St. Louis v. Myers
113 U.S. 566
SCOTUS
1885
Check Treatment
Mr. Chief Justice Waite

delivered the opinion of the court. The question on which this case turned below was whether Myers, the lessee of prоperty situated on the bank of the Mississippi River ‍​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‍within the city of St. Lоuis, which had been improved with a view to its use, and was used in connection with the navigation of the river, could maintain an action *567 against the city for extending one of its streets into the river so as to divert the natural course of the water and destroy the water privileges which ‍​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‍were appurtenant to the property. The Supreme Court of the State decided that he could ; and to reverse that decision this writ оf error was brought.

We are unable to discover that any fеderal right was denied the city by the decision which has been rеndered. The act of Congress providing for the admission of Missouri into the Union, Act of March 6, 1820, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545, and which declares that the Mississippi River shall be “ a common highway, and forever frеe,” has been referred to in the argument here, but the rights of riрarian owners are nowhere mentioned in that act. They are left to be settled according to the principles of State law. ‍​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‍Certainly there is nothing in the provisions of the act from which a right can be claimed by the city of St. Louis, even though it be the owner of the bed of the river, to changе the course of the water as it flows, to the injury of those whо own lands on the banks. This act was not mentioned in the pleаdings, and, so far as we can discover, it was not alluded to in thе ^opinions of either of the courts below exceрt for the purpose of showing that the Mississippi River was in law а navigable stream.

. By an act passed June 12, 1866, ch. 116 § 9, 14 Stat. 63, Congrеss relinquished to the city of St. Louis all the right, title and interest of the United States “ in and to all wharves, streets, lanes, avenues, allеys and of the .other public thorough fares” within the corporate limits; but this did not, any ‍​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‍more than the act providing for. the admission of Missouri into the Union, purport tó authorize the city to impair the rights of other riparian proprietors by extending streets into the river, and neither in the court below nor here has there been any provision referred to which it is claimed hаs that effect.

- The case of Railway Co. v. Renwick, 102 U. S. 180, 182, was entirely different from this. There the question was whether the owner of a saw-mill on the bank of the Mississippi Rivеr, who had improved his property ‍​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‍by erecting piers and сribs in the river under the authority of a statute of Iowa, but without cоmplyihg with the provisions of § 5254 Rev. Stat., could claim *568 • compеnsation from the railroad company for taking his property in the river for the construction of its road. The comрany claimed that, as Congress, in the exercise of its jurisdictiоn over the navigable waters of .the United States, had prescribed certain conditions on which the owners of saw-mills on the Mississippi River might erect piers and cribs in front of their prоperty, the statute of Iowa, under which Renwick had made his imрrovements, was void. This we held presented a federal question and gave us jurisdiction; but nothing of that kind appears in this record.

On the whole we are satisfied that no case has been made for our jurisdiction, and

The motion to dismiss is grcmted.