23 S.C. 297 | S.C. | 1885
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The contest in this case is in reference to a certain lot of land with a church edifice thereon, located in the city of Charleston. It is admitted that the land originally belonged to the plaintiff, and the present contest has grown out of the following facts and circumstances.
The plaintiff is, and has been for years, a body politic and corporate, under the laws of this State. In May, 1847, it conveyed the land in dispute, by indenture of lease, to John Caldwell and others, the survivor or survivors of them, and their assigns for a term of ninety-nine years, with the privilege of a renewal of the
In pursuance of this agreement application was made to the legislature, and by act of 1847, the free white persons who were then, or who might thereafter become, members of the Glebe Street Presbyterian Church of the city of Charleston, were duly incorporated under the name and style aforesaid, for the term of fourteen years, and thereupon the grantees aforesaid, to wit, Caldwell and others, in consideration of the agreement contained in the indenture aforesaid, did, on December —-, 1847, convey and assign the said indenture of lease, and their rights thereunder to the said Glebe Street Presbyterian Church. After-wards, to wit, in 1856, the plaintiffs, who still held the fee in said premises, for and in consideration of $2,400 paid by the said Glebe Street Presbyterian Church to the plaintiffs, by deed, setting forth the indenture, and the assignment thereof, bargained, sold, and released the said premises unto the said Glebe Street Church and their assigns forever, warranting and defending the-same against all persons whatsoever.
In 1858, the Zion Presbyterian Church of Charleston, defendant, was constituted a body politic and corporate for a period of
In 1866, the Glebe Street Church, its first charter having expired in 1859, at which time it had been renewed for a period of fourteen years, conveyed by deed, dated May 10, 1866, the said premises to the said Zion Presbyterian Church, reciting therein that the congregation heretofore worshipping in the said Glebe Street Church had united with the congregation of white persons worshipping in the Zion Presbyterian Church, and that the two had agreed to form one congregation, and that all church property standing in the name of the Glebe Street Church should belong to the-Zion Church, the said Zion Presbyterian Church having assumed the payment and discharge of the liens upon said land. The Zion Presbyterian Church took possession, under this deed, and continued in possession from its date until the — day of-, when it contracted to sell the same to certain trustees of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, known as the Mount Zion African Methodist Episcopal Church, and to execute a conveyance thereof on the payment of the purchase money, in pursuance of which contract the said trustees were duly, let into possession.
Under these circumstances the action below was commenced. First, for the recovery of the premises, but in the event that such recovery could not be had, then that the defendant be enjoined from executing a conveyance of said premises to the said African Methodist Episcopal Church, or to any one else, contrary to the alleged conditions upon which the defendants held the property. This action was founded upon -the following propositions contended for by the plaintiffs: 1. That the lease by plaintiff Caldwell and others, and the subsequent conveyance by the plaintiff to the Glebe Street Church, should be construed together, and that when thus construed, the conditions in the lease should
The case was heard by his honor, Judge Kershaw, without a jury, upon testimony taken before the master, and reported to the court. His honor held, first, that inasmuch as the action in one of its phases involved title to land, an issue was raised thereby which could be tried by a jury only, unless a jury trial had been waived; and there being no waiver, he could not hear that portion of the case. He, however, discussed the questiens involving the title and then proceeded to the consideration of the right of plaintiff to the equitable relief demanded, to wdt, a restraining order intended to confine the defendants to the use of the property, according to the trusts and conditions contained in the original lease to Caldwell and others.
On the question of the right of reversion to the plaintiff, he held that the Glebe Street Church, to whom the plaintiff had conveyed, being a corporation other than a moneyed or trading corporation, that reversion would take place to the plaintiff on the dissolution of the said Glebe Street Church by expiration of its charter, unless before that time a valid alienation of the land had been made by said Glebe Street Church corporation, holding it to be a general principle of law, that upon the expiration of the charters of all corporations, causing their dissolution, other than moneyed, trading, or municipal corporations, the property thereof reverts to the grantor, unless before the dissolu
He held, further, that a valid alienation of the property in question had been made by the Glebe Street Church during its corporate existence to the defendant, the Zion Presbyterian Church, to wit, by deed in 1866; and therefore notwithstanding the subsequent dissolution of the Glebe Street Church corporation by expiration of its charter in 1873, no reversion could be claimed, alienation having been made before that event. He held, further, that there had been no such dissolution of the Zion Presbyterian Church by expiration of its charter as to entitle the plaintiff' to a reversion on that ground. And holding, further, that the original lease to Caldwell and others, which had been assigned to the Glebe Street Church, had become merged in the fee simple, which said church afterwards obtained from the plaintiff, thereby vacating and annulling the conditions of said lease, he dismissed the complaint with costs.
Both parties have appealed, the plaintiff assigning error to all of the rulings above, except the second, and the defendant contesting the second, claiming that the ancient right of reverter in this State “is obsolete and odious,” or, if existing at all, it exists only as to corporations purely public and eleemosynary.
We concur with the Circuit Judge in all of his rulings, and he has so fully and ably discussed the principles upon which these rulings were based, sustaining them, as he does, by the authorities cited in the decree, that we might content ourselves with simply referring to and adopting the decree as our own, which we would do, except for the fact it would be best, perhaps, that at least the distinct points made and decided should appear in this opinion.
The action below was intended to accomplish one of two purposes, to wit, first, the recovery of the land in dispute, and, second, failing in the first, a restraining order as demanded in the complaint. The first was a case at law, involving an issue of title to real estate, and nothing more. This was a jury case, and the Circuit Judge was certainly right in holding that, in the absence of waiver, he could not try it, and he distinctly states that there was no waiver. DeWalt v. Kinard, 19 S. C., 291.
The judge, however, held that the plaintiffs could not avail themselves of this doctrine in this case, because the Glebe Street Church, before the expiration of its charter, had conveyed to the defendant. It is not denied that if this be true, it would defeat the reversion, but it is denied that a valid deed had been executed by the Glebe Street Church to the defendant. So that the only point in this question is, was there a valid deed executed by the Glebe Street Church in 1866 to the defendant? There is no doubt that a paper purporting to be a deed between these parties and conveying this land was executed and delivered at the time stated, the date of the execution being years before the expiration of the charter of the Glebe Street Church. The deed was drawn by a distinguished attorney of Charleston, who also witnessed it. It was recorded, was regular in form and execution in every respect, except that instead of having an established corporation seal impressed, the seal used consisted of a wafer attached. The judge held that this seal was sufficient, if so intended, citing Relph & Co. v. Gist, 4 McCord, 267; Angell & Ames Corp., § 218 ; Decker v. Freeman, 3 Greenl., 338. Whether it was so intended was a question of fact which the judge, upon the evidence, solved in favor of the deed. We think the testimony sustains his conclusion.
Next. The plaintiff contends that defendant’s charter having expired since its purchase of the land, with no alienation before said expiration, that reverter has taken place on that account, and therefore their action should have been sustained. The Circuit Judge overruled this position, and we think, upon the facts,
Lastly. Did the Circuit Judge err in holding that the conditions of the lease did not attach to the subsequent deed conveying the land in fee to the Glebe Street Church ? We think not. That deed was absolute on its face and in its terms. No such conditions as those appearing in the lease were incorporated in the deed. It was executed upon a further and valuable money consideration, the sum of $2,400, which was paid. It conveyed the fee, and we can see no reason why, under the doctrine of merger, the lease was not “drowned” in the higher estate the moment the Glebe Street Church received the deed and took possession thereunder. It was said in Mangum v. Piester (16 S. C., 330), sustained by Blackstone and Kent, that where two estates meet in the same person, without any intermediate estate, the less is merged in the greater. Here these facts occurred, and merger must have been the result.