212 N.W. 342 | Iowa | 1927
The first question raised is whether or not such an order is appealable. Section 3164, Code of 1873, reads in part as follows:
"An appeal may also be taken to the Supreme Court from the following orders:
"1. An order made affecting the substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken;
"2. A final order made in special proceedings affecting a substantial right therein, or made on a summary application in an action after judgment;
"3. When an order grants or refuses, continues or modifies a provisional remedy; or grants, refuses, dissolves, or refuses to dissolve an injunction or attachment; when it grants or refuses a new trial, or when it sustains or overrules a demurrer;
"4. An intermediate order involving the merits and materially affecting the final decision;
"5. An order or judgment on habeas corpus."
This section has been substantially re-enacted as Section 12823, Code of 1924.
The position of appellants is that, under Subdivision 3 of the above quoted statute, an order of this kind is a "provisional remedy," and therefore appealable. We have twice passed upon this question, holding that such an order is not 1. APPEAL AND appealable. Cook Wheeler v. Chicago, R.I.
ERROR: P.R. Co.,
To the effect that such an order is not a provisional remedy, *86
2. CERTIORARI: see West Branch Pants Co. v. Gordon, 51. N.D. when writ 742 (
It being found by the court that the order involved herein is not appealable, the appeal is dismissed. — Appeal dismissed.
EVANS, C.J., and De GRAFF and MORLING, JJ., concur.