OPINION
Plaintiff brought this action for damages under theories of breach of warranty, negligence and strict liability. Its claim for breach of warranty was barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed. The trial court later dismissed plaintiffs negligence and strict liability claims on defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals from the order granting summary judgment.
We affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment.
FACTS
Plaintiff’s insured, the Osborn Building in downtown St. Paul, Minnesota, purchased an automatic window washing unit manufactured by Steeple Jac, Inc. Some years later the window washing unit was damaged when it fell from the Osborn building. Plaintiff paid Osborn for its loss and then sought recovery from Steeple Jac, Inc., and Alpana Aluminum Products, Inc. Plaintiff alleged a defective gear box caused the window washing unit to fall and based its action on warranty, negligence and strict products liability theories.
During the initial stages of litigation, plaintiff’s warranty claim was dismissed because the statute of limitations had run. Steeple Jac, Inc., was dismissed as a defendant for reasons not material here.
Defendant Alpana Aluminum then brought a motion for summary judgment, claiming that recovery for plaintiff’s damages is not available under negligence or strict products liability theories. Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment.
ISSUE
May plaintiff recover under strict liability and negligence theories for damages to a product caused by a defect in the product itself when the defect causes no personal injury or damage to other property?
ANALYSIS
This case presents a difficult question for this court requiring interpretation of
Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp.,
economic losses that arise out of commercial transactions, except those involving personal injury or damage to other property, are not recoverable under the tort theories of negligence or strict products liability.
Superwood,
The central dispute is whether allowing recovery under strict liability and negligence for damage only to a defective product itself will substantially undermine the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). In many cases a сause of action for breach of contract or warranty would lie but for the lapse of time. Since the statutes of limitations are uniformly longer for negligence and strict liability claims, plaintiffs instead attempt *109 recovery under these theories. Courts have reаched varying results, sometimes using complex and intricate rules.
Two distinct lines of cases have developed on this issue:
1
the majority follows
Seely;
the minority follows
Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc.,
The issue for those states following Seely then becomes distinguishing between “еconomic loss” that cannot be recovered under negligence and strict liability theories and physical damage which can be recovered.
In cases such as the present one where only the defective product is damaged, the majority aрproach is to identify whether a particular injury amounts to economic loss or physical damage. In drawing this distinction, the items for whiсh damages are sought, such as repair costs, are not determinative. Rather, the line between tort and contract must be drawn by аnalyzing interrelated factors such as the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in which the injury arose. These factors bear directly on whether the safety-insurance policy of tort law or the expectation-bargain protection policy of warranty law is most applicable to a particular claim.
Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
The majority of the jurisdictions that follow Seely exclude from the definition of economic loss damages arising from an unreasonably dangerous defect. 2 They characterize these damages as physical damage or physical injury. Damages caused by defeсts which are not unreasonably dangerous are defined as economic loss. Using this distinction, they allow recovery under negligence and strict liability theories for damage to the defective product itself when the damage was caused by an unreasonably dangerous defect.
At least one jurisdiction which has expressed approval of
Seely
uses a different method of defining economic loss. In
Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv.,
Defendant insists that the Court in Su-perwood adopted the same rule Texas adopted, even though Superwood does not cite the Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. decision. Plaintiff distinguishes Superwood because the defective window-washing unit created an unreasonable danger to persons or other property. Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court’s approval of Seely requires adoption of the majority’s definition of economic loss.
While we believe that the public policy considerations of imposing аn obligation on manufacturers to produce safe products regardless of whether the impact of the hazard is on people or property support plaintiff’s position, we cannot distinguish this *110 case from Superwood. Plaintiff Super-wood Corp. sued defendant for failure of a hоt plate press under several theories, including negligence and strict products liability theories. Plaintiff claimed damages for the damage to the press and for lost profits.
A cause of action for strict products liability necessarily entails an allegation thаt the product defect created an unreasonable danger.
Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.,
DECISION
We must conclude that the Supreme Court in Superwood intended to deny recovery for damage only to a defective product itself, even when the defect creates an unreasonable danger to persons or other property.
Affirmed.
Notes
. Delaware, in
Cline v. Prowler Industries of Maryland, Inc.,
.
See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,