*1 918 jury to (1996); punitive damages and to allow the Lip Tillett v. 666 N.E.2d (1996); fully compen- P.2d 1158 reach a verdict that
pert, Mont. Melton, plaintiffs their losses. Perry 299 sate the for v. 171 W.Va. (1982). S.E.2d 8 J., STUMBO, joins dissenting permitting Kentucky, concept
In opinion. in damages compensa punitive addition tory long standing. damages one Heat & Light, Power
Horton v. Union (1985).
Co., Ky.,
Punitive
damages penalty to be a are intended Bis rights
the violation of the of another. (1972). Goss, Ky.,
set v. 481 S.W.2d nature of egregious
focus is more on the terms rather than societal offense STALLWORTH, Appellant, Shaun plaintiff on the individual suf impact Damages fering injury. See 25 C.J.S. (1989). 117(1) § KENTUCKY, OF COMMONWEALTH punitive damages The doctrine serves Appellee. society’s purpose expressing useful disapproval of conduct and de- No. 2000-SC-0211-MR. intolerable other reme- terring such conduct where no Kentucky. Court of Horton, dy supra would suffice. See Roberts, Punitive quoting Mallor and April Damages Principled Approach, Toward (1980). Punitive L.J. Hastings damages are in addition to com- awarded
pensatory damage punish defendant rights reckless indifference (Second) The Restatement others. Cf. 908(2) (1979). § Torts Dyche dis- Judge
As observed Appeals, an
senting opinion the Court totally
injured person can never be made attorney fees are not a re-
whole because of punitive The allowance
coverable cost. case
damages proper legitimate in a step producing a reme-
could be a toward
dy problem. be exercised always
Caution should punitive damages
regard to the award of blatantly award can
because a excessive en- embarrass the
counterproductive and judicial legal system.
tire in error in refus-
The circuit court was
ing jury issue instruct
as to whether his should revoked, instead, Appellant’s pri- mary arguments concern the (20) amended, validity of the sentence that he received as a result of the Appellant revocation. We authority modify court had no judgment, the final and we thus reverse and remand for the trial court to vacate its (20) prior reinstating the twenty year sentence and to enter a new order (10) reinstating the ten sentence re- in Appellant’s flected final judgment. Appellant, juvenile transferred cir- offender, cuit youthful court as a (15) guilty pleas to each count of a fifteen indictment, count and the trial court origi- (10) nally Appellant to a ten Arnold, Timothy G. Assistant Public Ad- year imprisonment, term of vocate, Department of Advocacy, Public the sentence on the condition Appel- Fraknfort, Appellant. lant enter and complete “Teen Challenge,” a fourteen Disciple- month Christian Chandler, III, A.B. Attorney General, ship Program located in Springs, Hot Ar- Zak, John E. General, Assistant Attorney Girardeau, Cape kansas and Missouri. Division, Criminal Appellate Office of the Appellant program absconded from the General, Attorney George G. Seelig, Assis- (24) hours, within twenty-four and the trial General, tant Attorney Appellate Criminal subsequently Appellant’s revoked Division, Office of Attorney General, probation and original reinstated the Frankfort, Appellee.
(10) year prison sentence. Approximately later, a month eighteenth OPINION THE OF COURT (18th) birthday, the trial court brought Stallworth, Shaun herein, ap- Appellant back before it for resentencing peals as a matter of right from a Marshall 640.030(2) under KRS and recommitted Circuit Court order revoking Appellant’s Appellant to the custody shock and “reinstating” Appel- Department of Corrections. lant’s year prison sentence. 110(2)(b). Ky. § then filed a Motion for Const. After Appellant’s motion, pleas response Probation. In guilty, court’s final express- first entered an order fixed his years. sentence at ten However, ing the trial willingness court’s to consider during subsequent proceedings probation: probation, motion for shock Appellant agreed that the trial court could This matter is before the Court on amend the final to reflect a Defendant’s Motion for Shock Probation. year sentence. Although this has reviewed the Motion as matter comes ap- before the Court Response as an well as the of the Common- peal from the revoking Appellant’s wealth objecting to the Motion for Shock probation, Appellant raises no issue Probation. The Court is of the the Indictment has made other Counts while the Commonwealth plead has which Defendant very points opposition good
some concurrently. Probation, pos- the Motion for Shock returning to sibility of this individual 2. That final sentence would be *3 the explored. Challenge Teen should be penitentiary. in the state However, grant the will before Court pro- That the Defendant would be Motion, it to deny this wishes hold the same conditions as bated on matter the Defen- hearing the with out in the set November present in the Courtroom. At that dant Order. hearing, opportu- each side will have then re- 4. That Defendant would nity present arguments to testi- and/or County leased from the Marshall mony position. supporting 15,1999 Detention Center on June transported to immediately at which he hearing After considered Challenge program, with arguments [Ap- Teen “look[ed] counsel and parents transport to Defendant’s pellant] in eye,” the trial court entered him. explaining the terms under which willing grant Appellant privi- it to respon- 5. That Defendant would be probation: lege of shock additional sible for and all costs incurred. This matter is before the Court on Probation. Defendant’s Motion Shock be agree- That Defendant previously granted shock [sic] The Court change to the under- ing this with subsequently revoked the he have his standing should probation for an almost immediate viola- he again, that probation revoked major tion of one of the terms of the at a 20 looking would be That, probation. being requirement opposed as to a 10 Teen that Defendant Chal-
lenge program. again Defendant is now agree- the Defendant be 7. Should petitioning for shock the Court terms, able to these request. and making tion same probation. grant would then hearing has held a and has dis- file will this aside The Court set with the Defendant. cussed matter day. until June 1999 rule frankly time, Court is While De- Prior to that counsel for change in the that there has been some the Court as fendant shall advise Defendant, intention; it the Court believes to the Defendant’s with these agrees it will be if the Defendant must evidence more before terms, him bring the Court will willing grant to Motion 7, 1999 the Court on June before deny Probation. Rather than to time, him. resentence at this Shock Probation Motion hereby will set out follow- the Court motion, On grant before it will ing requirements up date a few “resentencing” moved probation. They are follows: and, date, judge on that days, sentence, prior if De- agreed paraphrased 1.The the terms of were fendant, parties before explained would be amended if if he 3, 4, willing, “to he’s and 15 find out make Counts the Court go wants to just of 20 to do he consecutive for a total wants years.” ten penitentiary. and do his in the state That ahead And, judge engaged colloquy you’re doing then this voluntari- Court: ly, freely, intelligently, and under- Appellant counsel as agreed standingly? whether understood and Yes, to shock under the terms of- sir. Appellant: fered: it’s That Court: anymore, but tence it’s [Appellant’s Mr. Blankenship
Court: years. counsel], you anything there else Yes, Appellant: sir. say, you your
want and do client with the I set out terms willingness After indicated his May year? in the order of 7th of this have his sentence term increased to the *4 aggregate maximum sentence of do, your We I Counsel: honor. have (20) years, trial judge Appel- ordered explained Mr. Stallworth the rami- on lant’s release and stat- fications and the he’s risks of what ed that the docket sheet would reflect that doing. He understands that he’s fac- an order granting Motion ing a ten year increase modifying and aggre- Probation it, complete sentence should he fail to imposed in gate previous final pa- additional ramifications judgment “to be entered.” The Mar- eligibility, role additional time shall completed Circuit Clerk should he fail. he can He thinks Custody AOC 385 Release From form on successfully it, complete and that’s date, no modifying Appel- he what wants to do. granting Appellant lant’s Stallworth, Okay. you Court: Mr. was entered. through your rights your -with later, A little over two Appel- months attorney? again Challenge lant left Teen Pro- Yes, Appellant: sir. 18, 2000, gram. January On And, that, you Court: do if understand court, brought before trial this, you go along with going I’m what form January order was on do is set aside that ten 2000 revoking probation: sentence, and I’m going to amend the Defendant above-named was sen- 1, 3, 4, on Counts 15 to imprisonment term of tenced to a run consecutive for a total of offense(s) 16,1998 years on for the Nov. (20) years? degree endangerment; of 1st wanton $300; degree burglary; third theft over Yes, Appellant: sir. possession forged instrument and other pro- Court: other [Lists terms of shock pro- misdemeanors. Said sentence was ... Complete bation] the Teen Chal- period bated on various conditions for a lenge Program You un- successfully. year(s). of 5 don’t, you you’re derstand then hearing A was held January looking years, less cred- concerning whether the Defendant it for time served? you Do under- proba- had violated conditions that? stand represented tion. Defendant was Yes, sir, Appellant: I understand. counsel, Tom Blankenship. And, you you Court: understand The Court finds the Defendant’s don’t have to do this? be revoked he should because to, Appellant: want sir. has the conditions violated of his following in the leaving tion manner: consecutive a total penitentiary, Challenge complete Teen the state —-failure final Challenge. Teen sentence of 20 penitentiary. The Court entered hereby Therefore it ORDERED 7, 1999, May this order on and on is RE- Defendant’s or about June Defendant VOKED, year(s) and his sentence of 20 was resentenced to a in a penal state institu- tence, con- hereby tion is reinstated.... dition that he Teen Ap- filed After his Notice However, a Challenge program. peal, court entered another order setting out the subsequent it attempted clarify state of 7,May terms of 1999 Order the record: was not entered. pursu- This matter before the Court 18, 2000, January 8. On Defendant’s of its ant to Court’s review Order revoked, probation was with a 20 revoking probation January dated reinstated [sic] purpose 2000. The of this Order is to *5 7, 1999 pursuant May to Order. in matter. clarify record this Hav- Therefore, 4. Court ORDERS file, ing hereby reviewed the the Court prior Judgment FINDS and as follows: ORDERS 1,1999 February Court dated sen- procedure 1. this case was to 10 in a tencing Defendant originally that Defendant was modi- penal state institution was transferred to circuit court as a 1999, 4, which or- fied on June offender, youthful and was sen- 3, 4, and 15 dered that Counts tenced to 10 this Court run for a total of 20 consecutively imprisonment on November did in fact years, and the Court 1999. Defendant was hereby ORDERS that Defen- successfully that he condition dant to 20 is sentenced program known as penal term in a state maximum Challenge”. Shortly “Teen 7,May to the pursuant institution having probated, Defendant 1999 Order. violated the terms of IT OR- 5. STILL FURTHER IS tion, 7, 1998, and on December an grant- DERED that the revoking probation was Order 7,May is ed order sentencing by this to pursuant the Janu- REVOKED year prison to a Defendant Order, and that Or- ary 1, 1999, the February term. On herein. incorporated der is sentencing an Court entered Therefore, IT STILL FUR- IS following as an adult Defendant the De- THER ORDERED reaching age Defendant’s to 20 fendant is committed 2. Defendant then filed a Motion for in a prison term [sic] sentenced Probation, April and on institution, penal for which state an the Court entered currently is serv- the Defendant out which set ing. grant would Court, Appellant agreed having In his brief to Defendant (1) Ap- alternatively, despite that: argues, [sic] amended to pellant’s agreement prisoner privileged to the amendment tional belief that a is probation, trial exchange for shock negotiate his release in vein of authority court lacked final amend the to an in- agreeing is Galusha —that view, and increase In our entitle- creased (20) (2) years; tence to if the even ment to shock must rest validly court could amend final an evaluation of a host traditional judgment, longer may criteria. A not cannot be enforced because the trial probation- supply quid pro quo failed to make that amendment without A ary rule which would allow a release. delay; undue prisoner exchange to obtain forfeited incar- right has longer for a sentence in the event of imprison- cerate term of would, opinion, revocation our under this indictment because chaos, only invite result intrusion alleged Compact violation of Interstate power, arbitrary something foreign 439.560, Supervision, Parole re- KRS end, system government. our In the quires application of the “Forfeiture practice think such a we offend Sentence Although Appel- Rule.” we find process the due clause and the double argument lant’s final completely without clauses of federal jeopardy both the merit, Hale, Ky., see Commonwealth v. state constitutions. S.W.3d (abandoning “Forfeiture (citations omitted). Id. The Common policy), Appel- Sentence” we inapplicable wealth argues Galusha subject lant only a ten year term here negotiated guilty because because the trial court *6 plea agreement contained no recommenda had no authority judg- amend the final tion as to whether the for his sentences either Appellant’s virtue of motion felony multiple offenses would concur shock or Appellant’s agree- thus, rently consecutively, the trial ment. only We thus address the first of (20) imposed court have could a Appellant’s allegations. final year Appellant’s original at sentence with agree We that the attempt find sentencing. We to dis result in this case controlled by Galusha ineffective, however, tinguish Galusha be Commonwealth, v. Ky.App., 834 S.W.2d cause, regardless of whether the trial court (1992), 696 in which the Court Appeals (20) imposed year could held virtually under identical facts that a Appellant’s sentencing, sentence at final its trial court could not “as a condition (10) actually ten judgment imposed probation, enhance the sentence Thus, appeal once the time imposed.” first at Id. 698. The Galusha passed, judgment final and became explained court that its holding was dictat trial court lost the to amend it. ability by protections ed in the United States Commonwealth, v. Silverburg Ky., 587 Rights: Bills of (1979); v. McMurray S.W.2d 241 Com offense,
[W]hen one is tried for an monwealth, Ky.App., 682 795 S.W.2d finding guilt, he is entitled (1985). Appellant’s pro for shock motion certainty have his fixed sentence with juris bation limited granted court finality. Constitutional restraints judgment purpose diction over prevent subsequent enhancement. suspend determining whether to further sentence,
Finally, nothing prison find of the we execution but did ability to lead ra- trial give statute one to the court the make 924 finality length as to rights to its final changes
other substantive matter unrelated to the Ky., 82 sentence —a ment. Prater v. and, (2002) (“KRS proceedings ... then before 439.265 906 S.W.3d moreover, no a matter that the trial court the limited grants jurisdiction ‘only for alter, amend, power to probation.’ longer had no purpose considering shock matters, We therefore hold because if no is taken vacate. For other jurisdiction had no to amend trial court loses judgment, from alter, amend, judgment, Appellant final or vacate the jurisdiction to (10) (10) subject only its the ten sentence judgment days entry.”); ten Gross, judgment. in the Accord- set forth final Ky., v. S.W.2d Commonwealth (“Nowhere ingly, we reverse and remand ... does [KRS prior court to vacate “reinstat- any type ... other authorize 439.265] sentence.”). ing” year sentence as well change original in the subsequent purporting orders disagree the Common We likewise the final and to enter modify Appellant’s con contention that wealth’s reinstating new order implicates prece amendment sent to the final reflected sentence to an permitting dent a defendant judgment. if that sentence unauthorized operate to benefit. would otherwise COOPER, LAMBERT, C.J.; Townsend, Ky., 87 See Commonwealth v. STUMBO, JJ., concur. JOHNSTONE (waiver of KRS S.W.3d 12 640.030(2)(b) right finally dis KELLER, J., by separate dissents Commonwealth, Ky., charged); Myers GRAVES, J., v. joins. opinion which (2001) (waiver of KRS S.W.3d WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents 532.110(1)(c)maximum aggregate separate opinion. limitation); Griffin, Ky., KELLER, Justice, dissenting, (1997) (waiver of former S.W.2d 533.020(4)’s length KRS limitation majority respectfully dissent probation). statutory protections view, because, *7 Appellant my in Townsend, Myers, issue in bring matter-of-right appeal a Griffin cannot proceedings the directly germane were a Kentucky from Supreme the Court of time ac at the the waivers were ongoing of revoking a term circuit court order Here, however, rights the complished. if, a of as result shock —even by Appellant i.e., “waived” purportedly (or order, Appellant re- that commences — jeopardy process protec and double due commences) twenty of a service finality judg in the tions embodied va- prison Accordingly, to the motion ments —were unrelated our March improvidently cate as brought Appellant 13, Cir- directing order the Marshall words, the the Court. In other before cuit Clerk transmit record Court present does an issue case at bar Court, appeal in this dismiss the sentence,” an “unauthorized see concerning Court, ap- the notice of and forward both Myers supra at 596- Ap- the Court of peal and the record to the identical is presents and instead peals for a decision on the merits. sue addressed Galusha. provides Kentucky Constitution from a of the Circuit “[ajppeals judgment purported waiver Appellant’s or life a of death imposing attempted to waive ineffective because it imprisonment or order of shock twenty revoking term years shall meet directly qualifications. or more be taken does not Supreme In oth- The in this case entered on judgment Court. all cases, civil, Ap- er criminal and November and it sentenced term, jurisdiction year prison appellate pellant shall exercise to a ten provided by gov- suspended imposition rules.”1 rules that term Our erning appeals criminal sentencing Appellant mirror consti- to a term language,2 provide imposed tutional tion.7 elsewhere The sentence was later appeals all other “shall be taken when court revoked later, higher by filing probation. next a notice of initial Still appeal court from appeal suspended previously- which the execution course, is taken.”3 imposed granted Appel- Of we must avoid tun- sentence when it nel the “twenty years probation.8 vision as to or more” lant’s motion for because, language appeal although an from order from is appeals thus imposing simply and, conviction a sen- revoking probation, years tence of longer although or must the revocation resulted a re- appealed Court,4 sumption sentence, to this rules our do not it not a judg- is an appeal authorize such “imposing from orders ment a ... of twenty affecting criminal of “twenty sentences The appeal more.” from that years or more.”5 order should therefore have filed in Appeals. Court of that,
While
is no
there
doubt
as a result
of the trial
worthy
court’s revocation
his shock
I find it
mention
probation, Appellant
serving
primary authority
now
cited
majority,
prison sentence,
Commowealth,9
the Jan- Galusha v.
is a Court of
uary
Appeals
from which Appellant
opinion with “virtually identical
appeal
takes his
“judgment
fact,
not a
...
inspection
facts.” In
a close
reveals
imposing
... a
bar,
sentence of
like
case
Kentucky’s
more.”
Rules of
Pro-
appealed
Criminal
Galusha also
identify
cedure
nature of
criminal
“whereby
revocation decision
he was sen
to,
“judgment,”6
January
2000 tenced
for a
penitentiary
the ‘state
max-
110(2)(b).
§
1. KY.CONST.
'imposing
ap-
ment
a sentence.’ Hence an
peal from it is addressable to the Court of
("[A]n
2. See
Appeals.”).
RCr 12.02
from a
death,
imposing a
sentence of
life im-
*8
prisonment,
twenty years
for
6. See RCr 11.04.
directly
or more
shall
taken
to the Su-
Court.”).
preme
Commonwealth,
See
Ky.,
7.
Prater v.
82 S.W.3d
(2002) (explaining
be-
difference
73.01(2).
("Civil
3. CR
See
suspension
imposition
suspen-
also RCr 12.02
tween
and
73.01(2)
execution).
apply
Rule[]
...
... shall
also
sion
”).
criminal actions ....
439.265(1) ("[A]ny
8. See KRS
Circuit Court
Shepherd
Ky.,
may
suspend
...
execution
further
(1987).
proba-
S.W.2d 540
place
sentence and
defendant
(em-
upon
tion
terms
court determines.”
Venters,
added)).
Ky.,
phasis
5. Williams v.
S.W.2d
(1977) (“A judgment
denying
or order
a
motion, however,
postconviction
(1992).
Ky.App.,
is not a
This Stallworth, day and his juve- program one guilty plea which he was ordered felony D tion was revoked and nile, to fifteen Class pled guilty ten-year Several ulti- serve his He was and misdemeanor offenses. later, he a motion pris- months twenty years in filed mately *9 opposed. prosecution whether which presented are questions on. The that judge The circuit to amend judge authority lacked that stated sentence as condition Stallworth’s his agreed to have granted the trial Stallworth and whether original). (emphasis in Id. at 696-7 Galusha, as to supra, sentence amended to ran I would overrule so consecutively conformity with twenty years. agreed Myers. a total of He and he it into bring twenty years was resentenced to which affirm conviction in all re- I would was on condition he that spects. complete Challenge” “Teen program. again probation by Stallworth violated his
fading program. to Thereaf-
ter, was revoked and he twenty years prison.
sentenced to The
essential reason that majority opinion
reverses this case because it believes judge jurisdic-
that circuit was without CARDINE, Jeffery Appellant, tion. v. heart legal The of this case is a conflict decisions, between two one the Su- Kentucky, COMMONWEALTH Court, preme and the panel other Appellee. of Appeals. argues Stallworth No. 2002-SC-0099-DG. judge the trial lacked authority twenty years
amend the sentence to in- Kentucky. stead of as a condition of shock April tion. He contends judge the trial actually never changed his sentence
twenty years and powerless impose
a twenty-year revocation. Commonwealth,
He relies Galusha v. (1992).
Ky.App.,
judge properly sentenced Stallworth
twenty years and that he agreed twice
serve this time.
It
Myers
relies
(2001).
Ky.,
for the defendant
validly agree to an inappropriate sentence
if that sentence operate would otherwise Surely, probation prefera- benefit.
ble to incarceration term years
and thus a benefit to a defendant. triumph well result here could be a strategy
of clever over fundamental sub- agreed
stance. to and accepted Stallworth twenty-year sentence this Court years.
has now reduced to ten The trial
judge right did not forfeit his to enforce twenty-year part
plea agreement. necessary, To the extent