57 Iowa 748 | Iowa | 1882
I. A sleigh in which plaintiff was riding with a friend, in the city of Oskaloosa, was turned over by a small mound in the street, which had been made by the street commissioner depositing the earth removed in cleaning the street crossing. Plaintiff suffered very severe injuries by the fall, from the fracture of a bone of the thigh, which will, probably, cause him to be a cripple for life. There is no dispute, or at least no conflict in the evidence as to plaintiff’s injuries, and as to the fact that the sleigh was turned over by reason of being driven upon the little mound of earth. The contention of the parties involves the negligence of the defendant in permitting the mound to remain, and the want of care of plaintiff’s friend, who was, at the time, driving the horse hitched to the sleigh. Yarious objections to the judgment, based upon alleged erroneous rulings of the court, are discussed by coun
The want of knowledge on the part of plaintiff, of the driver’s carelessness, would not secure him the right to recover, notwithstanding the driver’s want of care. The instructions in these respects are erroneous.
Other instructions given to the jury, we think, are correct. The instructions asked by defendant and refused were, so far as they are correct, covered by the instructions given.
We are united in the opinion that the verdict ought not to stand in view of the transactions and association between the attorney and juror while the trial was pending. It would be extremely unsafe for the pure and correct administration of the law, through trial by jury, to permit such transactions. In this case the high characters of the juror and attorney may offer an assurance that r.o wrong was done and no prejudice wrought. But the transactions were in the way of temptation, which the law will not permit jurors and attorneys to pursue.
While good men, strong to resist temptation, may do no evil by such a course of conduct, weaker men may fall The law has but one common rule to be applied to the good and bad, to the strong and the weak.
To sanction the transaction in question would bring disgrace upon the administration of the law. There is absolute safety in the rule we adopt; there is danger in a different one. “Prudence and a desire to secure a pure administration, of the law demand that we adhere to it.” Ryan v. Harrow, 27 Iowa, 494.
It is well said in Bradbury v. Coney, 62 Me., 223 (225), a case involving the question of the misbehavior of a juror, that "in the trial of a cause the appearance of evil should be as much avoided as evil itself. It is important that jurymen, should be devoid of prejudice. It is hardly less so that they should be free from the susjncion of prejudice.”
The facts of this case distinguish if from Koester v. The City of Ottumwa, 34 Iowa, 41. The intercourse between the juror and attorney in that case was brief and trifling, when compared with the intimate association and transactions disclosed by the evidence found in the record before us. That
For the errors pointed out in the foregoing discussion, the judgment of the Cii'cuit Court must be
Reversed.