194 F. 363 | 5th Cir. | 1912
(after stating the facts as above).
“Children, wherever they go, must be expected to .act upon childish instincts and imj mises; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution towards them must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them, and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty to be taken.”
The admission of the testimony objected to by the defendant was not prejudicial error. The moderate amount of the verdict rebuts any presumption of prejudice on the part of the jury.
Finally, it is objected that the court erred! in permitting the witness Keel to testify that the pile of lumber was dangerous to children playing on it. We perceive no error in admitting the testimony. The question was one of fact, about which any one of ordinary intelligence might have testified. Besides, the evidence was merely cumulative, since the witness Wells had testified without objection to the same fact.
We find no reversible error in the record, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.