St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railroad v. Southern Express Co.
108 U.S. 24
SCOTUS
1883
Check Treatment
Me. Chief Justice Waite

delivered-the opinion of the court. After stating the facts in the language above cited, he continued : ’

As Ave have had occasion to say at the present term, in Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3, and Grant v. Phœnix Insurance Company, 106 U. S. 429, a decree is final, for the purposes- of an appeal to this, court, Avhen it terminates the litigation betAveen the parties on the merits of the case, and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been *29 determined. Under this rule we think the present decree is final. The suit was brought to compel the railway company to do the express' company’s business. . The controversy was about the right of the express company to require this to be done on the payment of lawful charges. It was no part of the object of the suit to have it definitely settled "what these charges should be for all time. " The point was to establish the liability of the railway company to carry. The decree requires the carriage, and fixes the compensation to be paid. It adjudges costs against the railway company, and awards execution. - Nothing more remains to be done by the court to dispose of the case. Inasmuch as the rales properly chargeable for transportation vary according to circumstances, and what was reasonable when the decree was rendered may not always continue to be so, leave is given the parties to apply for a modification of Avhat has been ordered in that particular if they, or • either of them, shall desire to do so. In effect the decree requires the railway company to carry for reasonable rates, and fixes for the time being the maximum of' Avhat will be reasonable.

The controversy Avhich the express company has'had referred to the master, about the compensation to be paid for the transportation during the pendency of' the suit, does not enter into, the merits of the case. All such matters relate to the administration of the cause, and the accounts to be settled under the present order are of the same general character as those of a receiver who holds property awaiting the final disposition of a suit. They are incidents of the main- litigation, but-not neces-' sarily a part of it. The supplemental order¿ made after the decree," relates only to the settlement of the accounts which ac-' crued pending the suit.

The motion to dismiss’is denied.