116 Mo. App. 447 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1906
(after stating the facts). —
Indeed, it is generally true upon the principle that inasmuch as the act of incorporation is to' them an enabling act giving to the corporation all of the poAvers of Avhich it is possessed thus conferring its ability to contract and that the constitution or charter is the source through which such powers flow from the fountain head and Avithin which is supposed to> lie the proper limitations on the exercise of such powers, that therefore, when the mode and manner of contracting is prescribed in the charter, the power thus conferred must be exercised in the mode and manner pointed out in the charter and as a necessary result therefrom, such provisions which are material and of the essence of the corporate existence, are not subjects of waiver by the company or its officers. The doctrine is especially applicable in requiring corporations to remain within their charter limits in contracting and contracts entered into outside of its charter provisions are frequently declared ultra vvres in a proper case. [Head v. Prov. Ins. Co., 6 U. S. 127; Presby. Mut. Assurance Fund v. Allen, 106 Ind. 593; Matthews v. Skinker, 62 Mo. 329; Leonard v. Amer. Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 299; Couch v. City Fire Ins. Co., 38 Conn. 181; Plahto v. Mer. & Mfg. Ins. Co., 38 Mo. 248; Ruggles v. Collier, 43 Mo. 353-376; Holland (Guardian) v. Taylor et al., 111 Ind. 121; Sup. Council, etc., v. Smith, 45 N. J. 466; 17 Atl. 770; Blair v. Perpetual Ins. Co., 10 Mo. 565; Bank of Louisville v. Young, 37 Mo. 406; Dairy Co. v. Mooney, 41 Mo. App. 671; Hosack v. College of Physicians, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 547; Beatty v. Marine Ins. Co., 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 109; Fridley v. Bowen, 87 Ill. 151; Niblack on Benefit Societies (2 Ed.), sec. 215; 7 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 695.]
In accordance with this doctrine, it was held by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Couch v. City Fire
The result of the adjudications on the subject is thus aptly stated in the text (7 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, (2 Ed.) 714 to be: “Not every provision in a charter or act of incorporation is to be regarded as mandatory. Some are merely directory. Whether they are the one or the other, must depend upon the nature and object of each provision and apparent legislative intention. Provisions merely directory to the officers of.the corporation do not affect the powers of the corporation.” From the considerations above mentioned and from the further consideration that those provisions of the charter which are merely directory to- the officers of the association for their guidance in the safe and convenient con
That it is competent for mutual benefit societies to waive a strict compliance with their by-laws, is well settled. [Grand Lodge v. O’Malley, 114 Mo. App. 191, 89 S. W. 68; Grand Lodge v. Reneau, 75 Mo. App. 402; Allison v. Stevenson, 51 N. Y. App. Div. 626; Kimball v. Lester, 43 N. Y. App. Div. 27; Kepler v. Sup. Lodge, 52 Hun. (N. Y.) 274; Courtney v. St. Louis Police Relief Assn., 101 Mo. App. 261, 73 S. W. 878; 3 Amer. & Eng.
With these principles before us, it becomes our duty to examine the several constitutional provisions involved with a view of ascertaining whether those pertinent here he mandatory or merely directory. Section 1 of article 2 provides that the rights, powers and responsibilities of the association shall he vested in, enjoyed, exercised and borne by an executive committee. It is palpable from those provisions that the executive committee was not expected to exercise the powers in detail personally, for section 3 of article 5 above quoted places the principal portion of the active business of the association upon the Secretary, constitutes him the keeper of the records and seal and makes him the agent thereof for the purpose of consummating the details of the insurance contracts and otherwise conducting the business of the institution, and as such agent, he is required to report quarterly to the executive committee. Section 5 of article 1 provides that Avhen the applicant has been admitted to membership, he shall call at the office of the Secretary between the hours of 9 and 11 a. m. on the third day thereafter and designate on the death benefit record the disposition of his death benefit. And it is provided in section 3 of article 5 that the secretary shall be at his office from 9 to 11 a. m. on such .third day to alloAV such designation to be made and that the same shall be attested by him under his hand and seal. The provisions requiring the applicant and the secretary to he at the office on the third day were certainly incorporated as directory regulations for the purpose of enabling the assured to know on Avhat day he can, if he desires, have his designation attended to and for the convenience of both himself and the association. Prior to the admission to membership, there was an application to he made and a medical examination to he had, after which the act of admission, and therefore three days time no doubt was pro
First. That the provisions of the constitution pertaining to the designation of the beneficiary are merely directory in their nature, inserted for the convenience of the parties, more particularly designed for the protection of the association, the object being that it might-have in its records authentic written evidence as to who are designated as beneficiaries to whom benefits shall be paid. It is a formality which neither goes to the substance of the contract of membership nor affects the express object of the association, and therefore it could be waived by the association.
Second. That the act of designation contemplated in the constitution is a positive, affirmative and express act on the part of the assured, amounting to the express naming and pointing out of the beneficiary by him and that his failure to exercise the act in the manner and afc the time designated, did not operate as an act of designation of the heirs at law so as to give them vested rights in the fund which could only be divested in the manner provided for changing the beneficiary.' Authorities supra.
The law is well settled that in making the designation as well as in changing the beneficiary in contracts of this kind, the insured is bound to do it in the manner pointed out by the policy and the laws of the association unless a strict compliance therewith is waived by the association. [1 Bacon on Benefit Societies, (3 Ed.) secs. 238-239-307; Grand Lodge etc. v. O’Malley, 114 Mo. App. 191, 89 S.W. 68; Supreme Conclave, etc., v. Capella, 41 Fed. 1; McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 104 Calif. 171; Holland v. Taylor, 111 Ind. 121; Presby. Mut. Assurance Fund v. Allen, 106 Ind. 593; Masonic Ben. Assn. v. Bunch, 109 Mo. 560, 19 S. W. 25; Head v. Sup. Council etc., 64 Mo. App. 212; Coleman v. Sup. Lodge etc., 18 Mo. App. 189; Fink v. Fink, 64 N. E. (N. Y.) 506; Wendt v. Iowa Legion of Honor, 72 Iowa 682; Sup. Council v. Smith, 17 Atl. (N. J.) 770; Natl. Assn. v. Kirgin, 28 Mo. App. 80; Keener v. Grand Lodge, 38 Mo. App. 543; Hall v. Northwestern Endow. Assn., 47 Minn. 85; Eastmen v. Prov. etc. Assn., 62 N. H. 555; Ireland v. Ireland, 42 Hun. (N. Y.) 212; Hollins v. McHatton, 27 Pac. (Colo.) 254; Sup. Lodge v. McNair, 60 Mich. 44; Daniels v. Pratt et al., 143 Mass. 216; Hennenberg v. Dist. No. 1, etc., 94 N. Y. 580; Mellows v. Mellows, 61 N. H. 136; Vallman’s appeal—Lang’s estate, 92 Pa. St. 50; Masonic Mut. Assn. v. Jones, 154 Pa. St. 107; Thomas v. Thomas, 131 N. Y. 205; McCarthy v. Sup. Lodge N. E. Order, 153 Mass. 314; 26 N. E. 866; Olmstead v. Mut. etc. Assn., 37 Kas. 93.]
The equitable doctrine announced in the cases last above cited is clearly evidenced by the rule to be found in the text (3 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 961-
For the reasons given, the judgment is affirmed.