40 N.W.2d 362 | Minn. | 1949
Two questions are presented for decision, viz.:
(1) Whether a municipality owning and operating an on- and off-sale exclusive liquor store pursuant to statutory authorization (M.S.A.
(2) Whether the owner and operator of an on- and off-sale exclusive liquor store is liable to a patron for harm self-inflicted as a consequence of having become so highly intoxicated that he did not know what he was doing from drinking intoxicating liquor furnished him in violation of statute (§
Four separate causes of action were alleged in the complaint. The third and fourth causes of action were dismissed at the hearing on the demurrer. The trial court overruled the demurrer as to the first and second causes of action. On the appeal, the order overruling the demurrer is challenged only so far as it relates to the first cause of action. *554
The allegations of the first cause of action, so far as here material, are that defendant owned and operated a municipal liquor store; that by its servants and employes it furnished intoxicating liquor to plaintiff in such store when he was "obviously" intoxicated and that he became so highly intoxicated he did not know what he was doing; that while he was in such highly intoxicated condition he was arrested by police officers of defendant and lodged in its jail; and that, while in jail, as a consequence of his intoxicated condition, he broke certain plumbing fixtures and came in contact with them in their broken condition in such a way as to sustain severe bodily injuries. We take judicial notice of the facts that defendant is a city of the fourth class and, as such, is a municipality other than a city of the first, second, or third class and entitled under §
Plaintiff predicates his right to recover upon two grounds: (1) That, by reason of the fact that defendant violated §
In support of the first claimed ground of recovery, plaintiff contends that under §
Defendant contends: (1) As to the first ground of liability asserted, that it was not required, as the owner and operator of a municipal on- and off-sale exclusive liquor store, to file the liquor dealer's bond prescribed by §
The arguments below upon the hearing of the demurrer and the presentation here have proceeded upon the assumption that, if a municipality as the owner and operator of an on- and off-sale exclusive liquor store is required to file a liquor dealer's bond under §
1. Whether, as the consequence of violating the conditions of the liquor dealer's bond required by §
In answering that question we should endeavor to discover and to effectuate the legislative intent (§
The statute to be construed (§
Defendant contends that all the sections, other than the one last mentioned, betoken a legislative intention that no such bond shall be required in a case like this. Plaintiff contends that, whatever arguments may be made from such statutory provisions, the provisions of §
At the outset, we think it clear that unless a municipality is required to obtain a license to own and operate an on- and off-sale exclusive liquor store it is not required to file a bond. Section
The licensing of liquor establishments and the public ownership thereof are so radically different as to compel the conclusion that the provisions of law relative to licensing have no application to *559
publicly owned establishments, and that consequently the provision of §
The licensing system contemplates private ownership of liquor establishments with governmental regulation to eliminate and suppress the evils incident to the business. Under the licensing system, which has been the traditional mode of regulation, the entire business of manufacturing and selling intoxicating liquor is illegal except as to licensees. Licenses are granted by governmental authority to permit a business, which without the license would be illegal, to be legally operated. Anderson v. City of St. Paul,
Publicly owned liquor dispensaries, including municipal liquor stores, are established pursuant to statutory authorization. The statutory authorization operates as a grant of whatever permission is required to establish such stores. A license, in the very nature of things, would add nothing to such authorization, and the granting of one would be a useless act. Publicly owned liquor establishments are governmental agencies established in the exercise of the police power to accomplish governmental purposes.6 Murray v. Wilson *560
Distilling Co.
That public ownership and operation of liquor establishments such as a municipal liquor store differs essentially from regulation of the liquor traffic by the licensing system is confirmed by the avowed purposes and objects of such publicly owned and operated liquor stores. To begin with, it is said that publicly owned and operated liquor dispensaries (this applies to municipal liquor stores) are the *561
outgrowth of dissatisfaction with the licensing system. State ex rel. George v. Aiken,
Of course, we intimate no opinion as to the merits of the two systems of regulation mentioned, for the plain reason that it is no part of the judicial function to do so. It may be, as asserted upon the argument, that the validity of the reasons advanced for municipal liquor stores is challenged by the facts here, which showed that defendant not only illegally served intoxicating liquor in its store, but also that after plaintiff had become intoxicated as a consequence thereof he was lodged in defendant's jail by its police officers. Such matters are for legislative consideration and not for the court.
The provision of §
Such a view accords with the legislative and administrative interpretation of the statute. Section
Implicit in the subject matter of §
Furthermore, a requirement that a municipality must obtain a license to own and operate such a liquor store and to file a bond as such owner and operator would involve absurdities, which under the rules above stated ought to be avoided, such as the legal, if not the physical, impossibility of at one and the same time occupying a dual relation to itself in such bipartite relationships as licensor-licensee, grantor-grantee, and issuer-recipient, and in the tripartite surety relationship that of obligor and obligee. The licensor-licensee relation is a bipartite one having two parties, viz., the governmental licensor and the private licensee. The relation cannot exist without both. Anderson v. City of St. Paul,
Finally, it must be apparent that plaintiff's contention, that a municipality is a person required to give a bond as a liquor dealer, for the reason that §
The conclusion necessarily follows that defendant is not required by §
2. Lest there be misapprehension as to scope of our decision on the point whether an on-sale liquor dealer is liable for harm resulting as the consequence of illegal sale of intoxicating liquor to a person obviously intoxicated, we think that the complaint should be construed as alleging that, while plaintiff was intoxicated when defendant furnished intoxicating liquor to him, he knew what he was doing when he purchased and consumed the liquor. In construing §
"* * * A drunken man, equally with a sober man, is presumed to know and intend the acts which he does, and to remember the acts which he has done."
Here, the complaint distinguishes between the degrees of plaintiff's intoxication — it alleges that when defendant sold the liquor to him he was intoxicated and that after he had consumed it he became "highly" intoxicated. There is no allegation that at the time of sale he did not know what he was doing, and the presumption is that he did know. In Sworski v. Colman,
"* * * Courts may in proper instances apply old rules to newly created conditions, but they cannot create new rules for conditions already regulated."
Our conclusion is that the order should be reversed as to the first cause of action.
Reversed as to the first cause of action.
"It shall be unlawful for any person, * * * to furnish, * * * any spirituous, vinous, malt, or fermented liquors * * * to any intoxicated person, * * *."
"As to 'Off sale' and 'On sale' dealers:
"(a) That the licensee will obey the law relating to such licensed business;
"(b) That the licensee will pay to the municipality when due all taxes, license fees, penalties and other charges provided by law;
"(c) That in the event of any violation of the provisions of any law relating to the retail 'Off sale' and retail 'On sale' of intoxicating liquor, such bond or policy shall be forfeited to the municipality in which such license was issued;
"(d) That the licensee, will pay to the extent of the principal amount of such bond or policy, and damages for death or injury caused by or resulting from the violation of any provisions of law relating thereto, and in such cases recovery under this subdivision '(d)' may be had from the surety on this bond or policy. The amount specified in such bond or policy is declared to be a penalty, the amount recoverable to be measured by the actual damages; provided, however, that in no case shall such surety be liable for any amount in excess of the penal amount of the bond or policy.
"All such bonds or policies shall be for the benefit of the obligee and all persons suffering damages by reason of the breach of the conditions thereof. In the event of the forfeiture of any such bond or policy for violation of law, the district court of the county wherein such licensed business was carried on may forfeit the penal sum of said bond or policy, or any part thereof, to the state or municipality named as obligee in such bond or policy." As amended by L. 1945, c. 313, § 1.
