*1 emotionally parents. able to take care of this child as ample
“There is healthy, happy child, evidence that the child is a addressed; whose being adequately interest, interest is and her best mind, my would by granting adoption; you be served can take an order to that effect.” 7, 1981, tunc,
The Court Order dated January
pro
nunc
10, 1980,
December
aban-
attempting
place
the judgment on
unsupported
donment
is
the evidence:
judgment
is
predicated entirely on abandonment. However the case was tried on
theory
the defendant had failed to communicate with and
child,
support
and on a
finding
what would be to the best
interest of the child. The judgment of the lower court must be
reason,
reversed for this
and for the further
reason that the mother
only
did not relinquish custody, abandon and sever all ties with
the child but
sign adoption
refused to
papers
signed only
power
attorney
limited
specific
for a
act of medical treatment. The
mother further on occasions asked that the child be returned but was
told that
yet
she had not
straigtened her life out. “A finding of
unfitness must
parent alone,...
center on the
Only under compelling
circumstances
found to exist
proof may
clear and
convincing
court
parent-child
sever the
custodial relationship...
ability
of a
parent
to raise his or her
compared
child
not be
superior
fitness of a
person.
third
That ability must be
examined
scrutinous,
Lewis,
abstract
light.” Carvalho v.
2. As to Code 74-405 In the instant case one of the § parents adopting only a first cousin of the statutory mother. The requirements permit the use of less scrutiny severing parent-child ties, as in section, cases under this code satisfied. For this additional reason I respectfully dissent and would reverse.
I am authorized to Judge state that Birdsong Judge Sognier join this dissent.
64403, 64404. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE
COMPANY v. al.; MITCHELL et and vice versa. Judge. Sognier,
St. Paul Fire (St. and Marine Insurance Company Paul), Dr. Ronald Kleber’s malpractice carrier, insurance filed the instant declaratory judgment action after Mary Sue Mitchell and her Kleber, husband filed suits against Dr. malpractice. After summary judgment on filed, partial St. Paul moved for answers were action not covered Mitchells’ suit was a tort ground Dr. policy.* The Mitchells and malpractice Dr. under Kleber’s summary on all issues. The trial court moved for Kleber Dr. to the Mitchells and Kleber partial summary judgment granted suit Kleber. requiring St. Paul to defend the *2 Paul coverage question. on St. The court denied all motions the appeal. cross appeals and the Mitchells 1. Paul contends that the trial court in Appellant St. erred summary judgment appellees because the insurance granting Dr. under the company duty had no to defend Kleber insurance The trial court’s in the insur- policy. ruling based on clause in policy provided, pertinent part: ance which “COVERAGE Company LIABILITY ... shall A-PROFESSIONAL the have the duty any in his right against to defend name and behalf suit the if alleging damages, groundless, Insured even such suit is false or .” fraudulent . .
The trial court followed the rule in enunciated Loftin U. S. (127 Co., (1962), quoted Fire Ins. 106 Ga. SE2d and cited McKemie, Great American approval 84,85 with Ins. Co. v. Ga. “ 39) (1979), duty as follows: ‘The true rule is that the by contract; defend is obligates determined and since the contract the insurer asserting liability policy; to defend claims under the even if groundless, allegations complaint are looked to to ’ ” determine policy whether covered is asserted. Thus, the issue in the instant case is not whether Kleber actually actually liable to Mitchells or whether he committed the alleged malpractice; acts to be the issue is whether a claim has been policy coverage asserted which falls within the and which St. Paul has duty to defend. inter alia: “. . . Defendant complaints alleged, The Mitchells’ by manipulation Mitchell’s emotions so aroused Mrs. she fell in love with him. Defen- phenomemon transference that brought by wrongfully manipulating about this result dant doctor-patient relationship point to the where feelings Plaintiff’s were longer feelings no transferred of love for Defendant as a beyond but direct of love for him as a person, phenomenon of . . . negligent transference Defendant was in his counseling treatment and of Plaintiff in that he failed to exercise the skill, degree possess of care and or to the degree knowledge *Appellant defending does not contest of the Mitchells’ action alleges Kleber which failure to his discover a brain tumor. regard
ordinarily possessed by psychiatrists exercised and was. knowledge psychiatry. state of Defendant existing phenomenon.” he negligent that mishandled the transference complaints alleged of the transference mishandling further that this relations with phenomenon having resulted doctor patient, Mrs. Mitchell. if recognize
We a claim is asserted which does not fall within coverage the contract then the insurer is relieved of his contractual Co., However, in our supra. defend. Great American Ins. falls opinion, allegations set forth above assert claim which the policy coverage. within question will on provides “pay legally all shall
behalf the Insured sums which the Insured become obligated pay performance damages arising out of the rendered, professional services have been rendered or should during policy period, by person the Insured or for whose . . .” Paul legally responsible acts omissions Insured is St. argues that Dr. Kleber’s acts category are outside purposes services for of coverage.
Courts other states have held that such conduct *3 alleged to have been committed Kleber considered malpractice by psychiatrist. Kambly, In Cotton v. 101 Mich. 537, 541 (1980), the alleges NW2d court stated: “Plaintiff that defendant engage induced her to sexual relations with him as prescribed her therapy. We see no for distinguishing reason others, between this type malpractice such as improper situation, administration or In drug operation. a defective each the essence of claim departure proper the is the doctor’s from practice. Therefore, standards of medical alleged while facts plaintiff might seduction, state also a cause of action for law common we do not find that seduction the gist was of her claim.” Wilkinson, also (Fla.) See Anclote Manor Foundation v. 263 S2d (1972), Zipkin Freeman, (Mo.,) (1968). 2d In SW Zipkin the “However, court said: it oversimplification is an focus to on the more spectacular of the and extreme acts doctor determinative of the issue. extremely Under the broad terms — us, policy before pay damages to ‘based agreed on’ — from, which would also mean by, or caused resulting due to professional services have rendered or should been rendered. The word is not ‘damages’ any particular damage limited kind of injury suit, applies specific claim or certain exceptions not here material. damages Defendant would limit very professional services, clearly act itself of but the covers liability results flowing from services rendered or which should have been rendered. gravamen petition
“The is that defendant did not treat Zipkin properly injured. [allegedly] Mrs. and as a result she was He phenomenon, mishandled the transference which is a reaction the psychiatrists anticipate properly. and which must be handled He [allegedly] long period [experts] mishandled it over a of time. As explained, relationship to take the outside the office into social relationships, develop ‘would allow the all sorts of unusual just ideas around the Thus, that she has about the doctor’...” ample authority holding we find that acts such as those complaints the Mitchells’ come within St. Paul’s contractual obligation arising per- to defend for matters out of Dr. Kleber’s formance of his duties. contrary Hartogs Employers St. Paul cites to the Mut. Ins. Co. distinguishable Wis., 391 N.Y. S2d 962 That case is Hartogs,
the facts in the instant case and will not be followed. In after judgment against the brought defending had secured a doctor, the doctor against seeking recovery suit his insurer of the cost of having suit, having denied refused to defend. Since a had been rendered adjudicated doctor, wrongdoer. Hartogs he had been In the court administering stated: “the doctor knew, ‘treatment’ at all times previous and has so stated in the motion, trial and on this that what doing way pursuant he relationship. doctor-patient inwas no purpose permit accomplish
The obvious was to him to satisfaction.” Id. at 964. “Therefore as between the plaintiff and his insurer those actions could not constitute malpractice and were never intended to be included within the protective coverage malpractice policy.” (Emphasis supplied.) of Id. at 965.
However, the New York Court also said: “The distinction to be injured party longer drawn between the and the insured is clear. No liability policy solely it the law in this state ‘that the existed for the protection recognize injured [Cit.] insured’ The courts that *4 person protected.” also is to Thus, court, Id. at 964. as between doctor, and the insured ruled the doctor so that he immorality. would not be indemnified for his But the court made a rights wrongdoer rights distinction between the doctor’s as a and the injured person protected. of the victim or the to be Of note Hartogs appeal pending, case is this statement: “While the was despite Hartogs, insurer, defendant its disclaimer to settled with the judgment.” and satisfied a reduced Id. at 963. deciding In the issue of defend, whether St. Paul should we are required alleged to find that the doctor’s immoral, activities were
219 illegal against public policy. stage At this Dr. litigation, adjudicated Kleber has been a wrongdoer and has denied all We wrongdoing. deciding only are that the allegations are sufficient to bring the suit within require the ambit of the contract Co., insurer Great supra, to defend. Loften U. S. Fire Ins. Co., supra. American Ins.
2. trial correctly summary court denied to all parties on coverage, reserving trial, this issue for as the issue depends on the questions resolution of i.e., fact. alleged, Whether the acts the mishandling of the phenomenon, transference amount to medical malpractice or intentional requires sexual assault testimony experts, is required on subject. medical Such medical testimony presented Freeman, in Zipkin v. and Anclote Manor Foundation, supra. Seymour Kan., See Lofgreen, 969, 495 P2d (1972) for a full discussion of the doctrine of transference psychiatry court, where the quoting Zipkin, supra, stated: “ ‘ perhaps “What regarded as the most significant concept psychoanalytical therapy, and one of the most important discoveries Freud, is the emotional reaction of the analyst toward the ” ”, known as the . . [Cit¡]’ transference on above,
Based it is clear stage at this proceeding neither the trial court determine, nor this court law, can as a matter of the acts of the doctor and the mishandling of the phenomenon transference constitute malpractice. That questions issue raises of fact requiring the aid of expert analyze an the occurrences in this case vis vis the owed his patient.
Judgment Quillian, J., affirmed. McMurray, J, C. Shulman, P. J., Banke, P. Birdsong, Carley JJ., Pope, Deen, J., P. concur. part. dissents in 13, Decided October
Rehearing denied November Hart, George W. Philip Henry, C. appellant. for Custer, Lawrence B. Jerry Hynes, Friedman, J. Hirsch appellees. part. dissenting
Deen, Presiding Judge, on, patient years, off and several was for Mitchell Mary Sue husband and her In she Kleber, psychiatrist. *5 in brief alleging the codefendant against action filed a counseling treatment and negligent his the latter had been that early diagnosis 1971 for Mary in that she became Sue at various times from disorder and that of a mental and treatment intimacy treatment, in sexual engaged they, under his then on these the truth of a child. Kleber denied in the birth of resulting who carried his appellant, but turned them over allegations insurance, attention. liability legal for complaint for filed the instant Paul Fire & Marine then
St. Kleber, and the Mitchells declaratory judgment, joining suit, if the facts the basis that the summary judgment for on moving under a tort action not covered complaint, stated in the were as Dr. Kleber pleadings on behalf of liability policy. its It filed defensive declaratory action rights agreement, a reservation of under on the summary its insured based partial judgment against moved for to the extent that the Mitchells’ obligation that it had no proposition part. sexual misconduct on his sought recovery actions for and these were summary judgment, sought Mitchells and Kleber also had a to defend holding appellant to the extent of granted actions, issues were involved. jury the Mitchell and that as to portions of the orders adverse appeal St. Paul and the Mitchells these interests. respective to their
I. Duty As to to Defend pay will “all policy question specifies legally obligated pay which the insured shall sums become services damages arising performance out of the during or which should have been rendered rendered right . shall have the period by company the insured .. and the his behalf suit duty to defend his name on false or groundless, even if such suit is alleging damages, insured supplied.) Professional services is defined (Emphasis fraudulent.” sickness, disease, death or destruction due to meaning “injury, any professional failure to render rendering service and shall dispensing drugs deemed to include the or medicine and service the insured as a member of a formal accredita- hospital or similar board or committee of a tion society.” motion on supported complaint, which count The seven proposition Mitchells, on is based affidavits physical Mrs. Mitchell’s represented psychiatrist he for maladjustments sexual resulted symptoms
proposed therapy through physical mental give wrongfully and stimulus. that he exchange information She manipulated doctor-patient relationship point where “to plaintiffs feelings feelings were no transferred of love for longer but direct love him as a defendant as a Moreover, person, beyond phenomenon of transference. de- *6 . plaintiff ability feelings of her her . . fendant robbed to control due to wrongfully negligently plaintiff Defendant and adviséd that intimate, her by way personal, condition she needed treatment of and him; a relationship beyond sexual contacts such went the accepted by psychiatrists.” standards of treatment
The complaint further that the act of intercourse alleges first her pregnant, rendered that she suffered a months miscarriage two later, passionately that when she told the defendant these he facts upbraided child, her for destroying his that for a sessions ceased period her, time “forgave” they of until he he a and that wished child period physical week, entered a relations of least that she at once eventually pregnant again became and bore him a child. At some period after this she diagnosed suffering inoperable as from an brain complaints tumor. The damages general punitive seek and for duty, humiliation, breach of recovery contractual shame and of sums paid psychiatric treatment, income, for loss of properly and failure to diagnose timely and refer specialist presence to a brain tumor.
It is obvious that
the claim
liability
must assert a
for an act
against which the insurer has a
to defend. Great
contractual
McKemie,
American Ins. Co. v.
“To professional establish negligence the evidence presented by degree must show a care violation required physician. and skill of a Code 84-924. Such standard of § circumstances, which, like under conditions and care similar Williams profession ordinarily generally.” the medical employed 457) (1979). Ricks, (1) (263 Ordinarily we 152 Ga. law the facts this say a matter of could and would as The issue that complaint up do not to such standard. do or measure here, where, must this case is as contended be decided relationship, accepted the doctor-patient into a defendant entered fees, offering treatment for represented himself as standard standard ones, as complaints physical well as psychological emotional and of such treatment will lead to assures that the end result such greater security marriage, her whether actions happiness foreign1 “professional represented services” as acts are so being by psychiatrist as to be or not to be covered under rendered performance terms of general policy the broad “professional are services. Under these circumstances services” those being paid and is represents such public policy Code are rendering, provided Criminal intentionally totally apart breached intentional misconduct treatment. law, Georgia construction recognize
We under *7 against the necessary, coverage and are construed exclusions 1 by authority psychiatrist There is a considerable that sexual acts to and with patient “professional may part larger “A be services” number of rendered: — — psychiatrists probably minority psychiatrists of all favor a but still a small wide adults, adultery... range experiences including intimacy of sexual selective — psychiatrist patient usually psychiatrist patient, of rarely a male with a female therapist a female male or a with a with a — justified ground patients same sex lack of suffer can be rationalized on from a warmth, caresses, touching ... love and need and closeness Various kinds 1960s, feeling therapies prominence in came and there were such into swimmingpools... ‘Laying group methods as marathons in aberrant treatment on of touching nude currículums; reintegrated nursing the medical hands’ has been into school and — worship readopted contact as church has been minority liturgy’ therapists ‘tactile relationships . . . The fact a small who had sexual patients their as a treatment with advocated this method of surfaced members, Psychiatric expelled 1969when the American Association one of its James McCartney, aging Jungian psychoanalyst although an himself a he had who called published psychoanalytic training, paper had no in The formal after he therapy... Journal of advocating survey A Sex Research intercourse as nationwide showed that patients percent psychologists more than 5 of male Ph.D. had had intercourse with percent percent of and more than 10 had ‘erotic contact.’ than 7 male had other More psychologists percent psychologists and more than had had 0.5 of female intercourse patients therapy, percent within three months after the termination of and 80 Robitscher, J.D., patient.” these intercourse one had had with more than Jonas M.D., 388, 421, 422, 423, Psychiatry, pp. The Powers of 425
223 Life Mutual indemnity sought. insurer and in favor providing (209 Bishop, Y. v. 223) (1974). Ins. Co. of N. App. 132 Ga. 816 SE2d responsibility been construing court’s contract has Davis, Ins. Guaranty Standard Co. v. succinctly 145 Ga. stated (243 537) (1978): “Courts, App. SE2d including appellate courts, just duty they are are have generous, bound be before construction, no more make right strained an insurance more extending coverage they beneficial contracted for than right (Emphasis have of coverage.” would to increase the amount IDS Greer v. Life supplied.) Likewise we rule observe the stated Co., 408) (1979) Ins. Ga. App. “In follows: construing policy, an insurance what test ‘[t]he mean, intended person its words to what in the but a reasonable ” position Here, of the insured would understand them to mean.’ insured unequivocally has testified that in his view of psychiatric practice intimacy form is not conduct. The insurer was not case of Great in the required to defend McKemie, American Ins. Co. v. supra, p. “It 85: is true that an insurer must groundless defend even a suit when true facts of the case Co., U. show no coverage. Loftin v. S. Fire Ins. examples See supra, ‘ Ga. at 291. “But a distinction must be drawn between groundless which, suits and actions if even successful not be would within the policy coverage.” A claim based on true facts not [Cit.] within coverage is not groundless meaning policy, within the simply but one for insurance is not afforded and which (though the insurer did not undertake to defend the insured ” liable).’ Had Kleber allegations admitted the truth of the as to sexual intimacy acts charged (adultery, possible fornication and prostitution), it my.opinion would be no defend would obtain. Great American insured “bodily” injury “property” damage but not “nuisance” or breach other contractual everyone facts, duties. There agreed stipulated as to the hence a question of law as to coverage. existed whether there was Here the *8 acts, therefore, the company doctor denies the is under a to defend to determine the truth the facts. of
II. to Coverage As Contract It is likewise contended a jury issue remains toas the ultimate of doctor, the defendant both as to its existence and as to the facts from which psychiatric it arises. In relationships transference anis process patient by unconscious on the the recipient therapist love of emotions he as the substitutes which dependence, among others, in social have arisen his psychological relationships his which are at the base of and mishandling the so-called transference That difficulties. psychiatrist strong phenomena result in between can only patient’s patient, both, with side or on whether on and dangers consequences, one of the treatment. deleterious may negligence indeed result from the Harmful results psychiatrist. may damages in a be recovered It is conceded they jurisdictions, proper in facts some injuries resulting case under similar liability coverage included Zipkin v. See which should not have been rendered.
services rendered
(1968); Seymour Lofgreen,
Freeman,
v.
Other hold adopt Georgia rule as should what the writer believes to be the better Hartogs Employers Liability Wis., Ins. Co. out Mutual set (SC 1977). by psychiatrist NYS2d 962 This an a involved action professional liability against his to his costs and insurer recover by patient. expenses defending brought a He was an action former engage in a course of sexual who convinced activity period through his him over of thirteen months representations necessary his it was for the treatment of Hartogs patient’s against condition. When the filed suit professional liability upon he called his carrier action to defend the coverage. his and his carrier disclaimed own The action was defended attorney judgment against The then entered him. doctor brought an his action insurer to recover costs expenses defending incurred the action. The doctor’s insurer contended that the did not “treatment” administered its insured malpractice policy. constitute medical and was not under the covered appellate agreed administering stating court “the doctor previous knew, ‘treatment’ at all times trial has so stated way pursuant doing motion, on this and the that what he was was in no doctor-patient relationship. permit purpose was to The obvious accomplish personal him his NYS2d 964. satisfaction.” 391 plaintiff [physician] “[t]he went state court on to knew that were for his actions satisfaction and did constitute practice. plaintiff Therefore, and his insurer between those actions could constitute and were never protective coverage the summary intended to be within the included malpractice policy.” grant is a “There further reason to [insurer]. There situations are several
225
policy
a
allow themselves
public
which Courts as matter of
refuse to
purposes.
to be used
immoral or unconscionable
to enforce illicit or
—
examples
they will
entertain suit to
To cite two
of the
debt;
a
which will effect
gambling
they
recovery
collect a
will disallow
Court,
policy,
it will not
public
a forfeiture. The
as
holds here
processes
afford
Court. To hold
plaintiff
this
resort
immorality
pay
expenses
otherwise
be to
indemnify
would
prurience.”
338 Cir. in “A F2d 673 stated rule this manner: contract indemnify resulting of insurance from his person damages a and against public policy own intentional misconduct is as void such provide coverage.” Courts will not construe a contract (Emphasis supplied.) public stability favors policy Georgia marriage and condemns immoral The criminal laws illegal and acts. of Georgia adultery person define “A as follows: married commits adultery voluntarily when he with persons has intercourse spouse punished than his upon conviction shall be for a misdemeanor.” Ga. Code Ann. 26-2009. “A will contract not be § construed the parties advantage so as to authorize one of to take of his Davis, Inc. own wrong.” Enterprises, National v. App. 488, 140 Ga. (231 490) (1976). 489 SE2d
Compare Porubiansky Emory University, App. 156 Ga. (275 House, 163) (1980) and Harris v. Barfield Music SE2d 18 Ga. (1) (89 592) (1916): SE keep penal “To a lewd house under State, any laws of this person knowingly who rents or sells property be used in such house will not assisted courts to recover such property contract, or the value thereof. The mores, contra bonos being support will not an action.” “Where a deed executed and delivered consideration of intercourse, future grantee illicit acquires possession and the under it, neither grantor nor can his heirs recover the As land... was said brief, the able counsel for the defendant in his error ‘it is a conveyance upon the set consideration of a vested remainder —life, consideration of concubinage for so much land for so much ” Watkins Nugen, 118 Ga. lust.’ 372, (45 374-375 SE psychological
Whether such treatment the standard of care up ordinarily measures to that employed by branch profession medical engaged in psychiatric problems treatment of afflicting here, such as that plaintiff reach, court should the acts and actions alleged performance herein are outside legitimate “professional pointed services.” It be further out that exceptions expert do exist from the rule general requiring testimony physician’s respecting surgeon’s patient. to his service patient’s on his to stitch a wound . a doctor undertakes “. . where move, patient’s needle into the cheek, and, thrusts his by an awkward ., 552) (1957). “... a 213 Ga. eye Phillips, Shea v. were to adjustment, an giving chiropractor, blow, surgeon if a take a hammer and shatter backbone a knife and were take performing appendectomy an to. *10 Knight, . .” Caldwell v. unintentionally patient’s slit the throat. examples The two above Ga. scope of yet while within unintentional acts of the doctor involve plain there was so attempted patient treatment. The action testimony expert malpractice palpable negligent as to constitute considering are necessary. In the instant case we was not deemed a consenting adults of intentional criminal adulterous acts of illegal of, within, scope of out but not personal arising nature action of the It that here the argued treatment. could be stepping away plain palpable, personal was so a treatment, medical scope legitimate professional from the of unnecessary. expert testimony regarding standards is Seymour supra, discusses Lofgreen, The facts the case of from, problems, swelling a among that the had suffered her doctor for failure leg cramps of the stomach and had and had sued mentally ill. The diagnose problem to the cause her in that she was expert testimony, but question latter could be addressed medical properly diagnose legitimate the failure there to a case with with, here, the adulterous actions equated treatment cannot be scope legal and acts out but within the arising conduct Generally professional psychiatric Georgia. acts within treatment if it is clear coverage duty if there is there exists a to defend. Likewise duty a there is no to given coverage from factual situation there is no groundless charges may defend however be.
I insurer to majority requiring concur with Division If the wrongdoing. defend inasmuch as the doctor has denied all liability. prevails prevail latter the insurer will also as to ultimate trial, my If then it is adjudicated wrongdoer jury the doctor is a personal represent there is no acts do not opinion coverage. treatment, misfeasance legitimate professional personal but are “bodily” separate as “nuisance” was from separate coverage, question This “property” coverage Great American. question jury. law for the court and not for the coverage is experts testify if majority saying effect that medical were patient’s headache cutting patient’s off a head would cure or a assault on the question respectfully I jury question. disagree. remains a must appellant err in had holding The trial court did not in denying appellant’s It did err defend its insured as outlined herein. paying any judgment partial summary judgment as motion for be rendered acts and actions discussed under the fact, by if, adjudicated wrongdoer its insured the insured jury. adjudication until a final stay
The motion to the main actions facts granted under the declaratory judgment this should have been of this case.
64462. GEORGIA COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION et al. et HORNE al. Judge.
Banke, This is appellees an action damages recover defamation based on appellant certain statements which Howard M. allegedly Williamson broadcast and allowed to be broadcast as an announcer for a by appellant radio station owned Georgia Com- Corporation. munications After the complaint served, had been appellees amended allege it to that Williamson had committed an *11 additional act of slander stating on his radio show that appellees were, and their counsel among things, in a engaged conspiracy to him. “get”
During deposition, course of his Williamson was asked to provide the persons names of given who had him information to concerning the existence alleged conspiracy and to reveal the source of certain other information which he claimed to have received in connection with one of his repeatedly broadcasts. He declined to questions answer these ground on the promised he had not to divulge identity of his sources. appellees moved answer, obtained an order him compelling but he continued to refuse. The appellees “application followed with an for contempt,” hearing, and after a the trial only court not him in contempt found but also struck his pleadings defensive judgment against entered him question on the of liability. appeal, On Williamson contends that “journalistic he had a privilege” under the state and federal con- stitutions to refuse to divulge identity of his news sources and that, event, in any the trial court was authority without to dismiss his defensive pleadings and enter him judgment against response to a motion which contained no request for such relief. Held:
1. The statements which charged Williamson was with making encouraging and with others to make on his radio quite show were clearly unrelated any legitimate journalistic form of endeavor.