delivered the opinion of the court.
Emеry, a supervisor of internal revenue, was sued by Stacey for causing the seizure of a quantity of whiskey belonging to him, which had been libelled by the collector of internal revenue, under Emery’s direction, and subsequently released, on dismissing the proceedings against it.
That judgment and the accompanying order are in the words following: “ It is, therefore, considered by the court that the information in this cause be dismissed, and that the delivery bond given by the claimant for the property seizеd in this cause be discharged. It is further ordered by the court that the cost be certified to the proper accounting officers for payment, and that а certificate of probable cause of seizure be issued to W. D. Peabody, collector, it appearing that the seizure, although impropеrly made, was made by his superior officer, the supervisor.”
Emery justified as supervisor, and upon demurrer to his pleas setting up the certificate of probаble cause, as above set forth, judgment was given in his favor.
Stacey then sued out this writ of error, which is based on the ground that the certificate is no proteсtion to Emery.
It is contended that the certificate protects the collector, on the sole ground that he acted as a ministerial officer, in obedience to the orders of his superior, and that the granting of the certificate in this form implies that the seizure was made without probable cause. Thеse facts, it is said, determine conclusively that the seizure was wrongfully made, and that the defendant' was a trespasser in making it.
Gelston et al.
v.
Hoyt,
The defendant must and does base his exemption from liability for an unauthorized seizure of the plaintiff’s goods upon the 'act of March 2, 1799 (1 Stat. 696, sect. 89), which provides as follows: “ When any proseсution shall be commenced on account of the seizure of any ship or vessel, goods, wares, or merchandise, and judgment shall be given for the claimаnt or claimants, if it shall appear to the court before whom such
Under this act, if it appeared to the court that there was a reasonable cause of seizure, it was its duty to causе a proper, certificate to be made thereof. This was its sole duty in this respect, and its decision is conclusive. The reason entitling the defendant to exemption, or the motive for granting the certificate, makes no part of the record, and should not be recited therein. If the prosecutoi hаd called together a jury of twelve good men prior to the seizure, and had taken their judgment whether the goods were liable to seizure, and had actеd upon it, this circumstance should have found no place in the record. Its recital would have been surplusage simply.
So when the court states as a rеason for granting a certificate of probable cause of seizure by the collector, that the seizure was made by the direction of his superiоr officer, this statement is irrelevant and superfluous. The certificate of probable cause is all there is of it. The residue of the sentence is out оf the case. The unusual form of the certificate should work no prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
The act we have cited provides that, when suсh certificate shall be made, neither the party making the seizure nor the prosecutor shall be liable to action on account of such seizurе or prosecution. The collector who made the seizure has been certified not to be liable, and the present defendant, the party direсting the seizure, — that is, the prosecutor, — is equally entitled to exemption.
Generally, it is the duty of the district attorney of the United States to prosecute for all violations of the customs revenue laws, or the internal revenue laws of the country. Rev. Stat., sect. 838. No doubt he falls within the protection of this statute of 1799, аs does the collector of customs, who is expressly authorized by the act of 1796 to direct actions to be commenced to recover the penalties for the violations in that act specified.
Supervisors of internal revenue are authorized to be appointed
It was in the discharge of this duty to see that the laws were faithfully executed, and to aid in the detection and punishment of frauds, that the defendant gave the direction complained of.
We are of the opinion that this offiсer, equally with the district attorney and customs collector, is entitled to the protection given by the act of 1799.
The complaint alleges that the seizurе of the goods was illegal, and wrongful and malicious, and it is now contended that, a certificate of probable cause affords no protection where the seizure is malicious.
This is an error. The question of malice or of good faith is not an element in the case. It is not a question of motive. If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offence has beеn committed, it is sufficient. Whether the officer seized the occasion to do an act which would injure another, or whether he moved reluctantly, is quite immatеrial.
Mr. Justice Washington says, in
Munn
v. Dupont,
Chief Justice Shaw defines it in similar language : “ Such a state of facts as would leаd a man of ordinary caution to believe, or to entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that the person is guilty.”
Ulmer
v. Leland,
In
Forhay
v.
Ferguson
(2 Den. (N. Y.) 617), the rule is laid down by Bronson, C. J., in the same languаge, with this addition : “ And such cause will afford a defence to a malicious prosecution, however innocent the plaintiff may be.” In that case, there was evidence to justify a finding that the prosecu
In the case before us, the certificate was of “ probable cause of seizure.”
The authorities we have cited speak of “ probable ” cause. The statute of 1799, however, uses the words “reasonable cause of seizure.” No argument is made that there is a substantial difference in the meaning of these expressions, and we think there is none. If there was a probable cause of seizure, there was a reasonable cause. If there was a reasonаble cause of seizure, there was a probable cause. In many of these reported cases the two expressions are used as meaning the same thing:
Talbot
v.
Seeman,
Judgment affirmed.