*1 Stambaugh. Appellant, Stambaugh, Stambaugh, Appellant. Stambaugh v. *2 1973.
Argued May Before C. Jones, J., Eagen, Pomeroy O’Brien, Boberts, JJ. Manderino,
reargu- ment refused December27,1974. *3 Cherry, D.
Garland with him John W. Nilón, Jr., appellant Cherry and Kassab, for at No. Archbold, <& appellee and 179. 178, at No.
Harold him Bichard B. Cramer, Bchiro, with and appellant & at Mesirov, Gelman, Levin, No. Jaffe appellee and at No. 178. by October Opinion Mr. Justice Manderino, 1974: Stambaugh Stambaugh
Esther S. and J. H. William County, married 1935 and were resided in Delaware Pennsylvania, they separated July until on 13, 1966. separation, after three months the About on October wife the commenced an action in Delaware County requesting a from decree of divorce bed and husband, the when pending action still That was
board. commenced Florida moved to had who requesting February 20, on in Florida action On March matrimony. bond of from divorce the wife’s action the which court Pennsylvania husband enjoining an order entered pending, was in Florida for divorce with his action from proceeding proceeding the husband enjoined further Florida jurisdiction. action in other any with any 26, 1969, June and on action continued, nonetheless, in Florida. Subse- entered a final decree of divorce was concluded action was Pennsylvania the wife’s quently, entered court and on March 21, 1972, contract marriage declaring a final decree (1) (2) decree, Florida affected divorce by was not board, (3) from bed the wife granting fifty four hundred lite alimony awarding pendente and (4) March 6, 1970, effective week, dollars per seventy- hundred three awarding permanent the termination at five dollars week effective per lite. for alimony pendente the award Court. That Both parties appealed Superior Florida di- court held that the husband’s unanimously to full and credit since decree entitled faith vorce therefore domiciled Florida. It the husband was final of that ordered a modification portion contract was marriage declaring Court, affected the Florida decree. The Superior entitled was divided whether wife was however, alimony. Stambaugh Stambaugh, Superior *4 dissent- 360, (1972) (Judge Ct. Hoffman . Both joined by ing, Judges par- Cercone) Jacobs for allowance of which appeal ties filed were petitions this Court. by granted first issue raised these
The is whether appeals should faith give full and credit to the Florida divorce decree. We conclude that it must and,
151 affirm that therefore, Court order as to Superior issue.
It well established
once Florida has
granted
a divorce decree
that decree
valid
presumptively
Es
jurisdiction. Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rel.
325
1118
U.S.
89 L.Ed.
65
Ct.
enwein,
279,
S.
1608,
v.
(1945) Williams North
;
Carolina
325
(II),
226,
U.S.
89 L.Ed
Ct.
65 S.
a decree is
1577,
(1945).
1092
Such
“a conclusive adjudication of
there
involved
everything
except
jurisdictional
facts on which it is founded
. .
ex
.,” Commonwealth
rel.
v.
Pa.
McVay McVay,
73, 118
144, 146
fide
bona
domicile
is the essential
jurisdictional
fact
necessary
give any
decree extraterritorial
effect. See Williams v. North Car
olina
(I),
U.S. 287, 297-98, 87 L.Ed
63 S.
279, 285-86,
Ct.
212-13
Commonwealth
rel.
v.
(1942);
ex McVay
McVay,
Commonwealth ex rel. Meth
supra;
Meth,
Ct.
Superior
41 A.2d
Addi
(1945).
“the
tionally
burden rests heavily”
at
upon
party
decree
show
tacking
jurisdiction
was
fact
Williams v. North
lacking.
(II),
Carolina
Here trial found court that the husband had not established valid domicile Florida and therefore his Florida was entitled to faith and credit. Court Superior unanimously reversed that determination. The wife asserts that since the trial found that her court husband was not a Florida domi Court Superior powerless ciliary, alter that The issue fact. finding domicile, is a however, of law and mixed fact reviewable question appel Estate, Dorrance’s late court. 309 Pa. 151, 156, 163 *5 “The determination held: this Court A. of upon a based law, ... is conclusion of . . . domicile . . . Furthermore are undisputed. most of which facts, from other fact is a deduction a of finding simply where and tribunal under review, facts reported by reason- the result of in question purely ultimate fact and of its correctness to judge we are ing, competent re- from the facts as draw our conclusions will own Smith, Accord, Smith ported.” 630 (1950). mov-
The record establishes that husband, upon in home there resided and ing Florida, purchased di- his instituting Florida for about two before years in Florida automobile action. He Ms registered vorce He opened and Mmself as voter there. also enrolled in a church and several Florida, bank account joined and Florida taxes. Appar- civic organizations, paid in remained PMladelpMa Ms business ently because retain con- found it certain necessary the husband in he maintained tacts Pennsylvania. Consequently in account filed Ms checking PMladelpMa, personal income tax return federal personal PMladelpMa, mem- and maintained various accounts club charge in After bersMps PMladelpMa. Ms securing he Florida remarrying immediately leased a one term in Philadel- apartment year he when not in occupied wMch Florida. The evi- phia, dence adduced was inconclusive how regarding exactly time actually spent much he and how Pennsylvania time Florida. much he this evidence the spent Upon Court determined that the wife had failed Superior her that her meet burden establisMng husband domiliciary. a Florida not argues, however,
The wife because the evi- her husband indicates was living dence part period question a “substantial” he was domiliciary a valid actually Florida. It well that a maintain business settled, though, person may interests outside the domicile and in fact state his live outside his he state as domiciliary long pos- sesses the intention to return requisite to that state. Smith Smith,
Smith, this Court was a similar factual presented with situation where the husband had inter- business many ests outside of his Florida, adopted including domicile, some interests He also about Pennsylvania. spent Florida, half of his time outside of living There, Court held that such facts did not a preclude finding the husband a bona was fide Florida domiciliary. therefore We with the agree Court’s deter- Superior mination that the husband was a bona fide domiciliary of Florida. the Florida Accordingly, divorce decree not be denied full faith may and credit because, here, valid domicile the state rendering decree, jurisdictional essential prerequisite, was fact present. The wife also argues Pennsylvania should deny full faith and credit the Florida divorce decree since by it was husband after the issuance an injunction anti-suit the trial by court which had jurisdiction over the personal husband. We cannot agree.
The
basis for
only proper
full faith
denying
to an out-of-state
credit
divorce decree is lack of juris
“A
in one
judgment
diction.
State is conclusive upon the
merits in
other
...
if
every
State,
the court of the first
..
. had jurisdiction
State
...
to render the judgment.”
Carolina,
added.) Williams v. North
(Emphasis
(II),
89 L.Ed.
325 U.S.
1577, 1581,
Moreover, injunction may properly it is estab where issue domiciliary enjoined spouse of an lished that Smith, other Smith v. state. affirming of a bill the dismissal enjoin spouse seeking
equity brought by
a di
one
by
spouse,
proceeding
we
the other
in Florida
vorce
(No. 1), 317
North
Carolina
said: “Under Williams
granted
the bona
a court of
U.S.
given
spouse
and must be
fide domicile of either
is valid
only ground upon
which
faith and credit.
may
jurisdiction
be attacked
of another
divorce decree
of either
bona fide domicile
not the
is that
spouse:
Carolina,
226;
North
325 U.S.
Williams
*7
Pa.
rel.
348
Esenwein,
Esenwein v.
Commonwealth
power
equity
to
has no
restrain
the case injunction, therefore, The anti-suit domiciliary. of-state issuance not and its is not have been granted should faith credit to denying basis a proper decree. Florida divorce issue is whether wife entitled
The next Florida alimony. Although decree permanent full faith and and is as to credit, effective entitled because the parties husband status the marital it is Florida, domiciliary controlling awas since Florida did not have in issue per- the wife. over “The result jurisdiction sonam the divorce divisible —to make give is to effect situation insofar as it affects marital Nevada *8 on it ineffective the issue make of ali- status the interests both accomomdates Nevada It mony. broken in this marriage York restricting New of her matters dominant concern.” State each U.S. 92 L.Ed. 541, 549, 334 Estin, 1561, 1569, v. Estin 156
68
Accord,
S. Ct.
1218
v.
(1948).
Kreiger
Kreiger,
1213,
334 U.S.
1221 (1948);
92 L.Ed.
68 S. Ct.
555,
1572,
L.Ed. v.
350 U.S.
100
Armstrong
Armstrong,
Vanderbilt,
S. Ct.
Vanderbilt v.
354
76
629 (1956);
U.S.
1
416, L.Ed.2d
The Florida decree is thus ineffective the issue of permanent It does not alimony. follow, however, that The the wife is entitled to Restate- alimony. such ment of “Al- Conflicts Second comment f. states: §77, from faith and credit does not bar a wife though from a seeking husband who has support previously an parte ex may she nevertheless be divorce, unable to obtain such This is because valid relief. the marital and the severs relationship local law some States makes no requir- provision an ex-husband ing support (Emphasis ex-wife.” added.)
The of Pennsylvania law does not for an provide award after a divorce permanent alimony Hooks matrimony. Hooks, bond v. Pa. 123 Superior Ct. 187 A. 245 Commonwealth ex rel. (1936); v. Branch 175 Pa. Ct. Branch, Superior ex Commonwealth rel. v. (1954); McCormack Mc Cormack, Superior
Commonwealth v. Pa. Kurniker, Superior Ct. 553 Commonwealth Pa. (1929) ; Parker, Superior Ct. Divorce Act of (1915); see, Law, May 2, 1929, et P. L. 23 P.S. seq., amended, et seq. §10 §10 Finck, See Gershman F.2d also, 229 (4th Cir. 1971). ex rel. Esenwein
In Commonwealth v. Esenwein, A.2d 335 (1944), Court said to a entitled revocation of a a husband Pennsyl if he had obtained award valid vania Nevada in Commonwealth recently, More rel. divorce. Mc 70, 72, 118 McVay, 144, 146 Vay full faith and credit if the clause “requires said we *9 recognized that the divorce be in this Common Nevada obligation support [the wealth his wife husband’s] automatically granted. ceased when divorce was Although MeVay, . . in both Esenwein and held we jurisdictional that the on Nevada decrees were invalid grounds, recognized long-estab we and restated the Pennsylvania alimony permanent lished of law that a improper following award is from the bond divorce matrimony. involving prop spouse’s of Even cases erty rights, alimony, other than we have held that valid divorce effect another state has the same Pennsylvania property as a valid on divorce decree rights spouse. of a In March Estate, Pennsylvania filed widow against election to her take will. The issue husband’s property rights was whether the widow’s had been following parte terminated a valid ex Nevada divorce citing McVay decree. our We decisions held, property rights that the widow’s Esenwein, were ter Pennsylvania minated under law. supra, permitted
Estin v. Estin,
the State of New
permanent alimony
though
York to award
even
another
validly granted
parte
state had
an ex
Estin,
divorce.
only
finding
did
however,
so
after
that the substantive
provided
permanent alimony
York
for
law
New
matrimony.
from
after a divorce
the bond of
Estin did
policy
permanent not sanction a state
which
parte
differently
ex
treats out-of-state
divorces
from
granted
Estin
divorces
in-state.
said “. . . it will be
any
enough
consider the effect of
time
discrimination
parte
ex
to out-of-state
shown
divorces when a State
policy.” 334 U.S. that its
92 L.Ed.
makes
(1948). Pennsylvania,
68 S.
which
parte
adopted any
permits
divorces,
in-state
has not
against
policy
parte
of discrimination
out-of-state ex
Nixon,
Nixon
Although
*10
ed
the decree
permanent alimony,
properly permitted
is
alimony
lite. Such
pendente
permitted
of
The
Act
Pennsylvania.
May 2, 1929,
Divorce Law,
P. L.
as amended 23 P.S.
The trial
1237, §46,
§46.
of
af-
court’s award
lite is therefore
alimony pendente
firmed.
Pa.
Ct.
Callen,
Commonwealth v.
165
Superior
Scholl,
Scholl v.
154 Pa.
(1949).
Su-
Ct.
Foust v.
144
perior
Foust,
35
(1944);
528
Ct.
A.2d 517
Superior
19
White
White, 106 Pa.
That of the order Court portion Superior the trial court’s as to the modifying termina- tion of the contract is affirmed. That marriage por- tion of the Court’s order the trial Superior affirming of court’s lite is also affirmed. grant alimony pendente In all other the order of the respects Court is Superior reversed.
Mr. Nix Justice took no in the consideration part or of decision this case. Opinion by
Dissenting Mr. Justice Eoberts: Mrs. is denied Stambaugh her right to permanent on alimony solely account of the majority’s adherence to a unrelated to conceptualization the particular of facts this case. exceptional Because no is attempt made view functionally relationship the parties and the Mr. parties’ (especially Stambaugh’s) conduct, I dissent.
Although correctly holding that Mr. Stambaugh’s
Florida
parte
is
divorce
“ineffective on the issue relies
mistakenly
permanent
alimony,”
majority
law
rule
substantive
general
of any
terminates
matrimony
a divorce
the bonds of
from
not adequately
right
by
errs
support.
majority
disobedience
Stambaugh’s
the effect of Mr.
considering
injunction
a valid and final anti-suit
him from prosecuting
Mrs. Stambaugh,
enjoining
a state other than Pennsylvania.
to utilize
forced
To
reach its
result,
majority
Pa. 1,
Smith,
of Smith
overly-broad language
no power
has
equity
: “Since
(1950)
it
divorce,
to restrain a
a lawful
obtaining
person
where
granted
follows
be
only
may
domicile
fide
a bona
spouse has not established
Although
sought.”
state
which the divorce is
occasions, e.g.,
other
this articulation has been used on
A.2d 653,
Monihan v.
Monihan,
misun-
on a fundamental
(1970),1
predicated
equity.2
of a court
powers
derstanding
Wallace,
404, A.2d 769
See also
Wallace
*11
injunction
distinguishable.
issued
There,
That case
the
foreign
already
divorce.
after
the husband had
anything
doing
Penn
enjoined
in
“from
entered
the husband
rights
sylvania
property
her
or
wife’s]
to affect
marital status
[the
relationship.”
incident
A.2d at 770.
to that
Id. at
they
Although
Pennsylvania,
parties
moved
married in
the
were
immediately
They
together
until
the wife
there
to Florida.
lived
Pennsylvania.
had
Court
This
the
and
left
husband
returned to
concluding
problem
a bona fide domi-
in
the husband was
no
that
required
that,
ciliary
Having
the Court was
concluded
Florida.
(1942),
Carolina,
v. North
S. Ct. 207
under Williams
317 U.S.
recognize
of marital status.
to
the Florida
on the issue
(1967),
Estate,
Knaus
and
vacate husband, her she had met burden the full faith because under presumption overcoming validity the of a credit clause and
A court of equity plainly power has to restrain person another prosecuting suit state be (though lawful to do so that if the state), jurisdiction court has enjoining person over the to be enjoined and if the foreign prosecution will offend a policy of enjoining state. This much was recognized Gourt Supreme of the United States long ago as 1877. “Dehon v. is the leading Foster, Allen, 545, upon case eminent counsel on subject, argued by both and upon great decided consideration. The sides, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, speaking through O. points jurisdic out J., Bigelow, tion of a as a to court, court restrain chancery, persons within jurisdiction its from prosecuting suits, upon proper case either in the courts of Massa made, chusetts or other States or rests foreign countries, on the clear authority vested courts of over equity persons within limits of their and jurisdiction amenable to to acts to process, stay contrary equity good conscience; as the decree of the court that, in such cases is directed at the it is solely wholly party, immaterial that such party is his action prosecuting of another courts state or Cole Cun country.” 133 U.S. 10 S. Ct. ningham, And this rule halt applies injunctions designed to foreign divorce. That case did not involve the effect of an anti-suit injunction. Although such an had been issued in that propriety pertinent case, its existence or was not the ratio fundamentally, of that case. More decidendi Court never stated spouse domiciliary enjoined was a of the state in which he divorce. obtained his Knaus, committing appellant
In Knaus v. the reason the order purged jail contempt until he himself of was reversed had nothing with whether he was or to do was not a bona fide domi- *12 ciliary Rather, ground state. of another ease on rested imprisoned purges contempt cannot be that one until he himself of “something apparently by doing beyond power which is his 380, Pa. at 127 . .” 387 A.2d at 674. do . .
161
in another
jurisdiction.
tlie
of a divorce
prosecution
434 Pa.
v.
254
Linett,
441, 444-45,
Linett
e.g.,
See,
v.
425
Rothman,
408,
Rothman
7,
(1969);
406,
9
v.
Wenz,
Wenz.
(1967);
397,
228 A.2d
901
899,
also James v.
See
(1960).
377
376,
399,
14
N.E.2d
Trunk Western
Ill.2d
152
356,
Grand
R.R.,
288 (1958);
79 S. Ct.
cert.
358 U.S.
858,
denied,
915,
v.
303 N.Y.
N.E.2d
481,
Hammer
Hammer,
N.E.2d
302 N.Y.
(1952)
Garvin,
96,
; Garvin
of Smith v.
language
broad
unnecessarily
A.2d at
is also based on
364 Pa. at
Smith,
v. North
317 U.S.
Carolina,
Williams
misreading of
That
case did
(Williams I).
S. Ct. 207
(1942)
injunction
not
an anti-suit
was constitutional.
pass on whether
U.S.
10 S. Ct.
Co
le
Cunningham,
long before;
had decided
question
269 (1890),
neither the
an anti-suit
violates
under Gole,
im
faith
nor the
privileges
and credit clause
clause of the United States Constitution.
munities
Williams I has relevance to the situation presented
an anti-suit
be-
injunction only
disobedience of
may
cause it restricts what sanctions a court
impose
on
the court’s injunction.
who violates
Ac-
party
the rule Williams
state
cording
I,
enjoining
divorce full faith and
foreign
credit
may
deny
if
who
was a bona
spouse
fide
And
foreign
state.
this rule is
domiliciary
even
United
Supreme
more limited. The
States
Court has
that a divorce valid under
held
repeatedly
law
entitled to full faith
a sister state is
and credit only
marital
it is not
status;
speaks
binding
Estin v.
334 U.S.
alimony.
Estin,
issue of
1218 (1948)
(recognizing
divisible di-
S.
Vanderbilt v.
Accord,
vorces).
Vanderbilt, 354 U.S.
Ct. 3360
Armstrong
77 S.
Armstrong,
*13
(1956); Kreiger Kreiger,
350 U.S.
once
is obtained,
over
may validly
injunction,
if
issue.
anti-suit
warranted,
succinctly
Mr. Justice
stated for this
Or,
O’Bbien
in Rothman v.
Court
425 Pa.
Rothman,
enjoined
(1967):
appellant
“Inasmuch as
[the
spouse]
jurisdiction of the
had submitted himself to the
previous
equity
court
its decree
actions,
injunction] may
action
issuance of an anti-suit
[i.e.,
properly
A.2d at 901.
him.” Id. at
See
bind
434 Pa.
short, enjoined domiciliary party a bona fide of a be state. sister Legislature be noted that the must also foresaw
It may necessary injunctions specifi- be and that anti-suit empowered cally in matrimonial our courts causes to injunctions. “In all matrimonial causes the such issue power equity jurisdiction, and and have court shall injunctions may or other orders which are neces- issue parties sary protect the interests of or to effect- may grant purposes such act, other uate justice relief remedy require against or as equity over whom either or third any person party against in or jurisdiction the court has and who is involved with the cause.” Act disposition concerned 23 P.S. as amended, P.L. May 2, 1929, § 55(2) (Supp. 1974). § issu-
Two are for the valid necessary elements then over jurisdiction ance injunction: anti-suit facts. justifying to be and a set enjoined proper party In the elements are present. instant both case, *14 question,
As for does jurisdiction, majority over Mr. Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction as it could not, no he was although The record Stambaugh. shows in his this state when commenced longer wife residing entered a Stambaugh her in Mr. 1966, divorce suit an and filed through his general appearance attorney “A answer on divorce. state contesting the merits in over an judicial jurisdiction has to exercise power in as defendant appearance dividual enters who (Second) the action.” of Conflicts Eestatement in that once cases accord (1971). Laws Our are § all ob a enters a he waives party general appearance, in Morell Es jurisdiction. jections personam E.g., C.E. tate, 522, B. Pancoast Co., Williams Co. Henry The rationale for this (1963). 194 A.2d voluntary participation rule is that the “individual’s for a in an makes reasonable action state party in over him that action.” Ee jurisdiction exercise comment of Conflict of Laws statement (Second) § a at 136 entered the Pennsylvania court which
Thus, in Stambaugh Mr. had personam injunction against him. And once personal jurisdiction over jurisdiction “jurisdiction continues all throughout this attaches, which arise out of proceedings original subsequent 26. Id. action.” § cause
The facts and considered as a circumstances, whole, demonstrate that a been case has made out the issu- ance of the anti-suit injunction. Pennsylvania’s First, contacts with are marriage substantial. parties were married Pennsylvania lived to- gether Delaware County until 1966. Mrs. Stam- baugh presently lives here. Mr. Although Stambaugh now resides he maintains considerable Florida, con- tacts with For Pennsylvania. since he moved instance, Mr. Stambaugh continues to remain Florida, active in the operations his real Philadelphia-based estate firm.
Second, jurisdiction over controversy three years almost to Mr. prior Stam for his ex baugh’s filing parte Florida divorce. And the court had personal jurisdiction over both parties. It is ““ ‘ well settled that court may restrain party prosecuting subsequent suit another jurisdiction, whether objects of the two are the suits same or if the effect of the suit not, second is to withdraw from the court first acquiring jurisdiction part sub ’ ” ject-matter the first suit.” Wenz Wenz, Pa. at at 377 Trees (quoting Glenn, *15 (1935)). A. 487, 490-91, a has substantial Pennsylvania interest
Third, with Mrs. her providing Stambaugh day court on the of permanent Mr. question alimony. Stambaugh’s and parte, Florida divorce was that court never ob- in personam jurisdiction necessary tained the to adjudi- Stambaugh’s personal rights. cate Ensuring Mrs. of this Commonwealth due process domiciliaries receive of a consideration to weighty deciding law is issue . injunction. an anti-suit a bona fide Stambaugh Mr. is of
True, domiciliary enjoined to party If the be is not a Florida. bona fide another state, certainly of a much domiciliary stronger injunction presented. anti-suit an case for But an the whether question on fact is not determinative a issue. it is injunction validly Rather, anti-suit may the others. all weighed factor to be with trial all the court exercised of these light facts, a Mr. enjoined Stambaugh, party and its discretion in another a divorce state. before from prosecuting it, hearing of the this injunction, notice Despite timely con- to to appear personally Mr. chose not Stambaugh was issued became it.3 After the test it or have amended vacated. sought he never final, from the trial court’s decree. took appeal He no the He injunction. Mr. Instead, Stambaugh ignored his divorce in Florida. prosecuting disobeyed day 5, 1909, the on March the wile record reveals that restraining petition order, counsel a her for a her mailed filed Stambaugh’s petition Cramp, copy Mr. Mr. to the office of of Cramp’s associate, Surrick, of record. Mr. admitted counsel Mr. receiving copy petition, of the Mrs. and said he then notified Stambaugh’s Cramp Mrs. counsel that Mr. was out of town. Stam baugh proceeded with her action and on March thereafter restraining order. At the time the decree the court entered present representing granted court, Mr. Surrick was having modify husband, succeeded in the court fact proposed language decree. of the
According of the Rules to Rule of Civil Procedure: l>y complaint party filing pleading, other than “A a a which every commenced, party shall forthwith serve it on other action by leaving copy mailing copy “(2) or for him at party place or or the business address residence record, (Emphasis attorney added.) party’s . . .”. See also petition restraining P. Because this Civ. 233. order was R. original complaint ancillary requirement in divorce the to the part Rothman, met. of the rule was Rothman v. first See of the J., concurring). Further, A.2d at 901 (Robebts, Pa. at completely complied part Stambaugh with the second Mrs. copy petition by mailing her her husband’s Rule counsel’s given Stambaugh therefore was required all the Mr. notice office. *16 by Rule. obtained an
Having exparte foreign divorce vio- lation a proper then injunction, only did Mr. Stam- baugh return to to attempt secure from the decree he court, whose benefits defied, his contumacious conduct. He challenges the award of permanent to Mrs. alimony Stambaugh on the ground that the Florida decree terminates all her rights support even this though and could not not, have decided Florida. been, by And the majority up- holds this challenge approves his contumacious conduct. I cannot agree.
Because Mr.
Stambaugh was
bona fide domiciliary
his ex
Florida,
parte divorce is entitled to full faith
and credit on the issue of marital
status.
Usually
this Commonwealth a final decree of divorce terminates
duty
husband to
either
pay
or ali
support
mony to his wife.
Commonwealth ex rel.
E.g.,
McVay
A.2d 144
McVay,
Common
(1955);
wealth ex
Esenwien
rel.
Esenwein,
A.2d 335
aff’d sub. nom. Esenwein
v. Pennsyl
vania ex rel. Esenwein,
But this is not the usual case. Whether a wife’s potential right permanent can alimony be terminated an ex by parte foreign divorce obtained her husband in violation of lawfully-issued anti-suit injunction is a unique question. Mr. Stambaugh’s my view, contumacious conduct him from estop
should asserting existence of his Florida divorce the issue of parte alimony. if is as for the purposes situation exist. did not permit Mr. refusing Stambaugh to
By profit by conduct, Pennsylvania his contumacious accommodates interests of federalism and competing this Common- The full faith and credit policies. wealth’s clause is *17 recognized not Florida divorce is violated because the Estin, Estin v. 334 U.S. as marital status. to there legislative provision S. The from the bonds of a valid divorce is no after Mr. Stambaugh’s because offended, matrimony not pur- non-existent, contumacious behavior makes ex divorce. parte the Florida poses of alimony, judicial system preserved of our process integrity and final orders one valid allowing who flouts con- of his benefits obtaining courts our due Stambaugh’s Mrs. process tumacious conduct. right support of her on the issue to a right hearing is vindicated. more than gives effect majority
However, parte divorce decree. and credit to the Florida faith and credit clause requires faith the full Nothing contumacious to allow Mr. Stambaugh’s support. his cut off wife’s right conduct in all order respects and would affirm I dissent Court. the Superior v. Richman, Commonwealth Appellant.