18 A.2d 537 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1940
Argued December 9, 1940.
On September 5, 1938 claimant, in the course of his employment as a painter, contracted lead poisoning and as a result was totally disabled for the period ending November 14, 1938. "Poisoning by lead . . . . . . in any occupation involving direct contact with, handling thereof, or exposure thereto" is included in the enumeration of occupational diseases made compensable by the Occupational Disease Compensation Act of July 2, 1937, P.L. 2714,
Both the referee and the board made an award of $143 payable by the employer and the Commonwealth. On *85 appeal to the common pleas both claims were allowed as compensation for which the Commonwealth and the employer were liable and judgment was entered accordingly. The Commonwealth appealed, raising the single question whether the term "compensation" under section 7(a) of the occupational disease supplement, includes the supplying of medical and hospitalservices imposing liability on the Second Injury Reserve Account for a part of that expense.
The act does not define what is included in the term "compensation" except by reference. Section 3 provides: "The several provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, to which this act is a supplement, shall be applicable to this act insofar as they are consistent with the terms hereof . . . . . . and shall be construed as including . . . . . . `occupational disease' and the resultant effects thereof." What is to be paid is determined by the following: "§ 4. When an employer and employee shall be subject to the provisions of article three of the Workmen's Compensation Act as therein provided, compensation for occupational disease shall be paid in all cases by the employer according to the schedule provided insuch act, subject however to the special terms and conditions thereto as set forth in this act," including the provisions imposing a part of the liability on the Commonwealth. (Emphasis added).
The question therefore becomes one of construction of the schedules of compensation contained in the various subdivisions of § 306 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of June 4, 1937, P.L. 1552,
Paolis v. Tower Hill C. Coke Co.,
In the Paolis case, the principles controlling the construction of § 306 (e) as applied to § 315 are stated in general terms which if applied literally to the question raised in this appeal, give support to the contention of the Commonwealth. But what was there said must be considered as the law applicable to the particular facts of that case. "All other legal conclusions therein are but obiter dicta, though . . . . . . entitled to great consideration because of the high standing of the tribunal announcing them": Welsch v. PittsburghT. Coal Corp.,
A case more nearly analogous in principle is Haley to use, v.Matthews,
The provision requiring the employer to furnish medical service is in the interest of the employee and when the employer's liability is established, supplying medical service is as much compensation as payments for loss of earnings. § 306(e) places the obligation directly upon the employer to make certain that the *88 employee will receive reasonable medical care. The decision as to whether such care is necessary, wisely, is not left entirely with the employee unless he asserts the right to the services of a physician of his own choice. Whatever relieves one from necessary expense is the equivalent of a direct payment to him. The Occupational Disease Act is a supplement to the Workmen's Compensation Act and must be liberally construed along with it as a part of that humane legislation. In an occupational disease the medical expense conceivably might exceed the loss of earnings. If the Commonwealth is not liable for a share of this expense, the employer is relieved also, placing the whole burden upon the employee, a result clearly not intended by the act. In ascertaining legislative intent the court may presume "that the Legislature does not intend a result that is . . . . . . unreasonable": Statutory Construction Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, 46 PS 552. By the reference to the schedules of the Workmen's Compensation Act we are convinced that compensation for occupational disease includes medical expense within the limits of § 306(e).
Judgment affirmed.