delivered the opinion of the court.
John B. Thrasher, the plaintiff below, commenced this action by a petition'(according to the practice of the courts of Louisiana) in the nature of an action of debt upon a judgment. He claimed as assignee of a judgment obtained in the Circuit Court of Claiborne county, in the State of Mississippi, by Dart & Gardner against Ann Lee, administratrix of C.- S. Lee, deceased. David S. Stacy, the defendant below, is the'administrator of Lee in the Stаte of Louisiana, where he had his dom *58 icile at the time of his death. In his pleas he has set forth six " several grounds of exception against the plaintiff’s right to recover, the last of which is in the nature of a demurrer to the declaration, or a denial of the plaintiff’s right to recover on the case set forth in his petition. As the decision of this point will be conclusive of the whole case, it will be unnecessary to notice the .-others.
The question presented by the demurrer is, whether- the judgment against Ann Lee, the administratrix of Charles.S. Lee in Mississippi, is evidence by itself sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover against Stacy, -the administrator of the same intestate in Louisiana. Or, to state the point disconnected with the accidents of the case, Will an- action of debt lie against an administrator in one of these United States, on a judgment obtained against a different administrator of the same intestate appointed under the authority of another ?
This is a question of great practical importance, and one which, we believe, has not yet been decided.
Thе administrator receives his authority from the ordinary or other officer of the government where the goods of the intestate are situate. But coming into' such possession by succession to the intestate, and encumbered with the duty to pay his debts, he is considered in law as in privity with him, and therefore bound or estopped by a judgment against him. Yet his representation of his intestate is a qualified one, and extends not beyond the assets of which the ordinary had jurisdiction. He cannot, therefore, do any act to affect assets in an-. other jurisdiction, as his authority cannot be more extensive than that of the goverñment from whom he received it. The courts of another State will not acknowledge him as a representative of the deceased, or notice his letters of administration. (See Tourton
v.
Flower, 3 P. Wms. 369; Borden
v.
Borden,
It follows as a necessary inference from these well-еstablished principles, “ that, where administrations are granted to different persons in different States, they are so far deemed independent of each other that a judgment obtained against one wül furnish no right of action against the other, to affect assets . received by the latter in virtue of his 'own administration ; for in contemplation of law there is no privity between him and the other administrator.” (See Story, Cond. of Laws, § 522 ; Brodie
v.
Bickley,
But it is cоntended, that,, however applicable these principles *59 may be to judgments against administrators acting under powers received from States wholly foreign to each other, they canr . not apply to judgmеnts against administrators in different States of this Union, because of the provision of the Constitution, which ordains that “ full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings оf every other State.”
.The act of Congress of 26th May, 1790, which prescribes the mode of authenticating records, and defines their “ effect,” enacts, that they “shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within thе United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from whence the said records are or. shall be taken.”
The question, then, arises, what is the “ effect,” or the “ faith and credit,” given to the judgment on which this suit is brought, in thg courts of Mississippi ? The answer to this must be, that it is evidence, and conclusive by way of estoppel, 1st, between the same parties ; 2d, privies ; and 3dly, on the same subject-matter, where the proceeding is in rem.
But the parties to these judgments are not the same.
Neither аre they privies. “ The term privity denotes mutual succession or relationship to the same rights of property.” (Greenleaf on Ev. § 523.) Privies are divided by Lord Coke into three classes, — 1st, privies in blood ; 2d, privies in law ; and 3d, privies by estate. The doctrine of estoppel, however, so far as it applies to persons falling under these denominations, applies to them under one and the same principle, namely, that a party сlaiming through another is estopped by that which es-topped that other respecting the same subject-matter. Thus, an heir who is privy in blood would be estopped by a verdict against his ancestor, through whom he clаims. An executor or administrator; suing, or sued as such, would be bound by a verdict against his testator or intestate, to whom he is privy in law. With regard to privies in estate, a verdict against feoffor would estop feoffee, and lessor, the lessee, &.c.
An administrator under grant of administration in one State stands in none of these relations to an administrator in another. Each is privy to the testator, and would be estopped by a judgment against him ; but they have no privity with each other,' in law or in estate. They receive their authority from different sovereignties, and over different property. The authority of each is paramount to the other. Each is accountable'to the ordinary from whom he receives his authority. Nor does the one come by succession to the other into the trust of the same property,.encumbered by the same debts, as in the case of an administrаtor de bonis non, who may be truly said to have an *60 official privity with his predecessor in the same trust, and therefore, liable to the same duties. In the case of Yare v. Gough (Cro. Jac. 3), it was decided that an administrator de bonis non could not have .sdre facias upon a judgment obtained by his predecessor on a debt due to the intestate “for default of privity.” But in Snape v. Norgate (Cro. Car. 167), it was. decided that a sdrefadas would lie against an administrator de bonis non, on a judgment against the executor ; and the court attempt to make a distinction between that and the preceding .case, on the ground that “ he cometh in place of the executor ”; or in other words, by reason of an official succession or privity. These cases cannot be well reconciled on principle ; but the difficulty was remedied in England by the statute of 17 Charles 2, c. 8. The Court of Appeals of Virginia have considered the latter case as fpunded on-more correсt principles than the first, and have overruled the doctrine of Yare v. Gough. (Dykes v. Woodhouse, 3 Randolph, 287.)
We may assume, therefore, that in the State of Mississippi, as in most other States .in the Union, the administrator bonis non is' treated as privy with his predecessor in the trusty and estopped by a judgment against him; but the question still recurs as to the effect of a judgment in .that State as against one who has neither personal nor official privity with the defendant. ■ Each. administrator is severally liаble to pay the debts of the deceased out of the assets committed to him, and therein they resemble joint and several co-obligors in a bond. A judgment against one is no merger of the bond, nor is it evidence in a suit аgainst the other. Their common liability-to pay the same debt creates no privity between them, either in law or .in estate.
It is for those who assert this privity to show wherein it lies, and the argument for it seems to be this: — that the judgment аgainst the administrator is against the estate of the intestate, and that his estate, wheresoever situate, is liable to pay his debts; therefore the plaintiff, having once established his claim against the estate by the judgment of a сourt, should not be called on to make proof of it again. This argument assumes that the judgment, is in rent, and not in personam, or that the estate has a sort of corporate entity and unity. But this is not true, either in fact or in legal construction. The judgment is аgainst the person of the administrator, that he shall pay the debt of the intestate out of the funds committed to his care. If there be another administrator in another State,. liable to pay the same debt, he may be subjected to a like judgment"-upon the same demand, but the assets in his hands cannot be affected by a judgment to which he is personally a *61 stranger. A judgment may fiave the “ effect ” of a lien upon all the defendant’s lands in thе State where it is rendered, yet it cannot have that effect on lands in another State by virtue; of the faith and credit given to it by the Constitution and act of Congress. The laws and courts of a State can only affect persons and things within their jurisdiction. Consequently, both as to the administrator and the property confided to him, a judgment in another State is res inter alios acta. It cannot be even primafade evidence, of a debt; for if -it have any effect at .all, it'must be as a judgment, and operаte by way of estoppel. . - -
It is alleged- by those who desire to elude this conclusion, while they cannot deny the correctness- of the principles on which it is founded, that it is technical and theoretical, and leads to an inconvenient result. But every logical conclusion upon admitted legal principles may.be liable to the same imputation. Decisions resting only on a supposed convenience, or principles accommodated} to the circumstances of a particular case, generally form bad .precedents; . It may be conceded that in this case there is an apparent hardship, — that thе plaintiff who has established his claim after a tedious litigation in Mississippi should be compelled- to go through the same .troublesome process in Louisiana. But the hardship is no greater than if the administrators had been joint and several co-obligors in a note or bond. • A plaintiff may be fairly presumed always to have the evidence of his demand in his possession, and the ability to establish.it in any court. But if a judgment against an administrator in one State, raised up, perhaps, for the very purpose of giving the plaintiff a judgment, should be conclusive on the administrator in another State, the estates of decedents would be subjected to innumerable frauds. And to what purpose is the argument that the defendant may be permitted to prove collusion and fraud, when, in order to substantiate it, he must commence by proving a negative ? This would be casting the burden of proof where it оught not to rest, and would cause much greater inconvenience and injury than any that can possibly result from the present decision..
The judgment of the Circuit Court must} therefore, be reversed.
Mr. Justice McLEAN and Mr. Justice WAYNE dissented.
Order.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel. On *62 consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be and the same is hereby reversed, with costs, and that this cause be and the same is hereby remanded to the said. Circuit Court, to be proceeded in according to law and justice, and in conformity to the opinion of this court.