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St. Louis—San Francisco Railway Co. v. Gitchoff
369 N.E.2d 52
Ill.
1977
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*1 on the that in such other cases the heart ground attack trauma, was exertion or preceded by limited, emotional never have involvement. We to those workmen who recovery exceedingly lift or who work under heavy intense heat. The things rule to all workmen alike. applies workman’s If structure existing physical gives way labor, stress his usual his death is an accident which arises out his employment.” (Emphasis Ill. 2d added.) (33

See also Wirth v. Industrial 475; Com. 57 Ill. 2d Guardian Electric Co. v. Industrial Com. Manufacturing 53 Ill. cannot,

We decisions, consistent with set aside prior award in favor Commission of Rosalie Rogers. Worse future cases will be determined to the yet, according will, course, decisions we have This alluded to. aggravate done this injustice today. petitioner MR. GOLDENHERSH in this joins dissent. JUSTICE

(No. 48947 . COMPANY, ST. RAILWAY LOUIS — SAN FRANCISCO al., Petitioner, GITCHOFF, et Judge, JOHN Respondents. 5, 1977.

Opinion October filed *2 DOOLEY, J., specially concurring.

Gundlach, Lee, Roessler, & of Belle Eggmann, Boyle Morris, ville Gerald D. Gundlach and (Norman J. for counsel), petitioner. Pierce, Pratt, Bradford, Ltd., T. Pierce & Jr.,

John Alton, of East for Stites. respondent MORAN delivered MR. opinion JUSTICE court: wherein an

This is petitioner, original proceeding Louis-San Francisco Railway St. Company (Railroad), court of mandamus from this seeks writ reversing denial of the Railroad’s motion trial court’s quash summons, Winfred Lane service and return. Respondent Stites, court there in the trial plaintiff proceeding, the Federal Employers’ Liability recovery sought et which U.S.C. sec. 51 injuries Act seq.) (45 alleged action, in that the defendant occurred Missouri. As Railroad, the Civil Practice Act under section (Ill. filed a Rev. ch. limited Stat. par. 20), motion. After above hearing, Judge appearance court of Madison denied Gitchoff of the circuit County motion. the Railroad’s neither asserts impropriety party

Although the issues of this mandamus to resolve action in original this court to note we deem it appropriate *3 at a the mandamus herein time when leave to file granted Baltimore & Ohio it the case of there was before pending raised which Ill. Co. v. Mosele R.R. There, that a issues in a context. we observed similar like that cases substantial number of against corresponding court of were in the circuit Madison railroad pending circumstances, in the interest of Under these County. to the we have elected to merits judicial economy, proceed of this petition.

The is a Railroad corporation organized foreign its in the State of Missouri. It has laws of headquarters Louis, to do business State of St. is not licensed and Missouri, in nine states: Illinois. The Railroad operates Tennessee, Ala- Kansas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Mississippi, bama, northern terminus is Florida. Its Texas and Louis, Missouri. It has no in St. Lindenwood Yards Illinois, no “run therefore in and railroad operates trackage this State. The trains in shipment through” is a or out of Illinois handled Railroad’s into by freight Association as the Terminal Railroad known corporation or transfer a facility which operates switching (TRRA), Louis, Missouri, St. Clair and Madison and between St. a sales in The office counties in Illinois. Railroad maintains seven The which staffed office is by employees. Chicago, sales offices across there, as in the Railroad’s 54 solicitors States, receive no United are continental salary, paid commissions, and collect no money shippers. of the Mr. assistant superintendent Harvey, John terminal, is for coordi- St. Louis

Railroad’s responsible within Illinois and movement expediting nating to it other cars and those cars by company’s consigned has, connection, this Mr. for railroads. In Harvey approxi- the last 10 between 60% 80% mately years, spent in An office was for his hours Illinois. provided working Illinois, TRRA at his use in the Lovejoy, Brooklyn shops in St. Clair which office was with County, equipped direct line to the While Railroad’s headquarters. telephone office, in this Mr. was served Harvey process. service substantial impor-

Expedited competitive fixed-rate tance to the Railroad view of industry’s 1972, the revenues for structure. In Railroad’s just traffic which in Madison terminated County, originated Illinois, $1,867,619. The for 1973 was totaled figure $2,982,188; 1974, $2,830,545. that venue does not lie in Madison

The Railroad urges in the State of business contacts County, Illinois are insufficient to it to subject personal with the the Illinois courts. briefly question Dealing venue, Rev. section 6 of Civil Practice Act Stat. (Ill. ch. part: par. 6) provides pertinent *4 corporations partnerships

“Venue —Residence of venue, the definitions purposes following defined. For of apply: Any

(1) private corporation or railroad or bridge company, organized State, of any under the laws this foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this State is a any county resident of in which it has its registered office or other office or is doing business. A foreign corporation not authorized transact business in this State ais nonresident of this State.” Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosele (See 67 Ill. The statute, of the venue section 5 pertinent part Civil Practice 1975, Act Rev. Stat. ch. (Ill. par. reads: 5), Generally. Except provided as otherwise in “Venue— Act, this every action must be commenced in the (a) county of any residence of joined defendant who is in

good faith and probable with cause for the purpose of obtaining a judgment against him and solely not for the purpose fixing venue in county, or in the (b) county in which the transaction or part some thereof occurred out of which the cause action arose.

If all defendants are State, nonresidents of the may action be commenced in any county.” It is clear above Railroad, that the provisions not authorized to do in foreign corporation business this State, is a and, such, nonresident as is not to the subject venue restrictions residents of this imposed State upon the first sentence of Instead, section above. under the second sentence of section venue in any county We do not dwell on the issue of proper. venue in view of the clear provisions venue statutory nonresi- applicable dents and in view of the Railroad’s assertion at oral was the real argument issue this only case.

Section 13.3 of the Civil Practice Act Rev. Stat. (Ill. ch. par. 13.3) provides: private

“Service on corporations. private A corpora- may tion be (1) by served leaving copy of the process registered with agent any or officer or agent said State; corporation anywhere found any (2)

43 by other manner or permitted now hereaft’er A law. private corporation may by publication also be notified and mail in like manner like and with effect as indivi- duals.”

This section has been construed to that a judicially require be business” in the State to the corporation “doing justify conclusion that the was corporation sufficiently “present” that it so could be served in the same manner as other resident of what due corporations. Conceptions process the attainment of in requires personam jurisdiction over have altered over foreign corporations dramatically the last 100 These have been reviewed years. developments this court 378, in Nelson v. Miller by 11 Ill. 2d (1957), 383-84, and most v. Heitner again, recently, Shaffer 186, 433 683, U.S. 53 L. Ed. (1977), 97 S. Ct. 2d 2569.

In International Shoe Co. v. Washington 326 (1945), 310, 95, U.S. 90 L. 154, Ed. 66 S. Ct. it was that in held for an in-State cause personam of action lies jurisdiction the with forum State when mere the solicitation by foreign is so continuous as to constitute a course of corporation There, business within that it State. was established due is satisfied where in is personam process asserted over a which has with the foreign corporation contacts, forum State certain “such that minimum maintenance the suit does not offend ‘traditional *** notions of fair and substantial play justice’ such] [and reasonable, as it make in the context of our federal system to defend government, require corporation suit which is there. An ‘estimate particular brought inconveniences’ result which would the corporation from a trial or ‘home’ away place principal business in this relevant connection.” (International 310, 316-17, Shoe Co. U.S. 90 Washington (1945), 95, 102, L. Ed. 66 S. Ct. “It is evident criteria which we line mark between boundary

those activities which justify subjection corpora- suit, not, tion to which do cannot be and those simply International Shoe Co. v. mechanical quantitative.” 310, 319, 95, 103, L. U.S. Ed. Washington 66 S. Ct. 159. Shoe, “the to International relationship According *** forum, defendant, and the litigation

among concern of the into became the central inquiry personal 433 U.S. v. Heitner jurisdiction.” Shaffer 683, 698, Ct. 97 S. Ed. 53 L. *6 it is with Federal due process, compliance Assuming it the to what extent will State to determine open Also, that, it is now clear doors to corporations. foreign Shoe, due International Federal under the criteria of a is not State’s assertion offended by jurisdic- process action in a cause of tion over corporation arising foreign activities, that business from out-of-State providing in-State done foreign corporation sufficiently Perkins Consolidated Co. substantial. Mining Benguet 485, 490, 437, 440-41, L. U.S. 96 Ed. 342 (1952), 413, 416, S. Ct. 72 are the Railroad’s two The cornerstones of position wherein cases mere Shoe and pre-International pre-Perkins to establish in insufficient solicitation was held be case, Green v. One Chicago, Burling personam jurisdiction. 533-34, 51 L. Co. U.S. ton & Quincy Ry. 595, 596, in Interna 916, 917, mentioned Ed. S. Ct. overruled, awas tional Shoe but not expressly personal in in Colorado and was action which arose brought injury The second district court of Pennsylvania. Federal Co. Ill. case, Ry. Booz v. Texas & Pacific in Louisiana but cause of action which arose bore upon Booz whether sole issue in was in Illinois. The was brought of the defendant service deprived employee upon the State and of law under defendant of its due process cases, Booz, other Green and Federal constitutions. citing are not that of business concluded “mere solicitors agents, Ill. and of the statute” within (250 meaning 381), the service of summons. quashed are here The Illinois activities Railroad’s represented Mr. as mere solicitation. The Railroad discount attempts “fallout” from the activities in Illinois as mere Harvey’s Stites, on the real business of the Railroad. Respondent hand, other the Railroad’s Illinois activities asserts solicitation that the constitute a continuous course of and falls rule enunciated consequently, directly therefore in International Shoe. Stites Respondent urges this court to reconsider the “mere solicitation” rule Booz the cases it. following of these lines of

We believe neither authority covers the situation this case. adequately presented International Shoe is because only generally applicable that case arose from in-State cause action and related to the in-State activities—not the corporation’s foreign situation here. The Booz Green cases arose from out-of-State causes of action are here but inapplicable because mere solicitation was’ foreign corporation’s within forum State. only activity that, The facts here reveal accordance with Perkins *7 Consolidated v. Co. U.S. Benguet Mining 342 440-41, 447, 485, 490, 493, 413, 416, 96 L. Ed. S. Ct. 72 the Railroad’s activities within Illinois beyond go mere solicitation and constitute sufficient substantial one business. Mr. assistant Harvey, superintendent terminals, the has the of his Railroad’s spent majority the in Illinois on the time 10 years working during past with, He Railroad’s exclusive behalf. is not officed nor is of, he his activities a the sales force. member Railroad’s by From a contact with the direct separate facility having the Railroad’s he coordinates and headquarters, expedites movement of the cars into out of this State. Railroad’s He, fact, is for that of the responsible aspect operation

46 business, the of the the

which is nature Railroad’s very of, to, source and essential its substantial Illinois revenue. note, too, We that the “estimate of inconvenience” the addressed in International Shoe has no on bearing are instant case. The Railroad’s corporate headquarters miles the State’s site of service. forum only away this suit could have been under 45 Additionally, brought U.S.C. section the Federal District Court for Illinois, Southern District of which court is located in the same in which the action is now county pending. the

In context of our jurisdic- evolving concepts the Court has observed: tional requirements, Supreme “ raditional notions of fair and substan- play ‘[T] tial as offended can be by justice’ readily that are no of ancient forms longer perpetuation of new as justified procedures adoption that are inconsistent with the values of our basic Heitner constitutional heritage.” Shaffer 186, 212, 53 L. Ed. U.S. S. Ct. that, We the facts of this conclude was, Railroad was business” Illinois and within “doing therefore, We further personam subject jurisdiction. that service of conclude Harvey, process upon John Railroad, with assistant complied superintendent section 13.3 of Civil Practice Act. it is that we of our

Because unnecessary findings, TRRA’s consider Stites’ concerning respondent arguments with Railroad. relationship agency reasons, issuance For foregoing of mandamus is denied. writ requested denied.

Writ DOOLEY, MR. concurring: specially JUSTICE where mandamus I believe do not proper service of it was not subject process defendant contends *8 it not business” in the since was within “doing jurisdiction is trial rule issue the State. Should the court adversely, It is a trial on the vital for review after merits. properly and a motion for review by preserved special appearance summons, service return. Such was the quash here. case 1975, 110,

The Civil Practice Act Rev. Stat. ch. (Ill. 20(3)) provides: par. ruling objection

“Error in on the is against defendant by proceed- waived in further taking part defendant’s ground ings objection unless the is on the process defendant in not amenable to issued (Emphasis court of this supplied.) State.” Keats v. See Cates 100 Ill. 183-84. 2d (1968), App. As I have out in dissent in Baltimore & pointed my Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosele 67 Ill. 2d 335-37: (1977), is

“Mandamus not to order the sought only act, but to act in a respondent particular way. Whether the was erroneous ruling judge and, so, extent, if to what are matters which we are called to decide. it is a But well- upon error, established rule that or mere however ‘[f] manifest, gross or writ remedy appeal error, writ of mandamus will not lie for its if the correction court has matter and the ex rel. subject People parties.’ Barrett 248, 259-60; v. 353 Ill. (1933), Shurtleff Atchison, ex People rel. & Santa Fe Topeka Ry. Co. v. Clark Ill. 2d

Mandamus should not issue where object is to circumvent the normal appellate process. ex rel. Sears v. Romiti (People 50 Ill. 2d 55; ex rel. Castle People Spivey (1957), Ill. Mandamus not lie does where the result is to ex fragment (People appeal. Atchison, rel. & Santa Fe Co. v. Clark Topeka Ry. *9 523; 515, ex Ill. 2d rel. Clark v.

(1958), People 12 458, McRoberts 100 Ill. The (1881), proper for errors in the trial is an remedy proceedings not a writ of for mandamus. appeal, petition Atchison, ex rel. & Santa Fe People Topeka Ry. 515, v.Co. Clark Ill. 12 520. (1958), is a motion of Highly analogous change venue. the be motion may Although improperly . denied, will lie to such an mandamus not review ex order. Clark v. McRoberts In rel. People court, Ill. this in 100 (1881), denying file to a for leave petition application original denial of a mandamus from a for writ of change venue, of noted: authorities, of the and an examination

‘After are of the of the we briefs opinion parties, *** If was writ will lie. the writ that the not in this the court case allowed compelling order, see no we enter mere interlocutory for and it not be asked reason why might the while suit was case every granted the court to enter compelling progressing, words, it orders. In other would be particular the the case in fragments up bring below, of and have court every ruling the court upon during progress passed cases case, in that before way bring there no final where was court judgment ” below.’ court determination of So section 6 the Federal Liability also Employers’ an action Act U.S.C. sec. 56 providing (45 (1970)), shall in which defendant be district may brought of the commencement business” at time be “doing courts the action that the the State with that of United shall be concurrent States See Miles v. courts, this the FELA. action under controls Illinois Central R.R. Co. 315 U.S. 86 L. Ed. 827; S. Baltimore Ct. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner 44, 50, 28, 31-32, 314 U.S. L. Ed. S. Ct. IWhile concur in the result in this a com- here with the parison majority opinion majority & in Baltimore Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosele will make manifest inconsistencies between two. many

(No. 49023. STILLO, re In E. Attorney, Respondent. JOSEPH Opinion October filed

Case Details

Case Name: St. Louis—San Francisco Railway Co. v. Gitchoff
Court Name: Illinois Supreme Court
Date Published: Oct 5, 1977
Citation: 369 N.E.2d 52
Docket Number: 48947
Court Abbreviation: Ill.
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