| N.H. | Dec 5, 1891

Lead Opinion

It is the settled law of this state that an infant may avoid his contract of sale by rescinding the contract and restoring the property to the vendor. If he does so, he may recover the price paid by him for the property. Heath v. Stevens, 48 N.H. 251" court="N.H." date_filed="1869-01-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/heath-ex-rel-heath-v-stevens-8047417?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8047417">48 N.H. 251. If he does not restore the goods and has not paid for them, he is liable in a suit by the vendor for so much of the price as is equal to the benefit derived from the purchase. Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N.H. 354" court="N.H." date_filed="1879-12-05" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/hall-v-butterfield-3556467?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3556467">59 N.H. 354; Bartlett v. Bailey, 59 N.H. 408" court="N.H." date_filed="1879-12-05" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/bartlett-v-bailey-3551468?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3551468">59 N.H. 408.

In this case the plaintiff returned the horse to the defendants reduced in value by the plaintiff's inexperience and want of skill in driving. Though returned on the same day and within a few hours of the purchase, it was not the same horse in character and value. But the acts of the plaintiff in dealing with the horse were the result of ignorance and want of skill in the management of horses, rather than of wilful abuse. Being an infant under full age, the same conduct towards a horse bailed to him for hire would have given the owner no ground for recovery. Eaton v. Hill,50 N.H. 235" court="N.H." date_filed="1870-12-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/eaton-v-hill-8047569?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8047569">50 N.H. 235. It is only for positively tortious acts wilfully committed that an infant is liable in an action of trespass or case. If the management and driving of the horse by the plaintiff in this case were not of such a character as to give the defendants a right of action had the plaintiff hired the horse, they cannot make the fact of injury from the same treatment by him as owner of the horse a ground for recoupment of damages. To give them this right the claim must rest upon a basis which would enable them to recover for an injury to their own property, and this they cannot do in a case of this kind against an infant.

The plaintiff's incapacity of infancy was known to the defendants before the suit was brought, and his treatment of the horse was not malicious nor wilful abuse. Upon the facts stated the defendants have no defence.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

CLARK, J., did not sit: the others concurred.

The foregoing opinion was delivered at the June term, 1891. The defendants moved for a rehearing for the following reasons:

1. Because the opinion goes upon the ground that the plaintiff *154 rescinded the contract of purchase, when, in fact, after proposing to rescind, he left the horse to be sold upon his account.

2. Because, when repayment of the sum of $25 was demanded, the horse had been sold on the plaintiff's account, and he thereby made it impossible to rescind.






Addendum

The former decision in this case, it is claimed, was based upon the erroneous assumption of fact that the plaintiff had rescinded the contract, when in fact he only proposed to rescind, and, instead of rescinding, ratified the contract by leaving the horse with the defendants to be sold. It is further claimed, that, *155 when repayment of the purchase-money was requested, rescission had become impossible, because, the horse having been sold on the plaintiff's account, the property could not be returned in specie.

Whether what took place when the plaintiff returned the horse was a rescission, a proposition for a rescission, or a ratification of the contract of purchase, it is not necessary to consider. The plaintiff's right of rescission remained during his minority, and was not defeated by the defendants' refusal to refund the purchase-money, nor by his request to them to do the best they could with the property. The contract and subsequent alleged ratification were voidable at his election, and were repudiated when he brought this suit. The bringing of the suit was an election to rescind. Eaton v. Hill, 50 N.H. 235" court="N.H." date_filed="1870-12-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/eaton-v-hill-8047569?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8047569">50 N.H. 235, 241.

The fact that the horse had been injured by the plaintiff's unskilful driving, did not, as shown in the former opinion, deprive the plaintiff of his right to return it. He derived no benefit from the contract. It was not necessary to renew his offer to return the property. It went into the defendants' possession when the plaintiff first attempted to rescind, and was sold by them. The money received by them from the sale stood in place of the horse. The presumption is that they acted in good faith in the sale, and got the most they could for the property. If they did not, they are in no position to complain.

If the plaintiff's mother was acting in his behalf when she requested the return of the purchase-money, what was then done was equivalent to a rescission, and the result is the same.

The defendants are not, as contended, entitled to judgment upon the ground that they had no reason to suppose the plaintiff was an infant. He did not affirm himself to be of full age, and there is nothing in the case that shows that at the time he made the purchase he intended to elude the contract. The case in this respect differs from Fitts v. Hall, 9 N.H. 441" court="None" date_filed="1838-12-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/fitts-v-hall-8504247?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="8504247">9 N.H. 441 (see p. 449).

Judgment for the plaintiff.

CLARK, J., did not sit: the others concurred.

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