22 Mont. 190 | Mont. | 1899
1. The Butte bank acquired the §6,000 note of Stadler & Kaufman by indorsement, in the ordinary course of business, in good faith, for value, and before maturity; hence it is apparent that, if. the note be commercial paper, the Butte bank acquired an absolute title thereto, notwithstanding any defect in the title of the Helena bank (Civil Code, Secs. 4034, 4035); that is to say, the Butte bank took it free of, and discharged from, any defense, legal or equitable, which existed as between the makers and the payee, and therefore the Butte bank would be entitled to a judgment for the full amount thereof, without reduction by reason of any set-off claimed by plaintiffs.
The contention of defendants is that the note is negotiable, while plaintiffs insist that the agreement therein contained to pay attorney’s fees in case of suit destroys the quality of negotiability otherwise possessed by it. It has been a much-
The note in the case at bar contains a promise to pay the sum of §6,000; it contains, also, another contract, to wit: an agreement to pay reasonable attorney’s fees in case of suit on the note, in violation of the mandatory and prohibitive language of Sections 3992 and 3997. It contains a condition not certain of fulfillment, and also a contract to pay a sum of money, other than the §6,000, if that condition should be fulfilled. We are satisfied that the note is a nonnegotiable instrument, when the plain words and clear intent of the sections quoted are are applied to its terms; nor is there want of direct authority for these views. The sections referred to were borrowed, word for word, from either the Civil Code of California or that of North or South Dakota — probably from that of California, whence we have adopted a large part of our statute law. The Supreme Court of California interpreted
“Sec; 4240. Except where it is otherwise declared, the provisions of the last foregoing fifteen titles of this part, in respect to the rights and obligations of parties to contracts, are subordinate to the intention of the parties, when ascertained in the manner prescribed by the chapter on interpretation of contracts; and the benefit thereof may be waived by any party entitled thereto, unless such waiver would be against public policy. ’ ’
“Sec. 4604. Any one may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement. ’ ’
“Sec. 2204. When a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible, subject, however, to the other provisions of this title. ’ ’
They contend that, under these sections, the provision for the payment of reasonable attorney’s fees, in case of suit on the note, does not destroy its negotiability. Counsel assert that in this note is an agreement by the parties that it shall be negotiable notwithstanding the provision for attorney’s fees, and therefore, by virtue of Sections 4240 and 4604, the provisions of Sections 3991, 3992 and 3997 are subordinated to the intention of the parties as expressed in, and ascertained by, the note itself, and that such an agreement is a waiver in favor of the indorsee of any benefit to the makers on account of equities existing between them and the payee; in short, that the phrase “negotiable and payable at the First National Bank,” is a contract to waive, and is a waiver of, the effect
2. The note is nonnegotiable. It therefore becomes necessary to inquire into the title obtained thereto by the Butte bank, and for that purpose convenience may be attained by regarding the action as one brought by the ■ Butte bañk upon the $6,000 note, in which Stadler and Kaufman, as a co-partnership and as individual persons, claim the right to set off deposits to their credit in the Helena bank. The Butte bank took the note subject to the provisions of Section 1982 of the Civil Code, and of Sections 57Í, 690-692 and 698 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 1982 provides that “a nonnegotiable written contract for the payment of money or personal property may be transferred by endorsement in like manner, with negotiable instruments. Such endorsement shall transfer all the rights of the assignor under the instrument, to the assignee, subject to all equities and defenses existing in favor of the maker at the time of the endorsement.” Section 571 provides, in substance, that an action by the assignee of a nonnegotiable thing in action “is without prejudice to any set-off or other defense existing at the time of, or before, notice of the assignment. ” By Section 690, the defendant may plead a counterclaim, which, by Section 691, “must, tend, in some way, to diminish or defeat the plaintiff’s recovery, and must be one of the following causes of action against the plaintiff, •or, in a proper case, against the person whom he represents, and in favor of the defendant, or of one or more defendants, between whom and the plaintiff a separate judgment may be had in the action: * * * (2) In an action on contract, any other cause of action on contract, existing at the commencement of the action.” So much of Section 692 as is pertinent reads: “But the counterclaim specified in subdi
The first position taken by plaintiffs is that a defendant who is sued by the assignee of a nonnegotiable chose in action may, in virtue of Section 571, interpose as defense, by way of set-off, a demand held by him against the assignor, and which came into existence after the making, and before notice to defendant, of the assignment, — in other words, that until notice is given to him such assignment is not complete so as to .prevent defendant, when sued by the assignee, from asserting, as set-off against the assigned claim, a demand against the assignor which arose subsequently to the date of the transfer.
As has been stated, when the note was transferred to the Butte bank, Stadler & Kaufman had on deposit in. the Helena bank subject to check $413.37, and Kaufman had on deposit in the same bank $4,240, which was payable on and after July 8, 1896, upon presentation of the certificate; Stadler and Kaufman each had then on deposit in that bank $5,000, payable on and after November 6, 1896, upon presentation of the certificate representing the same. Plaintiffs argue that since notice of the assignment of the note was not given until September 8, 1896, which was after the Helena bank had suspended payment and had been taken charge of by the Comp
We are unable-to agree with the foregoing interpretation of Sections 1982 and 571. The former makes general provision that the indorsement shall transfer all the rights of the assignor, subject to such equities and defenses as may exist in favor of the maker at the time of the indorsement; but it does not define or specify the equities and defenses which may be availed of by the maker of the contract. This section is found in that portion of the statutes treating of substantive law. Section 571 is part of the Practice Act, the chief purpose of which is to indicate the means whereby the rights created, declared and limited in the Civil Code and elsewhere are to be enforced, and to prescribe the modes of procedure thought best adapted to accomplish the attainment of the end desired, —the protection of those rights. Were there a mere verbal conflict between these sections, no reason occurs tous why Section 571, — which, as we shall see, does not 'profess to establish new rights, but only to declare the application of an old principle to new conditions, — should control or enlarge the effect of Section 1982. But, in either the interpretation or construction of statutes, consideration of the general scope and purpose of a particular code becomes important only as an
The sections are not in conflict, nor does one in any wise limit the operation of, or expand, the other. Section 571 is found in the chapter devoted to the subject “Parties to Civil Actions, ’ ’ and immediately succeeds the provision of Section 570, to the effect that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Now, at the common law, the assignee of a nonnegotiable contract could not maintain an action thereon in his own name, but only in the name of the assignor. The change in this respect brought about by Section 570 was the reason for the enactment of Section 571. In Section 571, as in Section 1982, no attempt is made to define “set-off;” the question as to what a set-off is and when it accrues are left to be answered by reference to, and the application of, other statutes and laws. It does not change the substantial rights of the parties, but, in the language of the opinion in Beckwith v. Bank, 9 N. Y. 211: “Section 112 was intended only to introduce such alterations in the mode of protecting them as were rendered necessary by the provisions of Sections 111 and 113, which require in most cases the real party in interest to be the plaintiff. The first branch of the section will have its full and appropriate meaning if we regard it as providing that, ‘in the case of an assignment of a thing in action, the action by the assignee shall be without prejudice to any set-off or other defense existing at the time of, or before notice of, the assignment, ’ which would have been available to the defendant had the action been brought in the name of the assignor. In other words, the provision is that the substantial rights of the defendant shall not be affected by the substitution of the assignee as plaintiff in place of the assignor.” Section 112 of the Code of New York of 1819, referred to in the quotation, is identical with Section
We must therefore turn to other provisions of the law in order to ascertain, what a set-off is and when it may be allowed as against the assignee of a contract. “Set-off” ex vi termini implies reciprocal demands existing between the same persons at the same time, as is substantially expressed in Section 698, supra. By Section 1982, the indorsement of a contract not negotiable transfers to the assignee the title of the assignor, subject to all equities and defenses existing in favor of the
*212 ‘ ‘The assignee takes the demand assigned subject to all the rights which the debtor had acquired prior to the assignment, or prior to the time when notice was given, if there was an interval between the execution of the transfer and the notice; but he cannot be prejudiced by any new dealings between the original parties after notice of the assignment has been given to the debtor. When two opposing debts exist in a perfect condition at the same time, either party may insist upon a set-off. If, therefore, the holder of such a claim, already due and payable, assign the same and the debtor, at the time of. the transfer, holds a similar claim against the assignor, which is also then due and payable, he may set off his debt against the demand in the hands of the assignee. If, however, the assignment is made before the opposing demand becomes mature and the latter does not thus become actually due and payable until after the transfer, the debtor’s right of set-off is destroyed by the mere fact of the assignment, and no notice thereof to him is necessary to produce that effect. The following special rule also exists under the peculiar circumstances mentioned: If an insolvent holder of a claim not yet matured assigns the same before, maturity and the debtor, at the time of this transfer, holds a similar claim against the assignor, which is then due and payable, his right of set-off against the assignee, when the latter’s cause of action arises, is preserved and protected. This latter doctrine is based upon considerations of equity, and is intended to prevent one party from losing his own demand on account of the insolvency of his immediate debtor, and from being at the same time compelled to pay the debt originally due from himself to that insolvent. These three rules existed prior to the Codes, and have not been changed by the provisions of the statute under consideration.” And in Section 166 he says: “Notice may be required to cut off other defenses; but a set-off, according to the accepted rule, must exist in the form of a debt then due and payable to the debtor at the date of the transfer. ’ ’
Inspection of the statutes makes it evident that notice to the debtor of the transfer of his debt is not necessary to pre
It is to be remarked, in passing, that while we speak of “set-off” as a defense, this use of the word is neither technically correct nor warranted by Sections 690, 691 and 692, 6ujjra, which include within the definition of “counterclaim” that which was formerly “set-off,” and which provide for “defenses” as contradistinguished from “counterclaims.” (Babcock v. Maxwell, 21 Mont. 507, 54 Pac. 943.) We venture to use “set-off,” and to speak of it as a defense, because in Section 571 it is so used; and also because the ultimate natural effect of allowing the deposits as a counterclaim against the note in the hands of the Butte bank would be set-off, since the deposits owing by the assignor to plaintiffs could be used only defensively, as against the assignee, to diminish or defeat recovery by it, and not as a basis for a money judgment.
No new dealings were had or agreements made, between plaintiffs and the Helena bank after the assignment of the note and before notice thereof; and this opinion is not to be construed as denying the right to interpose any defense which might have vested in plaintiffs consequent upon satisfaction, by payment to the Helena bank or otherwise, of the note, in whole or in part, before notice of assignment or which- might have resulted from the execution or partial performance by plaintiffs, prior to such notice, of a contract with the Helena bank for a set-off of the deposits against the note.
We hold then, that by the indorsement of July 18th, the right to recover the amount of the note upon maturity was transferred to the Butte bank, subject only to such claims as the makers might at that time have been allowed to set off at law or in equity, against the Helena bank; in other words, the claim of plaintiffs is not a set-off against the assignee for value, unless it could have been properly asserted as such
Did plaintiffs on July 18th have the right in equity to set off the deposits against the note? They maintain they did upon three grounds which, as we understand them, may be epitomized as follows: (1) That there was an agieement or understanding between the Helena bank and themselves that, in the event the funds wherewith to pay the note at maturity were not received from a certain source, the certificates of deposit might be used for that purpose; (2) that the Helena bank lent the $6,000 to plaintiffs because of their deposits, to which all parties trusted as a means of payment — thus presenting a case of mutual credit; and (3) that the Helena bank was insolvent on July 18th and that all the deposits were then due and payable.
Disposition of the first two contentions is readily made. Finding 27 of the trial court is that the loan to plaintiffs upon the note was not made by the Helena bank upon the credit of their deposits, nor upon any agreement or understanding that the note should be paid out of the certificates of deposit. This finding negatives the theory of a mutual credit with respect to all the deposits, including the one subject to check and sets at rest the controversy as to whether there was an understanding for a set-off of the other deposits against. the note. This
We come now to the third ground maintained by plaintiff's. If that should be held tenable, but not otherwise, examination of the asserted right to set off against a partnership debt the several debts owing to the partners individually will become necessary. Were the deposits .due July 18th, and was the First National bank of Helena then “insolvent,” within the meaning of that word appropriate to the state of facts shown? If both conditions existed on July 18th, plaintiffs were then possessed of an equitable right to set off the deposits against the underdue note. (Richards v. La Tourette, 119 N. Y. 54 23 N. E. 521; Hughitt v. Hayes, 136 N. Y. 163, 32 N. E. 706; Spaulding v. Backus, 122 Mass. 557; Mercer v. Dyer, 15 Mont. 317, 39 Pac. 314; Yardley v. Clothier, 2 C. C. A. 349, 51 Fed. 506; Huse v. Ames, supra; Fuller v. Steiglitz, supra; Kinsey v. Ring, supra; Fera v. Wickham, supra; Pom. Code Rem. Sec. 163.) In Section 164 of the work last cited it is said, with reference to the maturity of claims: “Such a present indebtedness is indispensable, whether the case is to be governed by the ordinary rule, or whether the equitable doctrine based upon the assignor’s insolvency is relied upon.”
The two certificates of deposit, for $5,000 each,.were payable, upon presentation, on and after November 6, 189.6; so neither of them could have been allowed as set-off on July 18th, even if the Helena bank were then insolvent, and they were rightly rejected. The action of the District Court in permitting a set-off of the open deposit of $413.37 subject to check, and in disallowing the deposit of $4,240, payable on and after July 8th, upon return of the certificate, remains to be considered. By a deposit (other than special) in a bank, the money becomes the property of the bank, the relation of
It follows that the action of the court in disallowing the two certificates of deposit for $5,000 each and the certificate for $4,240 as set-offs was correct, but that in allowing the deposit of $413.37 the court erred; in short, that the First National Bank of Butte is entitled to recover upon the note, and that plaintiffs are not entitled to any set-off against it. That part of the judgment appealed from by the bank will therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded, with direction to the court below to modify the judgment so that it shall conform to the views expressed in this opinion, and to enter it as modified; and it is so ordered.
Modified.