching the new employee the duties of her job.
On November 13, 1975, defendant informed plaintiff that he would not marry her. This came as a great shock to plaintiff and caused her to become ill and lose sleep and weight. Plaintiff sought medical advice and was treated by her physician. Plaintiff also had to take her home off the market and repurchase furniture at a cost in excess of that which she received for her older furniture. In addition,
In her first claim for relief, plaintiff sought damages to compensate her for her pain, impairment to health, humiliation, and embarrassment. Plaintiff‘s second claim sought damages to compensate her for her loss of expected financial security.
The breach-of-marriage-promise action has its origins in the common law. Professor Clark, a well-known authority on family law, has posited that 17th century English conceptions of marriage as largely a property transaction caused the English common-law courts to intervene in a subject matter which, up until the 17th century, had been almost exclusively under the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. See H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States 2 (1968) (hereafter cited as Clark). In any event, the action was carried forward into the common law of Washington (see
The breach-of-promise-to-marry action is one not easy to classify. Although the action is treated as arising from the breach of a contract (the contract being the mutual promises to marry), the damages allowable more closely resemble a tort action. Thus, the plaintiff may recover for loss to reputation, mental anguish, and injury to health, in
The action in its present form is subject to almost uniform criticism by the commentators, although our research has not disclosed any cases in which a court has abolished the action.1 In essence, these criticisms are: (1) the action is used as an instrument of oppression and blackmail; (2) engaged persons should be allowed to correct their mistakes without fear of publicity and legal compulsion; (3) the action is subject to great abuse at the hands of gullible and sympathetic juries; (4) it is wrong to allow under the guise of contract an action that is essentially tortious and penal in nature; and, (5) the measure of damages is unjust because damages are allowed for loss of social and economic position, whereas most persons marry for reasons of mutual love and affection. See, e.g., 1 C. Vernier, American Family Laws 26-27 (1931); Brown, Breach of Promise Suits, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 474 (1929); Wright, The Action for
When two persons agree to marry, they should realize that certain actions will be taken during the engagement period in reliance on the mutual promises to marry. Rings will be purchased, wedding dresses and other formal attire will be ordered or reserved, and honeymoon plans with their attendant expenses will be made. Wedding plans, such as the rental of a church, the engagement of a minister, the printing of wedding invitations, and so on, will commence. It is also likely that the parties will make plans for their future residence, such as purchasing a house, buying furniture, and the like. Further, at the time the parties decide to marry, they should realize that their plans and visions of future happiness will be communicated to friends and relatives and that wedding gifts soon will be arriving. When the plans to marry are abruptly ended, it is certainly foreseeable that the party who was unaware that the future marriage would not take place will have expended some sums of money and will suffer some forms of mental anguish, loss to reputation, and injury to health. We do not feel these injuries should go unanswered merely because the breach-of-promise-to-marry action may be subject to abuses; rather, an attempt should be made to eradicate the abuses from the action.
One major abuse of the action is allowing the plaintiff to bring in evidence of the defendant‘s wealth and social position. This evidence is admissible under the theory that the plaintiff should be compensated for what she or he has lost by not marrying the defendant. See, e.g., Bundy v. Dickinson, 108 Wash. 52, 182 P. 947 (1919); Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324 (1918); Fisher v. Kenyon, 56 Wash. 8, 104 P. 1127 (1909); and Heasley v. Nichols, supra.
Professor McCormick has concluded that evidence of the defendant‘s wealth has a more potent effect upon the size of the verdict than any instruction on damages. See C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages 399 n.36 (1935). If this is so, then it presents a very strong reason for disallowing any evidence of the defendant‘s wealth and social position. We conclude that damages for loss of expected financial and social position should no longer be recoverable under the breach-of-promise-to-marry action. This means that evidence of the defendant‘s wealth and social position becomes immaterial in assessing the plaintiff‘s damages.
Other damages subject to criticism are those damages given for mental anguish, loss to reputation, and injury to health. It is argued that these injuries are “so vague and so little capable of measurement in dollars that they give free rein to the jury‘s passions, prejudices and sympathies.” See Clark, supra at 12. This argument has little merit, for it places no faith in the jury‘s ability to evaluate objectively
As for retaining aggravated damages for seduction under a promise to marry, and the like, since plaintiff here was not seeking aggravated damages, we leave a decision on aggravated damages for a future case in which the issue for these damages arises. Also, we note that although other states allow punitive damages, these damages are not allowed in this state because they are not authorized by statute. See Steele v. Johnson, 76 Wn.2d 750, 458 P.2d 889 (1969).
We also do not believe the action should be abolished so that engaged persons are free from compulsion to choose whether to end an engagement. Although the policy of the state should not be to encourage a person to marry when he or she has begun to have second thoughts about a prospective mate, it is also the policy of this state to afford an avenue of redress for injuries suffered due to the actions of another. Allowing recovery for injuries, which are foreseeable at the time of entering into the relationship, should not be denied on the presumption the defendant would rather enter into the marriage than pay damages for the injuries caused. Furthermore, it is hard to conceive of a
In conclusion, we have decided that the breach-of-promise-to-marry action should be retained as a quasi-contract, quasi-tort action for the recovery of the foreseeable special and general damages which are caused by a defendant‘s breach of promise to marry. However, the action is modified to the extent that a plaintiff cannot recover for loss of expected financial and social position, because marriage is no longer considered to be a property transaction.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed on plaintiff‘s first claim for relief, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgment is affirmed on plaintiff‘s second claim for relief, which sought damages for loss of prospective economical and social advantage.
WRIGHT, C.J., and ROSELLINI, STAFFORD, BRACHTENBACH, HOROWITZ, and HICKS, JJ., concur.
UTTER, J. (dissenting)--The majority, in a well-written opinion, has set forth the historical background of the action for breach of promise to marry. It states the policy reasons for abolishing the action, but chooses to retain its major underpinnings. The sole change is to modify the doctrine to the extent that a plaintiff can no longer recover for loss of expected financial and social position, but may still recover foreseeable special and general damages caused by breach of a defendant‘s promise to marry.
I believe the change advocated does not go far enough. Motive of the defendant may still, apparently, be considered in assessing damages. Warner v. Benham, 126 Wash. 393, 218 P. 260, 34 A.L.R. 1358 (1923). Where the breach of promise to marry is wanton or deliberate, the effect is to
The current public policy expressed in the 1973 Dissolution Act is to disregard fault in the judicial determination of property rights at the dissolution of a marriage. Fault is not to be considered in determining which party shall have the decree. There are no damages as such in a dissolution. Is it not obvious, however, that one of the parties to a dissolution suffers at least as much humiliation, embarrassment, mental suffering and loss of financial expectation and security as does a party to the breakup of an engagement?
It is significant that there was no divorce by judicial decree at common law when the breach of promise action came into being. Tupper v. Tupper, 63 Wn.2d 585. Should not the public policy declared in the divorce statutes be applicable to engagements? I believe it is.
The majority lists the almost uniform criticisms of the action by commentators: “(1) the action is used as an instrument of oppression and blackmail; (2) engaged persons should be allowed to correct their mistakes without fear of publicity and legal compulsion; (3) the action is subject to great abuse at the hands of gullible and sympathetic juries; (4) it is wrong to allow under the guise of contract an action that is essentially tortious and penal in nature...”
DOLLIVER, J., concurs with UTTER, J.