69 Ark. 369 | Ark. | 1901
(after stating the facts).
Even in the absence of any. custom or positive invitation to remain, the passengers were invited by the very surroundings to remain on the Searcy coach, if they so desired, until the arrival of the Iron Mountain train which they expected to take. It was cold and dark on the outside, the fires were not kept up in the station house of the Iron Mountain. The Searcy coach had a fire, and was comfortable. It expected to await the arrival of the Iron Mountain train. Only about fifteen or twenty minutes intervened. There was no rule of the company forbidding its passengers to remain while awaiting the arrival of the Iron Mountain train. In the absence of such-rule, and with no other waiting room provided for its passengers by the Searcy road, we know of no rule of law that would force them from the only comfortable waiting place provided. The instructions of the court on all these points was therefore more favorable to the Searcy road than it had the right to expect. The verdict acquitting Battle of contributory negligence was amply sustained by the proof.
Was the Searcy road liable? It was its plain duty to exercise ordinary care to. have-its platform and the. incline or-approach thereto sufficiently lighted to enable its passengers and those intending to become its passengers to enter upon and depart from its trains with reasonable safety. Fordyce v. Merrill, 49 Ark. 277; Thompson, Carr. Passengers, 108.
The light slioiild be maintained a reasonable time before'and after the arrival and ’departure of trains. A finding of negligence for failing to keep the platform lighted for fifteen or twenty minutes, under the circumstances of this case, cannot be considered unreasonable. The Searcy & West Point Railroad failed to discharge the duty which it owed to the appellee in this regard, and is therefore liable. We find no' error in the charge of the court of which it can complain, and the judgment as to it is affirmed.
The facts of this ease in our opinion make the Iron Mountain a joint tort feasor with the Searcy road; and the principle of law applicable is correctly and concisely stated in 16 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 471, as follows: “Where a breach of duty is committed by more than one person, each contributing to the injury as a joint tort-feasor, the plaintiff, has his election to make either or all of them defendants. And it is not always essential, in order to make them liable as joint tort-feasors, that they should have acted in concert; acting independently and causing together a single injury, they are liable jointly and severally.”
The judgment should be affirmed against both appellants.