70 A.2d 345 | Pa. | 1949
An appellate court will ordinarily accept as conclusive the findings of fact of a chancellor approved by the court en banc, but this rule is not applicable where the evidence, in order to prevail, must be clear, precise and indubitable or where it must meet some other prescribed standard of proof. Whether findings are supported by evidence of that quality is always a question of law and therefore reviewable by the appellate court.* In the present case it is our opinion that they are not so supported, — a conclusion which requires a reversal of the decree entered by the court below.
Decedent, John S. Hummel, owned two adjoining properties in Lewisburg and also a small amount of personal property. He lived in one of these properties and rented out the other. His wife died in 1939 and his only child, a son, in February, 1947. He himself died at the age of 83 years in December, 1947, leaving as his only heir a granddaughter who resides in Chicago. *408
Claimant, Gay E. Stafford, nursed Mrs. Hummel in her last illness. After Mrs. Hummel's death she continued to live in the property occupied by Hummel as his housekeeper, and remained in that capacity until his death. Her claim, as set forth in her petition, is that four days after Mrs. Hummel's death Hummel orally requested her to live in his house, perform for him all the duties of a housekeeper, and, during his illness, nurse and take care of him during the remainder of his life; in return he orally agreed to make a will giving and conveying to her for such services all of his property, real and personal; she orally agreed to his request and, relying on his promise, remained with him from 1939 until his death in 1947, performing the household work, nursing him from time to time, and assisting him by financial advancements, for all of which services and advancements she received no compensation at the time. Hummel died without a will. Claimant prayed for a decree of specific performance of the alleged agreement. This the court below refused, but it awarded claimant the sum of $3,888 as compensation for the services she rendered decedent and the sum of $800 in satisfaction of her claim for money loaned to him. The administrator d.b.n. of Hummel's estate appeals from that award.
That the court below was right in refusing specific performance is beyond question. Decedent's estate consisted almost entirely of real estate and the Statute of Frauds bars specific performance of a contract to convey or devise real estate where the alleged agreement is not evidenced by writing:Anderson Estate,
The question arises, then, whether claimant in the present case proved the existence of the contract under which she claims. In that connection it should suffice to repeat but a few of the judicial admonitions that have been proclaimed concerning the standard of proof required to establish a claim of this nature against a decedent's estate. "This is one of the class of claims against a dead person's estate that must be subjected to the closest scrutiny and only allowed on strict proof. . . . Claims of this nature against dead men's estates, resting entirely in parol, based largely upon loose declarations presented generally years after the services in question were rendered, and when the lips of the party principally interested are closed in death, require the closest and most careful scrutiny to prevent injustice being done. We cannot too often repeat the cautions we have so frequently uttered upon this subject . . .": Reynolds, Executrix, v.Williams, Executor,
What is meant by the statement that the evidence must be clear, precise and indubitable? It means that the witnesses must be "credible, . . . distinctly remember the facts to which they testify, and narrate the details exactly." (Leonard v.Coleman,
Tested by these severe criteria, what is the evidence presented by this claimant to sustain her claim of a contract? There were four witnesses upon whose testimony she relies for that purpose. Of these, a Mrs. Williams testified that decedent said: "I'll take care of her"; a Mrs. Deppen testified that decedent said: "I don't know why she wants to go to work, because after I'm gone there will be enough there for her"; a Mrs. Hastings testified that decedent said "he would take care of her." Such loose and vague declarations of testamentary intentions certainly do not constitute a contract and are wholly insufficient to warrant a recovery: Roberts Estate,
Mrs. Stafford's claim of $800 for money allegedly loaned to decedent cannot be sustained. Not only was there no claim of a loan in her petition, but there is no adequate testimony to support it. Her petition alleges that she gave decedent various sums of money. And, *413 as far as the evidence is concerned, the only testimony is that from time to time she made payments out of her own funds for household items and for repairs to the property they occupied, but the evidence is not sufficient to establish that those outlays were regarded as loans or that decedent ever promised to reimburse her therefor.
It appears that claimant, ever since decedent's death, has continued to occupy the property in which she and the decedent lived, and his estate now asserts a claim against her for its rental value. In view of the fact, however, that, apart from other considerations, there was no testimony offered as to what such rental value was, this counter-claim cannot be allowed.
The decree is reversed; the costs to be paid by decedent's estate.
