St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co. v. Montana Min. Co.

104 F. 664 | 9th Cir. | 1900

Lead Opinion

MORROW, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above). The assignments of error raise but one (Question which need- now be passed upon, all others having been adjudicated, upon the writ of error of the defendant in error herein, in the case of Montana Min. Co. v. St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co. (C. C. A.) 102 Fed. 430. The question for present consideration is: When a secondary or accidental vein crosses a common side line between two mining locations at an angle, and the apex of the vein is of such width that it is for a given distance partly within one claim and partly within the other, to whom does such portion of the vein belong? This question does not appear to have ever been directly passed upon by the courts. But, while it is not entirely free from difficulty, the application of well-established principles of law thereto should conclusively determine the question. Two important elements enter into the consideration of mining rights: First, the surface boundaries, defining the rights acquired by reason of a vein or veins apexing within such boundaries; and, second, the extent of underlying mineral deposits attaching to such surface rights.

The defendant in error contends that it is entitled to the vein in its entirety in depth to the easterly of a vertical plane drawn through the line, E, C, upon the theory that the said line is an eud line so far as the Drum Lummon vein is concerned, or, if it be determined that the line, E, C, is a side line, that it is entitled to the entire vein in depth to the southerly of the 108-foot plane.

As to the first contention, it is a well-settled proposition that a mining claim can have but two end lines, and that, end lines having been once established, they become the end lines for all veins found within the surface boundaries. Iron Silver Min. Co. v. Elgin Min. & Smelt. Co., 118 U. S. 196, 207, 6 Sup. Ct. 1177, 30 L. Ed. 98; Walrath v. Champion Min. Co., 171 U. S. 293, 307, 18 Sup. Ct. 909, 43 L. Ed. 170. This court has already determined that the line, E, G, D, is a side line common to the two claims (102 Fed. 430), and therefore it cannot be considered an end line for the Drum Lummon vein.

The second contention of the defendant in error involves the construction of section 2322 of the Revised Statutes. That section provides:

“The locator of a mining location * * * shall have the exclusive right to possess r,ns! enjoy * * * all veins, lodes, and ledges throughout their entire depth, the top or apex of which lies inside of such surface lines extended downward vertically.”

The defendant in error maintains that the words “top or apex” cannot be construed to mean “cop or apex or any part thereof,” and that, .under the strict construction necessary, extralateral rights would not follow when the whole of the apex was not within the surface lines. If this be the correct view of the language of the statute, manifestly neither party herein would be entitled to pursue the vein in depth between the 108-foot plane and the 133-foot plane, since the apex of the vein between those points, while crossing the side lino, is not wholly within either claim. For the purposes of illustration, suppose the vein were regular and vertical for the 25’ feet between the two planes mentioned, crossing the side line at the same angle. The boundary rights between the parties could not then be determined by the application of a vertical plane extending to the center of the earth along the side line, and 25 feet in horizontal width, since that would be constructing an end line to that extent, and there is no authority in the statute or in the decisions for any such action. It might be said that the vein could equitably be cut by a plane parallel with and midway between the 108 and 133-foot planes, thus bisecting the portion of the vein in controversy, and giving half of the disputed ground to each claim. But neither is there any authority for such a determination by the court. It would seem, therefore, that by some rule the entire 25 feet should be construed to apex in one of the locations. And as, where the rights of two mining locators are apparently equal with respect to mining ground, the element of priority of location is controlling, preference being generally given to the senior locator (Argentine Min. Co. v. Terrible Min. Co., 122 U. S. 478, 484, 7 Sup. Ct. 1356, 30 L. Ed. 1140), the entire vein would be given to plaintiff in error. If this be the true doctrine when a vein is vertical, why should there be any change in its application when the vein dips? The right of lateral pursuit is a right conferred by statute. It does not depend upon circumstances, and is as absolute as the ownership of a vein apexing within the surface lines, save that it ceases when and at the point that it interferes with the statutory rights of another. In other words, the determination of a rule, and its application to the case before the court, should be the same whether the vein dips towards the junior location or towards the senior location, or does not dip at all. The defendant in error, in support of its contention that the right of extralateral pursuit only remains so long as the entire vein is within the claim, cites the case of Fitzgerald v. Clark, 17 Mont. 100, 42 Pac. 273, 30 L. R. A. 803, the decision in which was affirmed by the supreme court of the United States. 171 U. S. 92, 18 Sup. Ct. 941, 43 L. Ed. 87. But the question here involved was not there considered. It appears that in that case no attention was given to the width of the vein, its crossing of the side line being regarded merely as a point, hio mention whatever was made of the width of the vein or of its apex. Reference is also made by the defendant in error to adjudications upon the class of veins called “split veins.” But the case under review does not involve a split vein, and a different principle must apply. If, then, in construction of law the vein for the 25 feet in controversy must be either upon the one location or the other, and if the senior locator has priority of title, it would follow that the right of lateral pursuit would remain with the senior locator within a plane parallel to the end line of the senior claim,- and up to the point of departure of the apex, or in this case the footwall. It may be said that the application of this rule will sometimes work hardship. It is true that hypothetical cases may be assumed, which, as individual types, may present difficulties in equitable adjudication. But the application of principles sanctioned by judicial authority furnishes the most effective solution of such problems, and will undoubtedly reduce the seeming inequities to a minimum.

Upon the question first propounded in this opinion, therefore, the only deduction which can be made from the foregoing views is 1hat inasmuch as neither statute nor authority permits a division of the crossing portion of the vein, and the weight of authority favors the senior locator, the entire vein must be considered as apexing upon the senior location until it has wholly passed beyond its side line. It follows that the court below erred in its refusal to admit the evidence offered as to the value of ores taken from the Drum Lummon vein on its dip between the planes designated as the 108-foot and 133-foot planes, and the cause is therefore remanded for a new trial as to damages alleged and recovery sought for conversion of ore between the planes indicated.

---

Dissenting Opinion

ROSS, Circuit Judge.

I dissent. The case of Montana Min. Co. v. St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co. (C. C. A.) 102 Fed. 430, referred to in the foregoing opinion, affirmed the existence of extralateral rights in respect to a vein that enters and departs from a side line only of a mining claim, and the judgment in the present case affirms such right on the authority of the decision in tire former case. Yet in neither is the point at all discussed by the court, and in the opinion in the former case there is not a word said from which it can be seen ihat any such point was presented for decision. 102 Fed. 430. The importance of the question, not only to the correct determination of ihe present case, but in respect to other mining claims, is too manifest to require comment. In the former case a petition for rehearing is now pending, and 1 think it should he granted, and that case, together with the present one, set down for réargument, to the end that the question as to whether any extralateral rights exist in respect to any vein that enters and departs from a side line, only, be discussed by counsel, and fully considered by the court, before final determination.