100 So. 904 | Ala. | 1924
Lead Opinion
The suit is on an automobile insurance policy. The actionable loss is claimed under the collision clause of the policy.
In substance, the policy insured "against direct loss or damage" "by being in accidental collision during the period insured with any other automobile, vehicle, or object." It excluded injury received while engaged in a race or speed contest, or while operated by one under sixteen years of age.
The evidence for plaintiff tended to show that the car, a Winton Six, was standing in front of plaintiff's office on the crest of a hill; the rear wheels were on level ground, *594 and the fore wheels on sloping ground. The car was headed down hill. It had stood thus, with brakes on, overnight. In the morning, while Mr. Clark, the custodian and operator, was sweeping it out, the car started, ran down the hill some 90 feet, and off a precipice some 25 or 30 feet in height, landing head on upon the rock bottom of an excavation. Was the loss thus sustained covered by the contract of insurance? Before the days of automobile insurance, injuries from "collision" had a place in admiralty law.
In London Assurance v. Companhia De Moagens Do Barreiro,
"If while anchored in the harbor a vessel is run into by another vessel, it would certainly be said that the two vessels had been in collision."
"Collision imports the act of colliding, a striking together, violent contact; but, as used in the admiralty, includes vessels coming in collision with any moving or stationary object, as piles, drawbridge, etc., as well as another vessel. Newtown Creek Towing Co v. AEtna Ins. Co.,
This court has recently considered collision clauses in automobile insurance policies in two cases.
In Interstate Casualty Co. v. Stewart,
The court further cited and quoted with approval the case of Harris v. American Casualty Co.,
The meaning of "collision" and "object," as used in such policies, has been the subject of inquiry in the authorities reviewed in these notes.
In Wettengel v. United States "Lloyds,"
"The collision must have been with another automobile, vehicle, or somewhat similar object, ejusdem generis."
In Bell v. American Ins. Co.,
"It has been held that the rule [ejusdem generis] does not apply where the specific words embrace all objects of their class so that the general words must bear a different meaning from the specific words or be meaningless."
It may be regarded as now fully settled that a collision may occur with any kind of object.
"Being in collision with an object" is of so general import that any effort to classify the object with which a car may collide is futile, and apart from the thought of such provision. Huddy on Automobiles (6th Ed.) 1038; Rouse v. St. Paul F. M. Ins. Co.,
The authorities are not so uniform in their definitions of "collision" as applied to varying facts. It is generally conceded that the collision clause in such policies, like all insurance contracts, should be construed most strongly against the insurer; this upon the sound basis of reason that the form of contract is made by him and tendered to the public. He may insert therein, as is often done in this kind of policy, such exceptions as he may desire to limit the effect of general words to a narrower meaning than given by lexicographers.
In Universal Service Co. v. American Ins. Co.,
"Most collisions occur in the violent impact of two bodies on the same plane or level, and it is undoubtedly true that the word is more frequently used to express such impacts than other violent impacts. But we doubt that this fact has given to the word such a common understanding of its meaning as to exclude violent impacts unless upon the same plane or level. If one machine was going up and another going down a steep hill, and they came violently together, no one would hesitate for a moment in using the word 'collision.' At what angle must the impact occur to make the use of the word 'collision' inappropriate and relieve the *595 insurance company from liability? We are persuaded that the better rule, the safe rule, is to treat and consider the word as having the meaning given it uniformly by the lexicographers; that where there is a striking together, a violent contact or meeting of two bodies, there is a collision between them, and that the angle from which the impact occurs is unimportant."
In Wetherill v. Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co.,
In Rouse v. St. Paul F. M. Ins. Co.,
A different conclusion has been reached in other cases. In some cases the special wording of the collision clause has influenced the decision. Several cases are reviewed in Interstate Casualty Co. v. Stewart, supra.
In the late case of New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Young, 290 Fed. 155, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) reviewed the decision in the same cause by District Court of Montana, 284 Fed. 492. The car was being driven at about 30 miles per hour on the road, when an axle broke. The broken axle and frame of the car dropped to the ground and ploughed into the roadway, causing the car to pivot and be overturned. The court held that the noun "object," as used in the collision clause, includes something different from the specific words "automobile" and "vehicle," "that the doctrine of ejusdem generis cannot properly be applied." "But we are unable to construe the word 'collision' as including damage caused by the striking of the car upon the roadway after the defective axle broke and let the car down." "The proximate cause was the breaking of the defective axle, and damage was not by 'being in accidental collision' with an object."
It will be noted the decision is based on the fact that the injury did not result directly from collision. This principle, while not mentioned, really entered into other cases, as where the car was overturned, or where the wheel was smashed from strain. Where the only collision was contact by upsetting the car, and the injury primarily attributable thereto, it is generally held not the direct result of collision; but, where a collision causes the upset, the injury is attributed to the collision as the efficient cause.
In our recent case, Continental Casualty Co. v. Paul,
"The car was stopped upon an incline — a sufficient incline to cause the plaintiff to place rocks behind the rear wheels. If the brakes failed to hold, and the car of its own momentum, without the application of exterior force, and simply in obedience to the law of gravity, rolled down the embankment to the bottom of this cut, we are clear to the view that the damages thus sustained would not be the result of a collision with 'any moving or stationary object.' * * *
"If the car came in contact or collided with any object, whether moving or stationary, there is nothing in the proof to so indicate. The principle of res ipsa loquitur can add nothing to the plaintiff's cause. All the damage sustained to the car may be readily explained by its fall down this rugged embankment, a distance of 50 or 60 feet, and certainly its fall may as well be explained by the failure of the brakes to hold as by contact with some exterior force."
Appellant earnestly insists that the case at bar is controlled by the above decision.
The collision clause in an automobile policy is manifestly intended to insure against peril peculiar to the character of the machine and its use.
A collision implies an impact, the sudden contact of a moving body with an obstruction in its line of motion. Both bodies may be in motion, or one in motion and the other stationary. Clearly it matters not whether the car or the other object is in motion. The clause here involved covers all accidental collisions, save those arising from certain extra hazardous uses. In the nature of things, no effort is made to enumerate the accidental collisions covered thereby. No particular kind of accident is in the contemplation of the parties. The peril insured against is the unforeseen accident; otherwise, there is no accident in the true sense. Neither is there any limitation as to cause of the accidental collision. The force leading thereto may be applied by human agency, or it may be a natural force, to which all our actions and dealings are related. A car, standing on a grade, is usually held in place by the friction of the wheels on the ground. This friction is maintained by brakes. If the brake does not hold, the car starts and proceeds down grade with accelerated velocity until arrested by collision or otherwise. The sole force in operation is the force of gravity, an ever present agency, and a continuing peril to a car.
An automobile started by an external force, or by force of gravity on failure of the brakes to hold, and running uncontrolled against any object in its path, is in collision with such object. We think this court has *596
had no intention to hold otherwise. To do so would withdraw from this collision clause a large class of perils clearly within its terms. What was said in Continental Casualty Co. v. Paul,
We agree with the authorities holding that the direction in which the car is headed is of no consequence; that striking an embankment, bowlder or ledge is no more a collision than striking the bottom of an excavation into which the car plunges.
So far as the case of Continental Casualty Co. v. Paul, supra, is in conflict herewith, it is overruled.
The foregoing expresses the views of the writer, in which Justices THOMAS and MILLER concur.
The majority of the court, composed of ANDERSON, C. J., SAYRE, SOMERVILLE, and GARDNER, JJ., hold that the case in principle is governed by the case of Continental Casualty Co. v. Paul, supra; that the case is distinguishable from Interstate Casualty Co. v. Stewart, supra; and it follows the evidence shows no accidental collision with an object within the meaning of the contract.
It results that the court below was in error, and the cause is reversed and remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
ANDERSON, C. J., and SAYRE, SOMERVILLE, and GARDNER, JJ., concur.
THOMAS, MILLER, and BOULDIN, JJ., dissent.
SAYRE, SOMERVILLE, and GARDNER, JJ., dissent.
Dissenting Opinion
The case of Continental Casualty Co. v. Paul,
The Paul Case, supra, finds support in the cases therein cited as well as some of the cases cited in the majority opinion in the instant case. There are cases to the contrary, which were not overlooked in the consideration of the Paul Case, but the view was entertained that the authorities to the contrary were unsound and should not be followed.
I respectfully submit that the holding of the Missouri court that the mere surface of the earth is an "object" within the meaning of these policies is contrary to common sense, sound logic, and the common acceptation of the meaning of the language. A freak decision is rendered none the less so by reason of the fact that it comes from a respectable authority. Good common sense in such cases is the safer guide.
If the car running merely into the middle of a stream is in collision with an "object," as seems to have been held by the New Jersey court, then by the same logic, had the car swerved into the Atlantic Ocean, the ocean would then constitute an "object" within the meaning of the policy and within the contemplation of the contracting parties. If the surface of the earth at the bottom of a cut is an "object," then the surface of the roadbed must also be an object, and, if a car by a sharp turn is upset on the road, by like reasoning, it has collided with an "object." A train leaves the track, and rolls down the embankment: we have not heretofore spoken of such a wreck as a collision, yet the illustration applies to this case. But further discussion will serve no useful purpose. Following the holding in the instant case to its last analysis, it is difficult to conceive of an injury to a car of any character not covered and fully protected by the language used ("collision with an object moving or stationary"), unless it be damage by fire or internal combustion. I am, of course, fully mindful that the rule requires the language of a policy be construed most strongly against the insurer, but, clearly, an observance of this rule does not require a construction so strained and out of harmony with the meaning of the words used as commonly accepted and understood. The rule of reason is yet to obtain.
The Paul Case was decided in April, 1923, and by it the insured and insurer were given to understand that such an accident as therein shown was not covered by the policy: a year passes and the court holds to the contrary. The doctrine of stare decisis is seemingly ignored and placed in the discard, yet our reported decisions are replete with statements and quotations to the effect that —
" 'Certainty * * * is the mother of repose, and therefore the law aims at certainty! * * * 'It is better that the law should be certain * * * than that every judge should *597
speculate upon improvement in it.' * * * It is often more important that a rule of law should be fixed, * * * than * * * subject to the uncertainty of fluctuating * * * decisions." Morton v. N. O. Selma,
I am persuaded the decision in the instant case is fundamentally unsound, and therefore respectfully dissent.
On Appellant's Application for Rehearing.
Our attention is called to certain rulings presented for review not covered by the opinion.
Pleas were interposed setting up alleged negligence of plaintiff's agent in leaving the automobile in such exposed position as to lead to the accidental collision complained of. The court below sustained demurrers to these pleas.
Objection was also made to the proof of loss. The record shows proof in writing, but the objection is that it is defective in failing to conform to the requirements of the policy.
The full court has considered these several rulings, and finds no reversible error therein.
Application overruled.
